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Abstract
Every experiment or observational study is made in a context. This
context is being explicitly considered in this book. To do so, a conceptual
variable is defined as any variable which can be defined by (a group of)
researchers in a given setting. Such variables are classified. Sufficiency
and ancillarity are defined conditionally on the context. The condition-
ality principle, the sufficiency principle and the likelihood principle are
generalized, and a tentative rule for when one should not condition on
an ancillary is motivated by examples. The theory is illustrated by the
case where a nuisance parameter is a part of the context, and for this
case, model reduction is motivated. Model reduction is discussed in gen-
eral from the point of view that there exists a mathematical group acting
upon the parameter space. It is shown that a natural extension of this
discussion also gives a conceptual basis from which essential parts of the
formalism of quantum mechanics can be derived. This implies an epis-
temological basis for quantum theory, a kind of basis that has also been
advocated by part of the quantum foundation community in recent years.
Born’s celebrated formula is shown to follow from a focused version of the
likelihood principle together with some reasonable assumptions on ratio-
nality connected to experimental evidence. Some statistical consequences
of Born’s formula are sketched. The questions around Bell’s inequality
are approached by using the conditionality principle for each observer.
The objective aspects of the world are identified with the ideal inference
results upon which all observers agree (epistemological objectivity).
1 Introduction.
The aim of science is to gain knowledge about the external world; this is what we
mean by an epistemic process. In its most primitive form, the process of achiev-
ing knowledge can be described by what Brody (1993) called an epistemic cycle:
”Act, and see what happens”. Experiments in laboratories and observational
studies done by scientists are usually much more sophisticated than this; they of-
ten require several epidemic cycles and also higher order epistemic cycles acting
upon the first order cycles. An experiment or an observational study is always fo-
cused on some concrete system, it involves concrete experimental/observational
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questions and it is always done in a context, which might depend on conceptual
formulations; in addition the context may be partly historical and partly chosen
by the scientist himself, or depending upon the scientist.
In earlier years, experiments were often done by single scientists; now it is
more and more common that people are working in teams. Also, results of ex-
periments should be communicated to many people. This calls for a conceptual
basis which is common to a whole culture of scientists. One problem, however,
is that people from different scientific cultures have difficult with communicat-
ing. They might not have a common language. The first purpose of this book is
to develop a scientific language for achieving knowledge which is a synthesis of
the languages that I have met in the three cultures that have been exposed to
myself: 1) Mathematical statistics; 2) Quantum mechanics; 3) Applied statis-
tics including simple applications and also to some extent chemometrics. It is a
hope that this investigation may lead to a deeper understanding of the epistemic
process itself, and thus perhaps imply an enrichment of these different cultures.
It is also a hope that such an investigation may be continued in order to include
more scientific cultures, say, official statistics, machine learning and quantum
computation.
Since statistics is used as a tool in very many experimental studies, also
within physics, it is natural to take this culture as a point of departure. But I
will add some elements which are not very common in the statistical literature:
1. I make explicit that every experimental investigation is made in a context.
2. A transformation group may be added to the statistical model.
3. Model reductions by means of such groups are introduced.
4. In order to be more general, the parameter concept is replaced by that of
an epistemic conceptual variable (e-variable). This notion may also include
latent variables, and an e-variable can also be connected to a single unit
(say to a single human being in a sociological or psychological investigation
or to a single particle in physics). The basic aim of an epistemic process
is to gain some knowledge about the relevant e-variables.
5. To find a conceptual epistemic basis for quantum mechanics, I will also in-
troduce inaccessible e-variables, that is, conceptual variables which cannot
be estimated with arbitrary accuracy in any experiment. Macroscopic ver-
sions of such unknown variables can be found in counterfactual situations,
but the notion is also relevant, say, in connection to regression models
where the number of variables by necessity is larger than the number of
units.
Also, I have included the recent notion of confidence distributions, in order
to allow both a frequentist and a Bayesian basis for any given experimental
investigation.
It is crucial that this framework as further developed in the present book
leads to a non-formal basis for essential elements of quantum theory, a theme
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which occupies the second part of the book. The now traditional formal basis for
quantum theory as developed by von Neumann (1932) was a great achievement,
and the language that is implied by this basis has been used for all further the-
oretical developments and for all discussions among physicists since then. It is
a strong intrinsic part of the quantum mechanical culture, in fact, of the culture
shared by the whole community of modern physicists. On this background it
may seem presumptuous to claim this, but I will say it anyway: In my view, the
development of an alternative to this language is long overdue. The traditional
language is purely formal and has little or no intuitive basis for people outside
the community of physicists and mathematicians.
Many recent investigators in quantum foundations have reasoned that quan-
tum mechanics should be interpreted as an epistemic science. I agree with this.
But I see it as problematic that this notion of an epistemic science should be
connected to one language in fundamental physics and a completely different
language in the rest of empirical science. The purpose of this book is to work
out a common language with a simple intuitive basis. I offer translations of
this to the traditional quantum physical language. There are open ends of the
present program as far as quantum physics is concerned, but I will argue at the
end that the investigations can be carried on further along the same lines.
The sceptic might ask: What is the purpose of introducing a new language
when this does not lead to anything new? My answer is that I will show that
my program indeed leads to something essentially new, also within the science
of quantum mechanics itself: The Born formula, which is the basis for all proba-
bility calculations in quantum physics, is taken as an independent axiom in the
traditional formulation. I will derive it from a set of intuitive assumptions. In
my opinion I also resolve the problematic questions connected to Bell’s inequal-
ities by using statistical principles. Also questions around the derivation of the
Schro¨dinger equation are discussed.
The notion of scientific cultures is interesting. In my view it can be seen
in the same setting as human cultures in general. Every human being has a
background in some culture. He/she has a unique personal history, and this
history, together with his/her free will, determines his/her actions at any point
of time. People with a similar history often group together and develop cultures.
Today we see that large parts of the world are becoming multicultural, and it
is important that we achieve understanding across the different cultures. This
calls upon rational behavior and rational upbringing in all settings. In this
context it is important that science, as potentially the most rational activity
among human beings, can be given a basis which is as universal as possible.
The study of scientific cultures is not common. An exception is the book
by Knorr Cetina (1999), where the author describes from the inside epistemic
cultures connected to two empirical groups: High energy physics experimenters
at CERN and molecular biologists at a laboratory. Her arguments strongly
depend upon the notion of knowledge societies. Of course I agree that the
nature of knowledge is different in different scientific communities, but it is the
process of achieving knowledge that I feel should have something in common,
and it is this process I will focus upon in this book.
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PART I
2 The statistical culture.
2.1 Probability
.
The concept of probability will be taken as the same both in statistics and
in quantum physics. As developed by Kolmogorov in 1930, it is a taken as a
normed measure on some probability space Ω.
Formally, we first introduce a σ-algebra F of subsets of Ω. The mathematical
requirements are: a) Ω should be in F ; b) the complement Ac should be in F
whenever A is in F , where Ac = {ω ∈ Ω : ω /∈ A}; c) ∪∞n=1An should be in F
whenever An is in F for n = 1, 2, ....
A normed measure P is then a set function such that a) 0 ≤ P (A) ≤ P (Ω) =
1 for all A ∈ F ; b) P (∪∞n=1An) =
∑∞
n=1 P (An) if the sets Ai and Aj are
disjoint; i.e., Ai ∩ Aj = ∅ when i 6= j. This implies P (Ac) = 1 − P (A) and
P (A∪B) = P (A) +P (B)−P (A∩B) for all sets A and B. The sets A ∈ F are
called events, and the triple (Ω,F , P ) is called a probability space.
If Ω is a topological space, the Borel σ-algebra is the smallest σ-algebra
containing all open sets. If Ω is discrete and finite, we can, and will, take F to
consist of all subsets.
A random variable X is a measurable function from Ω into the Euclidean
space Rn, that is, a function such that {X ∈ B} = {ω ∈ Ω : X(ω) ∈ B} =
X−1(B) is in F whenever B is a Borel set in Rn. The probability distribution
of X is defined by P (X ∈ B) = P (X−1(B)).
Readers not willing to go into all these mathematical details may think of a
random variable X as some variable with a distribution associated with it. In
this book I will work with real-valued random variables of two kinds:
• Discrete finite-valued random variables X with point probabilities p(i) =
P (X = i); i = 1, ..., r satisfying
∑r
i=1 p(i) = 1.
• Continuous random variables X with P (a ≤ X ≤ b) = ∫ b
a
f(x)dx for some
probability density f(x) satisfying
∫∞
−∞ f(x)dx = 1.
From this we define expectation
µ = E(X) =
r∑
i=1
ip(i); µ = E(X) =
∫ ∞
−∞
xf(x)dx
E(g(X)) =
r∑
i=1
g(i)p(i); E(g(X)) =
∫ ∞
−∞
g(x)f(x)dx
and variance
σ2 = Var(X) = E[(X − µ)2].
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Two random variables X and Y are independent if P ((X ∈ A)∩ (Y ∈ B)) =
P (X ∈ A)P (Y ∈ B) for all Borel sets A and B, with a natural generalization
to several random variables. For discrete random variables, this is equivalent
to pX,Y (i, j) = pX(i)pY (j); for continuous random variables it is equivalent to
fX,Y (x, y) = fX(x)fY (y) with an obvious definition of the joint density.
The interpretation of the probability concept is important for applications.
In the literature, three different, but related interpretations are given:
1. The principle of equally likely outcome: If there are r possible outcomes,
each is given the probability 1/r. This can immediately be applied to
discrete finite-valued variables, and has examples in the tossing of a die,
the tossing of a coin, in card games, in opinion polls etc. Below I will
generalize the principle to random variables with a compact range, using
the group concept. When the range is not compact, we need un-normed
measures. This causes conceptual difficulties that I will not go too deeply
into in the present book. I will return to the problem at some points,
however.
2. The principle of odds making or subjective probability: The probability
of an event A is found on the basis of how much a person is willing to pay
for each outcome in a wager with the two outcomes A and Ac. This was
introduced by de Finetti and Savage, and used by them as a foundation
for Bayesian statistics.
3. The principle of long run frequency: If an experiment is repeated n times,
the relative frequency of the event A is the number of times A happens,
divided upon n. The probability of A is interpreted as the limit in some
sense (see below) of the relative frequency as n → ∞. I will indicate
below that this interpretation always can be applied, and made precise,
in situations where an experiment can be repeated an arbitrary number
of times and the probability can be defined from other considerations..
In many concrete applications, not only one, but two or three of these interpre-
tations may be relevant.
The concept of conditional probability can be given a precise mathematical
definition using the notion of a Radon-Nikodym derivative. Specifically, if B is
a sub-σ-algebra of F , then we define P (A|B) as the unique (up to a P-measure
0) B-measurable function such that∫
B
P (A|B)P (dω) =
∫
B
IA(ω)P (dω) (1)
for all B ∈ B. If B is generated by the disjoint events {Bi}, this is consistent
with the definition that P (A|Bi) = P (A ∩Bi)/P (Bi) whenever P (Bi) 6= 0.
Finally, asymptotic considerations may simplify statistics in cases where
there are many observations. I will introduce three limit concepts in probability:
• Convergence in probability: P (|Yn − Y | > ǫ)→ 0 for all ǫ > 0.
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• Convergence almost surely: P ({ω : Yn(ω)→ Y (ω)}) = 1. This is stronger
than convergence in probability.
• Convergence in law: P (Yn ≤ y) → P (Y ≤ y) for all y where F (y) =
P (Y ≤ y) is continuous. This is a property of the distribution functions
rather than of the random variables, but it is related in several ways to
the concept of convergence in probability. For instance, for convergence
to a degenerate distribution, the two concept are equivalent, and when Yn
tends in law to Y and Un in probability to c, then Yn + Un tends in law
to Y + c.
In statistical applications, we often have repeated observations, and thus a
sample X = (X1, X2, ..., Xn), where the Xi’s are independent with the same
distribution. Assuming these have finite expectation µ and finite variance σ2,
one can prove three limit laws for the mean X¯n = n
−1∑n
i=1Xi:
• The law of large numbers I: X¯n converges in probability to µ as n→∞.
• The law of large numbers II: X¯n converges almost surely to µ as n→∞.
• The central limit theorem: √n(X¯n − µ) converges in law to N(0, σ2),
where N(ξ, σ2) in general is the continuous distribution with density
f(x) =
1√
2πσ
exp(− (x− ξ)
2
2σ2
). (2)
For the first and the third law, see Lehmann (1999). The second law is
proved for instance in Sen and Singer (1993).
Using the law of large numbers on the indicator functions Xi = I(Zi ∈ A),
one easily shows that the frequency interpretation of the probability concept
always is valid in situations where it is applicable.
2.2 Statistical models.
In general, a model is a representation of the real world, simplified, but designed
such that the essential features that one is interested in, are focused in the model
and are correctly represented in the model. A map of the London underground
is sometimes taken as an example of a model.
In statistics, one wants a model which can be employed in the epistemic
process. This is the reasoning used: The unknown feature that one is interested
in, is modeled as a parameter θ, real-valued or belonging to a subset of some
Euclidean space Rn. (I will not go into nonparametric statistics in this book.)
Giving θ some value defines a state of the unknown world. Look at the sit-
uation before the experiment or observational study is done, and choose some
potential observations Xi. These observations are assumed to have a probability
distribution for each given state of the world. The specification of this class of
probability distributions constitutes the statistical model. The statistical model
should focus on the relationship between the parameter that one is interested
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in and the observations to be done, and it should represent this relationship as
well as possible. It should be simple, but not too simple.
The purpose of statistical modeling can be listed as follows:
• Give a rough description of the data generating process.
• Provide parameters that can be estimated from data.
• Allow focusing upon certain parameters.
• Give a language for asking questions about nature.
• Give means for answering such questions by estimation or by the testing
of hypotheses.
• Provide confidence intervals and error estimates.
• Give a possibility to study deviations from the model and choosing new
models.
Thus the model can be seen as part of a language. A model should be chosen
carefully using subject matter knowledge together with a realization of what can
be done statistically. If possible, the model should be scrutinized empirically.
But once the model is chosen, this is an existential choice. Any conclusion is
conditional, given the model.
Specifically, consider the situation with n repeated, independent observa-
tions. This is modeled by independent, identically distributed random variables
(X1, X2, ..., Xn) with distribution depending upon some parameter θ,
In the discrete case:
Pθ(X1 = x1, ..., Xn = xn) = Π
n
k=1pθ(xk).
In the continuous case:
Pθ(X1 ≤ x1, ..., Xn ≤ xn) =
∫ x1
−∞
...
∫ xn
∞
Πnk=1fθ(uk)du1...dun.
Here pθ(x) is the point probability of the individual observations and fθ(x) is
the probability density of the individual observations. For continuous models,
a very common choice of the probability density fθ(x) is the normal density
(2). In some cases, this may be motivated by some form of the central limit
theorem; in other cases it is just a matter of convenience. Here θ = (ξ, σ).
One can distinguish between three cases: 1) σ is known and ξ is the unknown
parameter. 2) ξ is known and σ is the unknown parameter. 3) Both ξ and
σ are unknown. The study of statistical methods that are robust against the
assumption of normality, is an active research area in statistics.
The simplest discrete case is when one has n independent repeated trials,
each with two possible outcomes A or Ac, often called success and failure. As-
suming the same unknown probability θ of success in each trial, and letting
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Xk be the indicator of success in the kth trial, we have the point probabilities
pθ(0) = 1− θ and pθ(1) = θ. If now Y is the number of successes in the n trials,
it is a straightforward exercise to show that Y has a binomial distribution:
Pθ(Y = y) =
(
n
y
)
θy(1− θ)n−y .
Other standard choices of point probabilities and probability densities are
listed in Chapter 1 of Lehmann (1999).
2.3 Inference for continuous parameters.
The modern theory of statistical inference was developed by R.A. Fisher in the
1920’s and the 1930’s, at the same time as modern quantum theory was devel-
oped. Fisher knew about quantum theory, but did never hint at any relation to
it in his own work.
From an epistemic point of view it is important in statistics to distinguish
between the situation before any observations are done, and after observations
are done. Before, the observations are unknown, but are modeled as stochastic
variables X through the chosen statistical model. After the observations, they
are known values X = x, and we want to use these observations to say some-
thing about the state of nature, the parameters θ. There has to be a recipe
from x to the inference about θ.
The simplest concept is that of point estimation: The parameter θ is es-
timated by a function of the data: θ̂(x). The properties of this estimation
procedure is evaluated by looking at the before-observation situation and using
the statistical model: With the stochastic variable X inserted, θ̂(X) is called
an estimator. One good property might be that the estimator is unbiased:
E(θ̂(X)) = θ or nearly so. Another good property is that it has a small vari-
ance. These two properties are sometimes combined in the requirement that the
estimator should have a mean square error which is as small as possible, where
MSE(θ̂(X)) = E((θ̂(X)− θ)2) = Var(θ̂(X)) + (E(θ̂(X))− θ)2.
A point estimator is often given together with a standard error : An estimate
of the standard deviation of the corresponding estimator, i.e., the square root
of its variance. The standard error gives an indication of uncertainty of the
estimate.
In a typical before-observations situation, one has also the possibility to
decide how much data one should take; this may be indexed by a number n.
The simplest, but not uncommon, case is that of repeated measurements, that
is, of n independent, identically distributed observations Xn = (X1, ..., Xn),
but many more situations of this kind exist. The before-observation version of
the estimation recipe, θ̂ = θ̂(Xn) is then the estimator. A weak, but desirable
property of the estimator is that it should be consistent : θ̂(Xn) should converge
in probability or almost surely to θ as n tends to infinity. A further property
which is often satisfied by some central limit type theorem is that of asymptotic
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normality: Typically
√
n(θ̂ − θ) converges in law to N(0, σ2) for some variance
σ2. It is desirable that σ2 should be as small as possible.
In fact these properties are satisfied for a large class of situations, explored by
Fisher. In the case of discrete observations, the model implies joint probabilities
for the data pθ(x), in the continuous case joint probability densities fθ(x). In
both cases, when one focuses upon the θ-dependence, this function is called the
likelihood L(θ). Fisher argued that one should maximize the likelihood to find
good estimates of θ. The intuitive argument is that this will provide the θ-value
which in a best possible way explains the obtained data. The maximum θ̂(x)
is called the maximum likelihood estimate. Local extremes can be found by
equating the derivative of the likelihood functions to zero. In more complicated
situations one may have problems with several local extremes, but often these
problems may be tackled by numerical maximization methods.
Maximum likelihood estimation is used throughout statistics in a large num-
ber of applications to a diverse set of applied sciences.
To evaluate the properties of the maximum likelihood procedure, one again
turns to the pre-observation situation. Then θ̂(X) with the stochastic vari-
able from the model inserted, is called the maximum likelihood estimator. For
simplicity let us look at the situation with repeated independent continuous
observations Xn = (X1, ..., Xn). Let fθ(x) be the probability density of a sin-
gle observation, and define the Fisher information by I(θ) = E(( ∂
∂θ
lnfθ(x))
2)
assuming that this exists. Then under regularity conditions (see for instance
Lehmann, 1999, where uniqueness of the local extrema is assumed for this), one
can prove the following: 1) θ̂ = θ̂(Xn) is consistent; 2)
√
n(θ̂− θ0) converges in
law to N(0, 1/I(θ0)) under θ0, the true value, as n → ∞. Thus the maximum
likelihood estimator has some good asymptotic properties, and these results
may be generalized to other cases with a large amount of data. However, there
exist many examples of cases where the maximum likelihood estimator does not
behave in an optimal way; see Le Cam (1990).
A good estimator δ(X) can also be found using a loss function L(δ(X), θ),
for instance quadratic loss L = (δ(X)−θ)2. One objective might be to minimize
the risk, or expected loss, R(δ, θ) = Eθ(L(δ(X), θ)), but a uniform minimization
here is not feasible: Taking δ(X) ≡ θ0 gives R(δ, θ0) = 0 for all reasonable loss
functions. One way around this, is to limit oneself to unbiased estimators:
Eθ(δ(X)) = θ for all θ. The theory on this can be found in Lehmann and
Casella (1998).
In addition to point estimation, statistical inference theory discusses hypoth-
esis testing and confidence intervals. Hypothesis testing is closely related to con-
fidence intervals. I will consider here one-sided confidence intervals (−∞, θ¯] and
two-sided confidence intervals [θ, θ¯]. The lower and upper limits of these inter-
vals are functions of the data. When considered again in the pre-observational
situation, they should have the properties
Pθ(θ ∈ (−∞, θ¯(X)]) = Pθ(θ¯(X) ≥ θ) = γ, (3)
Pθ(θ ∈ [θ(X), θ¯(X)]) = Pθ(θ(X) ≤ θ ≤ θ¯(X)) = γ, (4)
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where γ is a pre-assigned confidence coefficient, say 0.95 or 0.99.
The statistical methods discussed so far are called frequentist methods: They
are coupled to a pre-observational distribution using the statistical model. The
probabilities and expectations involved in this can be interpreted by a thought
construction: Imagine that the whole experiment is repeated a large number of
times. Then the imagined relative frequency of an event A for these repetitions
is approximately equal to the hypothetical probability P (A). The probabili-
ties and expectations are therefore connected to the methods used and to the
statistical model used.
There is another approach to statistical inference which has a long history,
but has been particularly popular in the last few years: The Bayesian approach.
Here the probabilities are imagined to be connected to the parameters them-
selves. The important assumption is that one first in some way has obtained a
prior distribution on the parameter, say with a probability density π(θ). From
this prior, one finds a posterior distribution, given the data, by using a variant
of Bayes’ formula
P (T |D) = P (T ∩D)
P (D)
=
P (T )P (D|T )
P (D)
.
The first part of this formula is the definition of the conditional probability of T ,
given D. This definition is consistent with the Radon-Nikodym approach, and
also consistent with what one calls conditional probability in simple examples.
The second part of the formula is a consequence. Applied to a situation with
a continuous parameter θ and a continuous data model with density fθ(x), a
formula for the posterior density of θ given the data is obtained:
π(θ|x) = π(θ)fθ(x)
f(x)
=
π(θ)fθ(x)∫
π(φ)fφ(x)dφ
.
Consider first Bayesian point estimation. Again defining a loss function
L(δ(x), θ), we can now introduce the Bayesian risk as
BR(δ(x)) =
∫
L(δ(x), θ)π(θ|x)dθ,
and find the estimate δ(x) which minimized BR. With quadratic loss this leads
to the posterior mean
∫
θπ(θ|x)dθ as an estimate. Other possible estimates in-
clude the mode and the median of the posterior distribution, the mode being the
maximum of the density and the median is the value such that the probability
that the parameter is below this value, equals 1/2. In these estimates one can
insert the pre-observational stochastic variable X, compare them with estima-
tors obtained by frequentists methods, evaluating estimators using a frequentist
or Bayesian approach.
The Bayesian concept which replaces the confidence intervals is that of cred-
ibility intervals. Again consider the one-sided case (−∞, θ∗(x)] and the two-
sided case [θ∗(x), θ∗(x)]. These intervals have direct interpretations in terms of
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a probability distribution over the parameter, the posterior distribution:
P (θ ∈ (−∞, θ∗(x)]) =
∫ θ∗(x)
−∞
π(θ|x)dθ.
P (θ ∈ [θ∗(x), θ∗(x)]) =
∫ θ∗(x)
θ∗(x)
π(θ|x)dθ.
To choose θ∗(x) and θ∗(x), this can again be given a preassigned value γ, say
0.95 or 0.99. In a specific sense, the interpretation of the credibility interval is
simpler and more direct than the interpretation of the confidence interval.
There is much more to say about Bayesian theory and Bayesian methods;
see Bernardo and Smith (1994), Box and Tiao (1973) and Congdon (2006).
The great weakness with the Bayesian approach is that the scientist should
be able to specify a prior distribution of the unknown parameter. In a way he
should be willing to and able to enter a wager on the values of this parameter.
It is often claimed that if the scientist is not willing to do this, he should use an
objective prior; for different formal ways to specify this concept, see Kass and
Wasserman (1996). I have recently used such a prior myself (see Helland et al,
2011), but even so I would claim: There are many cases where the scientist could
not or should not have any fully specified prior opinion about the parameter,
even not one based upon symmetry or other ’objective’ criteria. In such cases
he should resort to frequentist methods. In statistical inference one should be
flexible, not staying with one approach which should be imagined to cover all
cases.
Quite recently there has been proposed a frequentist alternative to a distri-
bution connected to a parameter: The confidence distribution; see Schweder and
Hjort (2002) and Xie and Singh (2011). The idea is that one looks upon the con-
fidence interval for any value of the confidence coefficient γ. Let (−∞, τ(γ,x)]
be a one-sided confidence interval with coefficient γ, where τ(γ) = τ(γ,x) is
an increasing function. Then H(·) = τ−1(·) is the confidence distribution for θ.
This H is a distribution function and has the property that H(τ(γ,X)) has a
uniform distribution over the interval [0, 1] under the model. According to Xie
and Singh (2011), the distribution function H is to be looked upon as a distri-
bution for the parameter, to be used in the epistemic process, not a distribution
of the parameter, as we have in the Bayesian approach.
Three general book on statistical inference are Casella and Berger (1990),
Bickel and Doksum (2001) and Cox (2006). For a discussion of Fisher’s contri-
butions with a view towards the future, see Efron (1998). The recent book by
Cox and Donnelly (2011) discusses many aspects of applied statistics and also
provides some links to theoretical statistics.
2.4 Inference for discrete e-variables.
Opinion polls, or sample surveys, while very much used in practice, are not much
discussed in the standard mathematical statistical literature. But specialized
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books like Cochran (1977) exist. The framework is that one has a finite popula-
tion consisting of N units, say N human beings, and one seeks some information
about this population from a smaller sample of n units. The simplest case is
when the sample is taken randomly from a register of the whole population,
but other sampling plans exist. To increase efficiency, one often uses stratified
sampling: The population is divided into k strata using some relevant criterion,
such that the numbers of unit in stratum i is Ni, and one samples randomly ni
units from this stratum. Of course
∑k
i=1Ni = N and
∑k
i=1 ni = n.
As a simple epistemic problem, assume that an unknown number M in the
population possesses some specific property A, and one wants to use the sample
to estimate θ = M/N . This θ takes a discrete set of values 0, 1/N, ..., N/N ,
and is not always called a parameter. In this book we will use the more general
concept of an e-variable, a conceptual variable which is unknown before the
epistemic process begins. In general it is implicit in the concept of an e-variable
that this is a quantity that we want to gain knowledge about.
A more general problem is that each unit j in the population has some value
yj attached to it, and one wants to estimate θ = y¯population =
∑N
j=1 yj/N . The
simple problem above is then obtained by specializing yj to be an indicator
function. A common estimate of θ is
θ̂ =
∑
sample yj/πj∑
sample 1/πj
,
where πj is the probability that unit j should be included in the sample. This
can be used for many sampling plans. For stratified sampling we get θ̂ =∑k
i=1Niy¯i/N , where the mean y¯i is over the sample in stratum i.
Opinion polls are based on the assumption that each person ’has’ an opinion
on the issue that is focused upon. The fact that opinions may vary with time,
and that they may depend on the contexts, is perhaps realized, but it is not
much discussed in this connection. To see this first from the point of view of the
person being interviewed, imagine for instance that a woman A has spent some
time on an hotel, and then after a few days receives a questionnaire by e-mail,
one of the questions being: ’On a scale from 1 to 10, how do you evaluate the
service at this hotel?’ This causes her to enter an epistemic process, mostly
related to introspection. To begin with, the score is some unknown number θ,
but after a while she decides on a value θ = uk, one of the values from 1 to 10.
This decision process may be evaluated subjectively by the woman A herself.
We may also consider the whole situation as looked upon by some person B
knowing her background. In this latter case prediction is relevant. The person
B may have access to some kind of data from a sample of size ni from a stratum
consisting of people with the same background as the woman, and to detailed
information about the hotel. On this basis he may want to predict θ. Again this
is an epistemic process with a discrete e-variable; the target for the prediction of
this e-variable is not a population, but a single unit, the woman A in this case.
B may wish a large ni to have accurate data, but at the same time resources
may be limited: He may be forced to have a small ni in order to be able to
predict from a fairly homogeneous subpopulation.
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Both in the introspection case and in the external observer case, one can
consider the following: Assume that the woman A had an unfortunate episode
with the receptionist of the hotel just before she left, and that the observer
B does not know about this episode. Let θ′ be the hypothetical score that A
would have had if the episode had not taken place. Depending on the further
circumstances, θ′ may not be accessible to the woman A herself, and θ may not
be accessible to the observer B.
Considerations of this kind are here very vague, but they should give some
feeling of what I mean by an epistemic process when a single unit is involved.
The situation here is on the borderline or outside what one meets in ordinary
statistics, but the point is that it describes epistemic processes, and that one
of these processes (the prediction part) in principle can be made precise in
statistical terms. Considerations of this kind will be important when I later will
try to approach the foundation of quantum mechanics from an intuitive point
of view.
The Bayesian concepts of prior and posterior distribution are straightforward
to formulate in the case of a discrete e-variable, and the concept of confidence
distribution also carries over: If θ takes the values u1, ..., ur, then the confidence
coefficient γ can take only r values, and the confidence distribution H is de-
termined as follows: Let again (−∞, τ(γ,x)] be a one-sided confidence interval
with coefficient γ, where τ(γ) = τ(γ,x) on the r values. Then H(·) = τ−1(·)
can be extended to a discrete distribution function for θ, which has the prop-
erty that H(τ(γ,X)) for data X has a uniform distribution on the r values
H(u1), H(u2), ..., H(ur) = 1.
3 Group actions and model reduction.
In simple random sampling, a natural objective prior for the e-variable θ is
found by giving the same probability 1/N to each unit in the population. This
is the invariant measure (see Appendix 3) for the permutation group. In general
an epistemic problem related to a θ may often have some symmetry property
associated with it, and this is formalized by introducing a group of transforma-
tions acting upon the space Θ of the e-variable. When θ is transformed by the
group and the observations are transformed accordingly (see Helland, 2004), one
should get equivalent results from the statistical analysis. As a trivial example:
One should get equivalent results from a statistical analysis whether the param-
eters and the observations are measured in meters or in centimeters. A summary
of basic group theory is given in Appendix 3. Examples of groups acting upon
a parameter space, are location: ξ → ξ + a for a real; scale group: σ → bσ for
b > 0; location and scale: (ξ, σ) → (a + bξ, bσ); rotation in a multidimensional
parameter space; a general linear group acting upon a multidimensional param-
eter space etc.. Invariance under a group may help improving the estimation or
the inference in general.
When we later come to our link to quantum mechanics, there seems in that
case to be a canonical choice of the group G. At present, we just say vaguely
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that we choose G, if possible, in agreement with some symmetry aspect of the
whole situation.
Now fix a point θ0 in the e-variable space Θ. An orbit in this space under G
is the set of points of the form gθ0 as g varies over the group G. The different
orbits are disjoint, and θ0 can be replaced by any e-variable on the orbit. Any set
in Θ which is an orbit of G or can be written as a union of orbits, is an invariant
set under G in Θ, and conversely, all invariant sets can be written in this way.
If there is only one orbit in Θ, the group is said to be acting transitively upon
Θ.
A statistical model should be as simple as possible, but not simpler. In some
cases we may want to do a simplification, a model reduction. This may take
the form of a reduction of the e-variable space Θ. Parts of this space which
are essential for the epistemic process, must always be retained, but irrelevant
dimensions should be left out. I will now formulate a general criterion which
will be used throughout this book:
If there is a group G acting upon the e-variable space Θ, any model reduction
should be to an orbit or to a set of orbits of G.
This will ensure that G also can be seen as a group acting upon the new
e-variable space. In particular, if the group actions form a transitive group G,
no model reduction is possible.
Example 1. Assume that a single set of observations is modeled by some
large parametric model, only assuming that parametric class contains the normal
model. Let the location and scale group be acting upon the parameter space Θ.
Then one orbit is given by the N(ξ, σ2) distribution. This is not an uncommon
model reduction.
Example 2. Look at two independent sets of observations: (X1, ..., Xm)
independent and identically N(ξ1, σ
2
1) and (Y1, ..., Yn) independent and iden-
tically N(ξ2, σ
2
2). Let G be the translation and scale group given by ξ1 →
a1 + bξ1, σ1 → bσ1, ξ2 → a2 + bξ2, σ2 → bσ2. Note that a common scale
transformation by b is assumed. Then the orbits of the group in the parameter
space are given by σ1/σ2 = constant. A common model reduction is given by
σ1 = σ2. This simplifies the comparison of ξ1 and ξ2, which is often the goal of
the investigation.
Example 3. Linear statistical models have a large range of applications. In
general these models have the form where the observations Yl are independent
N(ξl, σ
2), where the expectations ξl are linear combination of a set of parame-
ters. In one particular such model (the two-way analysis of variance model) the
observations Yijh have expectations µ + αi + βj + γij . To get a unique repre-
sentation of this kind, one often imposes the restrictions
∑
i αi = 0,
∑
j βj = 0,∑
i γij = 0 for each j and
∑
j γij = 0 for each i. Let the group G be given
by all permutations of the index i and all permutations of the index j. Then
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an obvious model reduction is given by the invariant set where the expectation
is µ + αi + βj . This is called the model without interaction, and is a valid
simplification in some cases.
Example 4. Another example of a linear model is the polynomial regression
model Yi = β0+β1xi+...+βpx
p
i+Ei, where the Ei’s are independentN(0, σ
2) for
i = 1, ..., n. LetG be the group defined by translations in the x-space: x→ x+a,
which generates a transformation group on the parameters (β0, ..., βp). Then the
submodels Yi = β0 + β1xi + ... + βqx
q
i + Ei q < p correspond to invariant sets
in the parameter space.
Example 5. A further example of a linear model is the multiple regression
model Yi = β0 + β1xi1 + ... + βpxip + Ei for i = 1, .., n with fixed xij , which
again has many different applications. Consider first the case where the xij are
measured in different units for different j. Then there is a natural transformation
group given by separate scale changes xij → kjxij (j = 1, ..., p). This induces a
group on the regression parameters by βj → βj/kj (j = 1, ..., p). The invariant
sets in the parameter space are found by putting some of the βj ’s equal to
0. These reduced models are well-known from many applications of regression
analysis.
Example 6. Consider the same multiple regression model as in Example 5,
but assume now that the explanatory variables xij all are measured in the same
units. A large class of transformations xi· → Qxi· may then be of interest. In
particular, an interesting case is when Q varies over the orthogonal matrices.
As here, and as in any linear model, estimates of the regression parameters
can in principle be found by the method of least squares, which is equivalent
to the maximum likelihood method. However, this method breaks down when
p > n, or more generally when one has collinearity problems such that the
matrix which we need to invert in order to implement the least squares solution,
is singular. A large number of alternative estimation methods are proposed in
the statistical literature to tackle this problem, but it seems very difficult to
decide which of these methods one should use in practice.
For this problem, one place where one may start the investigation, is that
many of the methods are equivariant under the transformation induced by ro-
tation in the x-space: A transformation on θ̂ found from transformations of the
data is the same the corresponding transformation on the parameter θ.
Before I return to this problem, I will summarize a little more theory. In
Appendix 3 the concept of a right invariant measure for the group is defined,
and it is recommended that such a prior is used as an objective prior. Among
other things it is proved in Helland (2004, 2010) that there for a transitive group
is a very close connection between confidence intervals and Bayesian credibility
intervals in this case. It follows from this that there is a close connection between
confidence distributions and posterior distributions with this prior.
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Concerning equivariant estimators, there is a generalization of an old the-
orem by Pitman, which is proved in Helland (2010), showing that if the loss
function is invariant and proportional to the quadratic loss, if the group is tran-
sitive and a right invariant prior is used, then the posterior mean, if finite, is
the best equivariant estimator.
Example 6, continued. Look at a modification of the model in Example
6 where the explanatory variables are random variables Xij . This is natural
in many observational studies. For simplicity, assume that all variables are
centered: E(Yi) = 0 and E(Xij) = 0. Then the model is Yi = β1Xi1 + ... +
βpXip + Ei for i = 1, .., n. Let Σx be the covariance matrix of the x-variables,
which can be defined by the property that Var(
∑
j ajXij) = a
T
Σxa for all
vectors a = (a1, ..., ap)
T . Then β = (β1, ..., βp)
T can always be expanded in
terms of an orthogonal set of eigenvectors di of Σx:
β =
p∑
j=1
γidi. (5)
In this expansion the number of terms can be reduced in two ways: 1) Some of
the eigenvalues may be coinciding. Then the eigenvectors in this eigenspace can
be rotated in such a way that there is just one eigenvector in this space which
has a nonzero component along β. 2) The vector β has no component in this
eigenspace. So an interesting reduced model is the one with m non-zero terms
in (5). The ordering of the terms in (5) is arbitrary, so the reduced models only
specify the number m of non-zero terms, not which terms that are non-zero. It
is not difficult to show that these models for differentm are exactly the orbits of
the following group G: Rotations in the x-space and hence of the eigenvectors
di augmented by independent scale transformations γi → aiγi where ai > 0.
It is shown in Helland et al. (2012) and Cook et al. (2012) that these
reduced models coincide with reduced models introduced by researchers from
two different traditions: The envelope model of Cook et al. (2010) and a natural
population model arising from the partial least squares algorithmic ’soft’ models
from chemometrics. Maximum likelihood estimation and other estimators under
the reduced model are discussed in Cook et al. (2012) and Bayes estimation
in Helland et al. (2012). The invariant prior induced by the group leads to
an undefined posterior expectation, so a best equivariant estimator can not be
found from this. However approximating the scale prior with a proper prior
leads to β-estimates, hence predictions, which seem to have good properties.
Finally I give for completeness a simple example of model reduction for the
case where the e-variable in question is not a continuous parameter.
Example 7. In stratified random sampling, the natural group G is the
group of independent permutations within each stratum. The orbits of G are
then given by the single strata, and model reductions to invariant sets are given
by reduction to any set of strata. Such a reduction is of course natural in cases
where one want to limit the investigation to a particular set of strata.
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4 Interlude
Before the epistemic process, one has an unknown e-variable θ. What is the
situation after one has gone through an epistemic process? In the case where θ is
the parameter of a statistical model, the situation can be summarized as follows:
Depending upon the statistical philosophy used, one has either a confidence
interval [θ(x), θ¯(x)] or a credibility interval [θ∗(x), θ∗(x)]. In both cases, assume
that the coefficient γ is very high, say 0.999. Then the practical conclusion from
the epistemic process is that the new state is specified by saying that θ belongs
to this interval.
Confidence intervals or credibility intervals for discrete e-variables are not
much discussed in the statistical literature, but the concepts carry over. One
difference is that when one has very much data, the intervals can degenerate
into a single point. In the following, it will make the discussion much simpler
to consider such a case. Assume that one has this situation, and let again the
coefficient γ is very high, say larger than 0.999. Then in the frequentist case,
one has a conclusion of the type Pθ[θ̂(X) = uk] = γ with realized data X = x,
and in the Bayesian case one has a posterior probability P [θ = uk|x] = γ. In
both cases we conclude for practical purposes that the new state is given by
θ = uk, and that this value can be used in further investigations.
Any epistemic process starts with an unknown e-variable θ, and when the
process ends, one has some knowledge about θ. A state is obtained when this
knowledge is almost certain. In the simplest case the knowledge can be expressed
by a certain fixed value θ = uk. This situation can be realized by a statistical
investigation with a discrete parameter/e-variable, but it can also be realized in
other epistemic situations. One example is when a person through introspection
makes up his or her mind on a particular issue, as illustrated with the woman
answering an opinion poll in subsection 2.4. Again we can talk about a state
when the person’s knowledge about his/her opinion is almost certain. Looking
upon the process of achieving an opinion on an issue as an epistemic process
can of course be discussed; in any case it involves philosophical and psycholog-
ical questions that are beyond the scope of the present book. However, many
examples of everyday epistemic processes can be given, some realized through
the communication with other people. Some of these processes start with an
unknown θ and end up with an (almost) sure state θ = uk. Other examples of
this are connected to prediction of some variable. In these last examples, the
e-variable is typically attached to a single unit, not to a population of units,
which is the most common situation in statistical investigations.
The example in Section 2.4 illustrates another issue: Here one e-variable θ is
accessible to the woman A herself, while another e-variable θ′ (the hypothetical
score if a certain episode had not taken place) is accessible to the person B
knowing her background and having information about the hotel. The reason for
this difference is that the two persons have different background knowledge. We
will come back to similar situations later when discussing quantum mechanics.
Returning now to statistics, nearly all papers on statistical inference have
data models, that is, either parametric or nonparametric models of the observed
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data, as their point of departure. Also, statistical practice is deeply founded
upon this tradition. Even though a different culture was promoted and discussed
by Breiman (2001), the data modeling culture is now more dominant than ever.
Nor will this paper depart radically from this culture, but we will add an
element to it: Every decision in any experimental or observational setting is
made in a context. This context may not be trivial, and may have decisive
influence on how the inference should be made. The context may be in parts
be formed by the historical and cultural background for the study, and it may
depend upon earlier decisions. But it can also in addition be conceptual, includ-
ing the formulated goal of the investigation, the model, a loss function and/or
a Bayesian prior. Also the framework for the study must be considered as a
part of the context: The experimental units available, what can be measured
on these units; limitations in terms of money, time and human resources.
In order to be able to discuss contexts in general, it turns out to be useful
first to give a precise definition of what we mean by conceptual variables, which
includes observations, parameters, latent variables and more. Then we define
e-variables, which up to now has been a loosely defined concept.
In statistical theory, a parameter is often defined as an index of a class of dis-
tributions, but in statistical practice, a parameter is often a quantity of interest
in itself, introduced as an expectation, a variance, a covariance, a correlation,
a regression coefficient or a probability. These two facets of the parameter
concepts may to some extent be regarded as complementary, even though this
introduces no logical difficulty.
In the statistical tradition, a parameter is usually connected to a hypothet-
ical infinite population, but in fact parts of the statistical theory - in reality
everything that is not related to asymptotical considerations - can be gener-
alized to the case where the parameter is replaced by a conceptual variabel
connected to a single unit or to a few units.
In addition to the unknown conceptual variable there are data x. The pur-
pose of an experiment is then to use these data to answer questions formulated in
terms of the conceptual variable. This will be the background for our approach
to essential parts of quantum theory later in this book.
5 Conceptual variables and contexts
Fisher (1922) introduced the concept of parametric models in the way it is used
throughout statistics today. According to Stigler (1976) and Cook (2007), the
word ’parameter’ is mentioned 57 times in that groundbreaking paper. Recently,
Taraldsen and Lindqvist (2010) argued that in Bayesian inference the param-
eters and the potential observations should be defined on the same underlying
probability space. This is one point of departure of the present book. Another
point of departure is that in any situation where inference is supposed to be
done, several other types of unknown variables than parameters are of relevance
(one simple example is in prediction), and that additional types of variables are
needed to describe the context of the experiment or observational study.
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Definition 1. Consider any experimental or observational situation at a
given time or over some time span, more generally any epistemic process. Any
variable which can be formulated conceptually by a person or by a group of
persons in that situation is called a conceptual variable.
This term was indicated in Helland (2010), where it also was argued that
some unknown conceptual variables could be inaccessible, that is, they could not
be assessed with arbitrary accuracy through estimation or prediction in any way
in the given situation. This was taken as the first steps in a line of reasoning
indicating a connection between theoretical statistics and quantum theory, a
line of reasoning that I will continue below.
In the following, I may alternately speak about one conceptual variable and
several related conceptual variables in the same way as we may talk about a
multivariate parameter or several one-dimensional parameters.
Several classes of conceptual variables are of interest in a statistical investi-
gation, depending upon the situation:
• Context variables: The background variables for an experiment or obser-
vational study.
• OCV’s (observed conceptual variables): Data or preset values.
• Statistics: Known functions of the data.
• Quasi-statistics: Known or unknown functions of the data.
• Input variables and responses/output variables. As used in prediction and
regression, cp. Hastie, Tibshirani and Friedman (2009).
• UCV’s (unknown conceptual variables): For instance parameters, latent
variables or a response for a new set of input variables.
• Hypothesis variables: Concepts from which one may formulate assertions
about the value of a parameter.
• Conclusion variables: Conceptual variables by which one may formulate
the conclusions from an experiment or observational study.
In this book I will consider any epistemic process.
Definition 2. A conceptual variable which is used in an epistemic process
is called an e-variable θ. Before the epistemic process is started, the e-variable
is unknown. After the process, one is able to achieve some conclusion about the
e-variable, the simplest case being that we know its value: θ = uk, a type of
conclusion which is only possible for discrete e-variables.
We also have the important concept of a context of an epistemic process.
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Definition 3. In the case of an experiment the context includes the set-
ting of the experiment, similarly for an observational study. But in general for
any epistemic process it also includes the background for the process, historical,
specific and conceptual. The conceptual background for any study should always
include a formulated goal of the study.
In a series of experiments or in a meta-analysis, the conclusions from one
situation may be used as a part of the context of the next situation.
Several operations may be done on any assertion containing conceptual vari-
ables, including ¬ (negation), ∧ (and) and ∨ (or). Formulating statements
connected to a concrete experimental or observational situation may then be
done using propositional logic, a subject which has a large abstract literature.
As formulated in Appendix 6, I want to be more concrete and regard sentences
formulated in ordinary, everyday language as primitive entities.
There is a close connection between propositional logic and set theory, where
we identify ¬ with complement, ∧ with intersection and ∨ with union. Such
identifications are often done implicitly in elementary textbooks in probability.
Let (Ω′,F ′) be the measurable space thus obtained, where F ′ is a σ-algebra of
subsets of Ω′. On some measurable subset Ω of Ω′ one can define conditional
probability measures related to one conceptual variable given other conceptual
variables, where the conceptual variable conditioned upon may or may not be-
long to Ω, that is, may or may not be measurable functions on (Ω,F), where
F = {A ∩ Ω : A ∈ F ′}. Strictly speaking, conditioning here must be taken as
more general than the usual conditioning in statistics where we condition upon
σ-algebras. We are talking in general about probabilities, given some infor-
mation, so that we should wish to stay within the framework of propositional
logic. As indicated in Appendix 6, however, it seems like we need some extra
assumptions in this framework to make the conditional probabilities precise in
general. Therefore I will in this book stay within the probabilistic framework
and limit myself to conditional probabilities given a σ-algebra as defined by (1).
Conditional probabilities, given some conceptual variable τ which is a random
variable on (Ω,F), is defined as the conditional probability, given the σ-algebra
generated by this conceptual variable, that is, the collection of sets τ−1(B),
where B runs through the relevant Borel sets. Conditional probabilities, given
some non-random variable τ are simply measurable functions of this variable.
When considering conditional probabilities, given the context, in most cases
only part of the context will be relevant. The conceptual variables on which
probabilities can be defined, will be called random variables. For simplicity,
technical problems resulting from the fact that conditional distributions are only
defined almost surely, are mostly disregarded in this book. However, difficulties
from this in the definition of sufficiency (see Lehmann and Casella, 1998) will
be addressed.
A statistical model is defined as a conditional distribution of the data, given
all parameters (together with the context, including preset values). It is assumed
as usual that this class is dominated, that is, all conditional distributions are
absolute continuous with respect to some fixed conditional probability measure
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P , given the context, whereQ is defined to be absolutely continuous with respect
to P if P (A) = 0 implies Q(A) = 0.
In addition, if a Bayesian analysis is to be carried out, there is a prior
distribution of of the parameters (again given the context). To allow for ob-
jective priors, I will, in agreement with Taraldsen and Lindqvist (2010) allow
these measures to be unnormalized; see that paper and also the recent paper by
McCullagh and Han (2011) on how logical difficulties with this can be avoided.
Note that I talk about a Bayesian analysis to be carried out, not about Bayesian
or frequentist research workers. The same person may in certain cases carry out
both types of analysis, first a frequentist analysis and then at a later point of
time a Bayesian analysis.
In the following, I will depart from my earlier notation and also denote
random data by lower case letters. It will be clear from the context whether I
talk about the pre-experimental or post-experimental situation. The statistical
model will, if this is natural, be seen from a pre-experimental point of view.
In the first part of this book I will in particular address the following
prediction or learning situation: In the statistical model, let yi have some
identical conditional distribution, given xi and some fixed parameter θ for
i = 0, 1, 2, ..., n, and assume that these distributions are independent. In ad-
dition xi (i = 0, 1, 2, ..., n) may or may not have some identical independent
distributions given a parameter κ, and θ and κ may or may not have priors.
I assume that y0 is unknown, but the other yi’s are observed data. The xi’s
are data or preset values. Thus here the UCV’s are y0, θ and κ, while the
OCV’s are {xi, yi; i = 1, ..., n} and x0. In principle the variables may belong
to any topological space and the σ-algebras of relevance may be contained in
the Borel σ-algebra, but in most practical cases they are constrained to subsets
of Euclidean spaces. My goal in this part is to give some theoretical basis for
discussing methods to predict y0, given the OCV’s. Thus y0 is in this case
the e-variable of interest. This is also the conceptual basis for much of Hastie,
Tibshirani and Friedman (2009) (supervised learning).
6 Data; generalized sufficiency and ancillarity
Let z be a statistic, and let τ be a conceptual variable. The following is assumed
throughout this section:
1) The distribution of z, given τ , depends on an unknown e-variable θ.
2) If τ or part of τ has a distribution, this is independent of θ. The part of
τ which does not have a distribution is functionally independent of θ.
To fix ideas, think of 1) and 2) as describing a situation where inference
on θ is sought from the data z in the context described by τ , but there are
variants of this. In a simple experiment, z may be the whole data set, and τ
may be trivial or some nuicance parameter. In addition, τ may contain the real
context of the experiment, which it always will, but this is often just taken as
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an implicit fact. In a series of experiments, ordered in time, z may be the data
set of the last experiment, and the context τ may contain some or all of the
conceptual variables connected to the earlier experiments. In a metaanalysis, z
may contain all data sets, and τ may contain all contexts. It is a basic condition
that the model assumptions are rich enough so that 1) and 2) are meaningful.
Throughout most of this section, z and τ will be held fixed.
6.1 Sufficiency
We let t be a known or unknown function of z. Later I will give a class of ex-
amples of the perhaps unfamiliar situation where we have an unknown function
of the data. The concept of sufficiency was introduced by Fisher as a tool for
reducing the data in a given situation without sacrificing anything related to
the inference on the parameter θ.
Definition 4. We say that t = t(z) is a (z, τ)-sufficient quasi-statistic for
θ if the conditional distribution of z, given t, τ and θ is independent of θ. If z
is the whole data set, we say just that t is τ-sufficient.
From the fact that 1) is meaningful, it follows that the conditional distribu-
tion of z, given t, τ and θ is meaningful. However, difficulties (Lehmann and
Casella, 1998) may arise because the conditional distribution is only defined
almost everywhere. I then follow Reid (1995) in making the definition more
precise: The quasistatistic t(z) is (z, τ)-sufficient if there is a transformation
from z to (t, v) such that the densities satisfy
f(z|θ, τ) ∝ f(t|θ, τ)f(v|t, τ),
where the constant of proportionality is independent of θ. This is a version
of the factorization theorem: t(z) is (z, τ)-sufficient if and only if there exist
functions g(t|θ, τ) and h(z|τ) such that for all z and θ we have
f(z|θ, τ) = g(t(z)|θ, τ)h(z|τ).
Ordinary sufficiency results if τ is trivial, θ is the full parameter and t is a
statistic. The case where part of τ is a nuicance parameter is also of interest.
The general concept is of interest also in many other situations.
In general, if t(z) is a (z, τ)-sufficient statistic, the rest of the distribution
of z can be thought of as generated by some randomization independent of θ,
and gives no information about the e-variable. This will be made precise by a
sufficiency principle formulated later.
It is clear that t = z is a (z, τ)-sufficient statistic, but usually we are in-
terested in smaller functions of z. In general a minimal sufficient observator
will not exist, but translating a result from ordinary sufficiency theory, any
boundedly complete (z, τ) observator will be minimal sufficient.
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Definition 5. A (z, τ)-sufficient statistic t is boundedly complete if for all
bounded functions h
E(h(t)|θ, τ) = 0 for all θ implies P (h(t) = 0|θ, τ) = 1 for all θ.
Proposition 1. (Bahadur’s Theorem). Suppose that t takes values in a
k-dimensional Euclidean space and that t is a (z, τ)-sufficient and boundedly
complete statistic. Then t is a minimal (z, τ)-sufficient statistic.
Standard results like the Rao-Blackwell Theorem and the Lehmann-Scheffe´
Theorem generalize immediately to (z, τ)-sufficiency. The first result says that
if g(z) is any estimator of θ and if t(z) is a (z, τ)-sufficient statistic, then the
conditional expectation of g(z), given t(z) is an at least as good estimator as
g(z), using quadratic loss. Sometimes one gets a considerable improvement
using such a Rao-Blackwellization. The last result says that if t is complete and
τ -sufficient for θ and h(t) is an estimator of θ which is conditionally unbiased,
given τ , then h(t) has uniform minimal conditional variance, given τ .
Assume that we on the basis of data z want to estimate the e-variable θ in
the context given by τ .
Definition 6. If t(z) is a minimal sufficient quasi-statistic for θ, and the
distribution of t depends on a part of τ , we say that this part is relevant for the
estimation of θ.
Example 8. Let z = (y1, ..., yn), where y1, ..., yn are independent and iden-
tically distributed (i.i.d.) N(µ, σ2). Then (y¯, s2) is sufficient for (µ, σ2), where
s2 = (n − 1)−1∑ni=1(yi − y¯)2. However, even in this simple example it is of
interest which parameter we focus upon. Write the log likelihood as
lnf = k+
1
2σ2
n∑
i=1
(yi−µ)2+1
2
ln(σ2) = k+
1
2σ2
n∑
i=1
[(yi−y¯)2+n(y¯−µ)2]+1
2
ln(σ2).
From this we see:
a) If τ contains the nuisance parameter σ2, then y¯ is (minimal) (z, τ)-
sufficient for µ.
b) If τ contains the nuisance parameter µ, then
∑n
i=1(yi − µ)2 is (minimal)
(z, τ)-sufficient for σ2. This is a first example of an unknown function of the
data where the concept of sufficiency is of interest.
In each case the minimality of the sufficient statistic can be proved from
Proposition 1.
We conclude from this that σ2 is irrelevant for the (point-)estimation of µ,
while µ is relevant for the estimation of σ2.
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6.2 Ancillarity and conditioning
Next I turn to the generalization of ancillarity, another basic concept introduced
by Fisher.
Definition 7. We say that u = u(z) is a (z, τ)-ancillary quasi-statistic for
θ if the conditional distribution of u, given τ is independent of θ.
If u is (z, τ)-ancillary and f is a measurable function, then f(u) is (z, τ)-
ancillary. In the corresponding partial ordering of statistics (u < v if u = f(v)
for some function f), z is an upper bound. By Zorn’s Lemma, one or several
maximal ancillaries will exist. We say that u is τ -ancillary if z is the whole data
set; just ancillary if τ is trivial.
A very important and much discussed question is when one should condition
upon ancillaries. Once one has conditioned upon an ancillary, this can be taken
as part of the context of the experiment or the observational study. Thus the
context is expanded, but after this expansion, 1) and 2) in the beginning of
Section 6 will still hold. A closer discussion of the question of conditioning will
be given in the next section, but as a background for this discussion we will
sketch some examples.
A basic argument for conditioning is given by the following example:
Example 9. (Berger and Wolpert, 1988; Cox, 1958) Consider two poten-
tial laboratory experiments for the same unknown parameter θ such that E1 is
planned to be carried out in New York while E2 is planned to be carried out in
San Francisco. The owner of the material to be sent chooses to toss an unbiased
coin, deciding E1 with probability 1/2 and E2 with probability 1/2. Consider
the whole experiment E including the coin toss, and let u be the result of the
coin toss. Here u is ancillary, and everybody would condition upon u in the
statistical analysis.
A problem with the requirement of conditioning, is that maximal ancillaries
may not be unique.
Example 10. Let θ be a scalar parameter between -1 and +1. Consider
a multinomial distribution on four cells with respective probabilities p1 = (1 +
θ)/6, p2 = (2 − θ)/6, p3 = (1 − θ)/6 and p4 = (2 + θ)/6 and total number
of observations n. Let the corresponding observed numbers in the sample be
z1, z2, z3 and z4. The multinomial distribution is a generalization of the binomial
distribution with multivariate point probabilities
n!
z1!z2!z3!z4!
pz11 p
z2
2 p
z3
3 p
z4
4 .
Then one can show that each of the statistics
u1 = z1 + z2, u2 = z1 + z3
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is ancillary for θ, but they are not jointly ancillary. And conditioning upon u1,
respectively u2 leads to distinct inference (the maximum likelihood estimator is
the same, but the asymptotic variances are different).
Cox (1971) has proposed an intrinsic criterium for the choice of ancillary to
condition upon in such cases, but my opinion is that this choice should depend
upon the context.
Example 11. In a certain city the sex ratio is 1:1, and it is known that 1/3
of the population have their own cellphone. The ratio between female and male
cellphone owners is an unknown quantity (1+θ)/(1−θ), where −1 < θ < 1. One
is interested in estimating θ by sampling randomly n persons from a register of
the city population. It is assumed that the population is much larger than the
sample size n.
Let the number of men in the sample be u1, and let u2 persons in the sample
be owners of cellphones. Thus u1 = z1 + z2 and u2 = z1 + z3, where z1 and
z2 are the male cellphone owners and non-owners, respectively, and z3 and z4
are the corresponding female numbers. The joint distribution of z1, ..., z4 is as
in Example 10. Again each of u1 and u2 are ancillary, but they are not jointly
ancillary.
Another question is whether or not one should always condition upon ancil-
laries. The following examples give a background for that discussion.
Example 12. (Helland, 1995) As a part of a larger medical experiment, two
independent individuals (1 and 2) have been on a certain diet for some time, and
by taking samples at the beginning and at the end of that period some response
like the change in blood cholesterol levels is measured. For the individual i
(i = 1, 2), the measured response is yi, which is modeled as independent normal
(µi, σ
2) with a known measurement variance σ2.
Because the two individual have been given the same treatment (diet) in the
larger experiment, the parameter of interest is not µ1 and µ2, but their mean:
θ = 12 (µ1 + µ2).
Suppose now that for some reason we have only capacity to measure one of
the individuals, but at the outset, we don’t know which. Let u be the indicator
of the individual chosen. It is clear that, given u, that is, given u = 1 or u = 2,
we get no information about θ. But choosing u randomly with probability 12 for
each of the two values will give us such information, provided that the identity
of the individual chosen is not revealed. The last statement follows from a
sampling argument: The situation is a special case of a sampling situation
where n individuals are sampled randomly from a population of N individuals
where the parameter of interest is the mean in the population. In addition
there is a measurement error for each individual, modeled as independently
normal (0, σ2). It is then clear that the sample mean of the observations is
an appropriate estimator of this population mean. It is equally clear that this
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conclusion also must be valid for the special case N = 2, n = 1, the situation at
hand.
The surprising aspect of this example is that a situation with less information
can give us more ability to do inference: By not knowing u we can make some
(admittedly uncertain, but nevertheless valid) inference on θ; when we know u,
such an inference is impossible.
Example 13. Consider a sensory analysis firm where there is a staff of N
trained assessors and a panel of n out of these are selected randomly to taste a
particular product. A report is written. Given the assessors, what they do in the
analysis must be considered as separate experiments on a common parameter θ.
Consider the whole investigation, and let u be the result of choosing randomly
the assessors to take part in it. Again u is ancillary. But in this case it may not
be immediately natural to condition upon u in the written report.
Example 14. (This example requires knowledge of some special statistical
procedures.) Look at the general comparison of logistic regression and linear
disciminant analysis (Hastie et al., 2009 and Efron, 1975). With inputs x and
classification into one of K possible classes g, both procedures correspond to
the same linear form βk0 + β
T
k x of
log
P (g = k|x)
P (g = K|x) .
The difference is that in logistic regression, βk0 and βk are the only parame-
ters, x is ancillary, and inference is done conditionally upon x in the training
set; while in linear discriminant analysis (LDA), these parameters depend upon
further parameters characterizing the underlying assumed multinormal distri-
bution of x, and inference is done unconditionally with respect to the training
set u = x. If the assumption of multinormality really holds, efficiency calcula-
tions by Efron (1975) lead to the conclusion that one should not condition upon
the training set, i.e., choose linear discriminant analysis. For the general case
where these assumptions do not hold, none of the procedures seem to dominate.
7 Conditioning and the conditionality principle
Any statistical investigation has to start with a conceptual analysis. This in-
cludes choosing question of interest, collect earlier information on this question,
the choice of design or sampling plan, choosing target population and sampling
units, the choice of a model and maybe of a loss function etc.. The result of
this analysis must be considered as a part of the context of the estimation and
prediction problem. Then data are collected.
Assume now the setting 1), 2) of the previous section and that u is a (z, τ)-
ancillary quasi-observator. All the examples in subsection 6.2 satisfy these con-
ditions.
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To choose the conditioning in example 11, one must specify further. Sup-
pose that the data collection is done by first finding out whether the person
in question is a man or woman, thereafter asking about cellphone ownership,
then the conditioning should be done upon sex. In the opposite case, if the
data collection is done from a register of cellphone owners, later asking about
sex, then one should condition upon cellphone ownership. In the case where the
data are found from a register containing both information on sex and cellphone
ownership, one should perhaps condition upon both variables, even though we
don’t have joint ancillarity here.
The last three examples describe different situations. First consider Example
12. Here the parameter of interest θ is a function of the total parameter φ =
(µ1, µ2), and an ancillary for φ is the choice u of a person to investigate. This is
chosen randomly, and is unknown to the experimentalist. Assuming that u takes
some definite value, let µu be the value of µ for the specific person chosen. The
experiment, in whatever way it is done, can then in principle be parametrized
by φ′ = (µu, θ), since the other µ is 2θ − µu. From this point of view µu is
irrelevant for the statistical decision that we want to do. In such a situation one
should not condition. However, a more difficult situation occurs if one has some
independent information about the chosen person which is relevant for θ itself
or for the potential estimate of θ. Then it is impossible to obtain a sampling
situation. One could or could not condition upon u, but in neither case we do
not get any immediate information about θ.
The generalized principle for conditioning (GPC). Assume that u
is a maximal (z, τ)-ancillary quasi-statistic for an e-variable θ.
1) In the case where u is a statistic, i.e., a known function of z, any in-
ference on θ based upon the data z should be conditional upon u. If there are
several maximal such u’s to choose between, one should condition upon the one
corresponding to the data that have first been obtained.
2) If knowledge of u implies knowledge about a conceptual variable for the
observed unit which one is sure is irrelevant for the statistical decision, then
examples seem to indicate that one should not condition upon u.
3) The difficult case is when the knowledge of u implies knowledge on some
conceptual variable and part of this conceptual variable is relevant for the de-
cision or one is not sure whether or not this is the case. Then one should
either seek more information on this conceptual variable or one should perhaps
do some suitable model reduction, see below.
Part 1) is consistent with the conditioning chosen in Example 9 and in
Example 11. Part 2) is consistent with the decision not to condition in Example
12. It is also applicable to Example 14, and consistent with the results of Efron
(1975) for this situation. If one is sure that the underlying distribution for each
class is multinormal (with the same covariance matrix), then the parameter
of interest is θ = {(βk0,βk; k = 1, ...,K − 1}, but in the LDA case there are
underlying additional parameters which are not relevant for the classification.
In this case one should not condition, i.e., use LDA instead of logistic regression.
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In case we are not sure that the underlying distribution is multinormal, one is
in the difficult case 3), and may want to seek more information.
Example 13 is a bordering situation. In most cases, a user of the results of
the sensory analysis will not be interested in which assessors that are chosen, will
not ask for this information and will thus not condition upon this information.
I have given a normative form of the conditionality principle. For the fur-
ther development in this book it is also important to consider a descriptive form,
which is often given in the literature; see Berger and Wolpert (1988). In this
case, the notion ’one shold condition upon ...’ translates into ’... the uncondi-
tioned experiment contains no relevant experimental evidence on θ in addition
to that of the conditioned experiment’. As in Berger and Wolpert (1988), the
concept of ’relevant experimental evidence’ is left undefined, i. e., it can be
made precise in any reasonable way.
The generalized weak conditionality principle (GWCP). Suppose
that there are two experiments E1 and E2 with common e-variable θ and with
equivalent contexts τ . Consider the mixed experiment E∗, whereby u = 1 or 2 is
observed, each having probability 1/2 (independent of θ, the data of the exper-
iments and the contexts), and the experiment Eu is then performed. Then the
evidence about θ from E∗ is just the same as the evidence from the experiment
actually performed.
Note that this corresponds to the situation 1) of the GPC: The variable u
is a statistic here; the two experiments are known to the experimentalist. For a
note on the equivalence of contexts, see the next section.
The present book concentrates upon estimation and prediction, but the con-
ceptual framework discussed here is also valid for other types of statistical in-
ference. Confidence intervals may be considered if the context contains a set
of hypothetical situations where a particular estimation procedure is used, and
Bayesian analysis is relevant if prior distributions of parameters are part of the
context. Finally, in the case of a hypothesis testing setting, which is not dis-
cussed further in this book, the context may contain a specification of a null
hypothesis and an alternative hypothesis. Or if we are interested in Fisherian
p-value testing, a null hypothesis and a direction for the alternative should be
specified in the context.
8 The sufficiency and likelihood principles
The motivation behind the definition of a sufficient statistic is that one wants
to reduce the data and still get the same information about the e-variable. One
version of the sufficiency principle, as formulated in Berger and Wolpert (1988),
translates to our setting as follows:
The generalized weak sufficiency principle (GWSP). Consider an
experiment in a context τ as described above, let z be the data of that experiment,
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and let θ be an e-variable connected to the experiment. Assume that 1) and 2) of
Section 6 are satisfied. Let t = t(z) be a (z, τ)-sufficient statistic for θ. Then, if
t(z1) = t(z2), the data z1 and z2 contain the same experimental evidence about
θ in the context τ .
There can be given many examples to support the GWSP. The simplest
example is an independent measurement series z = (x1, ..., xn), where the xi’s
are normal (µ, σ2). If σ2 is known, x¯ = n−1
∑
xi is sufficient for µ, and any
reasonable inference is based upon x¯. If σ2 is unknown, then t(z) = (x¯, s2) is
sufficient for θ = (µ, σ2), where s2 = (n− 1)−1∑(xi − x¯)2. (The denominator
n−1 makes s2 an unbiased estimator of σ2; more information about this denom-
inator will be given below.) Any reasonable inference on θ under the normal
model is based upon t(z). This kind of data reduction was Fisher’s motivation
for introducing the concept of sufficiency.
Now following an argument from Berger and Wolpert (1988), using the
GWSP and the GWCP, which we will regard as more or less obvious, we can
derive the following likelihood principle. This result is a classical theorem first
given by Birnbaum (1962). The argument is reproduced for completeness in
Appendix 2 for the discrete case; this is in fact the case I need later in the dis-
cussion of quantum mechanics. For the continuous case, see Berger and Wolpert
(1988).
A version of the likelihood principle will be used later to motivate Born’s
formula in quantum mechanics.
The generalized likelihood principle. Consider two experiments with
equivalent contexts τ , and assume that θ is the same full e-variable in both exper-
iments. Suppose that two observations z∗1 and z
∗
2 have proportional likelihoods
in the two experiments, where the proportionality constant c is independent of
θ.
Assume that one is sure that the decision problem on θ does not depend any
irrelevant UCV. Then these two observations produce the same evidence on θ
in this context.
Two contexts τ and τ ′ are defined to be equivalent if there is a one-to-one
correspondence between them: τ ′ = f(τ), τ = f−1(τ ′).
Since both my definition of ancillary and my definition of sufficient statistic
depend on the context, and therefore the context is kept fixed in the correspond-
ing principles, it is important that it is kept essentially fixed also here. This
aspect makes the generalized likelihood principle weaker than the principle as
formulated in the literature, in particular in Berger and Wolpert (1988). On
the other hand, paradoxes like what the ordinary likelihood principle seems to
imply in the following situation are avoided.
Example 15. Suppose that s1, s2, ... are independent, identically distributed
variables with P (s = 1) = θ and P (s = 0) = 1 − θ, i.e., iid Bernoulli variables
with parameter θ. In experiment E1, a fixed sample size of 10 observations is
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decided upon, and the sufficient statistic t1 =
∑10
i=1 si turns out to be t1 = 8.
In experiment E2, it is decided to take observations until a total of 2 zeroes has
been observed. Then assume that the sufficient statistics t2 =
∑
si also turns
ot to take the value 8. The two likelihoods are proportional, but the contexts
are different, so the intuition that the two experiments may lead to different in-
ference on θ is supported by my version of the likelihood principle. For further
discussion of this example, see Berger and Wolpert (1988) and references there.
The introduction of a context makes my formulation of the likelihood prin-
ciple far less controversial than the ordinary formulation. According to the
ordinary principle, the way data are obtained is irrelevant to inference; all in-
formation is contained in the likelihood. Thus sampling plans, randomization
procedures, and stopping rules are irrelevant according to a common interpreta-
tion of the ordinary principle. Furthermore, common frequentist concepts like
bias, confidence coefficients, levels and powers of statistical tests, etc., are irrele-
vant, as they depend on the sample space, not only on the observed observations.
In my formulation, all these concepts are related to the context. Also Bayesian
priors, if needed, are contained in the context. Maximum likelihood estimation
can not be derived from the likelihood principle, but is obviously permissible as
a method of obtaining reasonable proposals for estimates in general.
An important special case of the generalized likelihood principle is when
the proportionality constant c is equal to 1. Then the two observations z∗1 and
z∗2 have equal likelihoods. Again an important special case is when the two
experiments are identical. A consequence of the generalized likelihood principle
is then that all experimental evidence, given the context, is a function of the
likelihood of the experiment.
In the situation 2) of GPC the likelihood principle can not be deduced in
a similar way. It is nevertheless clear in the examples how inference should be
carried out; in Example 12 by using the sampling distribution, in Example 14 by
using the underlying Gaussian distribution. Other examples could be discussed
in a similar way. I will assume that the likelihood is the basis for inference also
in this case. However, in the situation 3) of GPC there are difficulties in finding
the best inference procedure.
9 Estimation and prediction
9.1 Estimation and model reduction
Sufficiency and ancillarity in the case with nuicance parameters have been dis-
cussed from many points of view by several authors (Fraser, 1956; Dawid, 1975;
Basu, 1977; Godambe, 1980; Zhu and Reid, 1994; Reid, 1995). Here I will see it
in light of the assumed context. If θ is the parameter we are interested in, and
λ is the rest of the parameters, it may or may not be that λ is relevant for the
estimation of θ. In any case, λ and the eventual estimation of λ must be taken
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as a part of the context when estimating the parameter of interest θ. Before
estimation, λ is an UCV in the context of the inference problem of interest. If
this UCV is not relevant, we are in the situation 2) of the GPC, if it is relevant,
we are in the more difficult situation 3), and more information should be sought,
for instance by estimating λ. However, even when this is possible, it might be
better to eliminate λ by reducing the model.
Example 8 (continued). As was seen from the likelihood, σ is irrelevant
for the estimation of µ, while µ is of relevance for the estimation of σ. Thus
µ̂ = y¯ from any point of view, while the estimation of σ as an isolated parameter
of interest may be discussed.
I will promote the REML (restricted or reduced maximal likelihood) princi-
ple as a solution to this and similar variance estimation problems. This reduces
the likelihood and eliminates the expectation based nuisance parameter if the
covariance parameters are the ones of interest:
Let the n-vector y be modelled as multinormal N(Xβ,Σ), where X is a
known n×p matrix of rank p, and where Σ depends on an r-dimensional param-
eter of interest θ. In general, y is multinormal N(µ,Σ) if cTy is N(cTµ, cTΣc)
for any constant vector c.
Define the residuals r = (I −X(XTX)−1XT )y. Let A be an n× (n − p)
matrix of full rank n − p such that ATX = 0. Then a = ATr = ATy will
have a non-singular distribution, and the maximum likelihood estimator found
from the distribution of a is independent of the choice of the matrix A with the
stated properties. This is called the REML estimator.
Example 8 (continued). REML gives σ̂2 =
∑
(yi − y¯)2/(n− 1) with the
correct denominator.
Similarly, REML gives variance components estimates with the correct de-
grees of freedom (denominator) in all balanced mixed models. In particular, a
general problem raised by Neyman and Scott (1948) is solved in a satisfactory
way by this estimator. REML was proposed for unbalanced mixed models by
Patterson and Thompson (1971), has been discussed by many authors, and is
now the routine method when estimating variance components in animal breed-
ing.
In Section 3, I discussed model reduction to one orbit or to a few orbits of a
group defined on the e-variable space (parameter space). This may be a way to
get rid of nuisance parameters. But there is also a complementary possibility.
The orbits of the group G0 on the sample space constitute equivalence classes
there, so we can always index the classes by some a. This is called the maximal
invariant of the group. Under weak conditions (see Eaton, 1989, and references
there), we can choose a so that it can be given a probability distribution. Sim-
ilarly, we can index the orbits in the parameter space by some parameter τ ,
the maximal invariant of the group G. One can easily prove (Lehmann, 1959)
that a has a distribution which depends only upon τ , and this gives again a
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reduced model. Again, the hope is that in this reduced model, the parameter of
interest θ is still present, while the effect of the nuisance parameter λ is reduced
or disappears.
As an example of the latter procedure, let once again the n-vector y be
modelled as N(Xβ,Σ), where X is a known n× p matrix of rank p, and where
Σ depends on an r-dimensional parameter of interest θ. This model implies that
the expectation of y belongs to the vector space V spanned by the columns ofX.
Let the group G0 consist of all translations of y by vectors in this space. Then
the corresponding parameter group G is given by all translations β → β + c.
The orbits of G can be indexed by a, where a = ATr = ATy, with A being any
n× (n− p) matrix of full rank n− p such that ATX = 0, and where r are the
residuals of the model. The orbits of G in the parameter space are independent
of the nuisance parameter β and depend only upon the parameter of interest
θ. Thus this model reduction gives exactly what one wants, and maximum
likelihood estimation in the reduced model in just REML.
9.2 Prediction, sufficiency and partial least squares
Consider now the prediction setting described at the end of Section 5. We will let
yi be scalars with identical independent conditional distributions, given vectors
or scalars xi and perhaps a distribution if the xi’s. The conditional distribution
of yi, given xi depend on a vector or scalar parameter θ for i = 0, 1, 2, ..., n. The
training set consists of the observations for i = 1, ..., n, which are OCV’s. In
addition, we know x0, and want to predict y0.
For later discussions of the link to quantum theory, note that the prediction
problem per se is dependent upon the e-variable y0 connected to a single item,
not to a population. The likelihood, given this e-variable is the conditional
density of x0, given y0. This conditional distribution played a prominent roˆle
in the discussion of Cook (2007).
Having noted this, this prediction problem is obviously dependent upon the
UCV θ. The first step now of the prediction procedure is to determine which
part of θ is relevant for the prediction. In the linear regression case this is
just the regression vector, or more specifically βTx0, where β is the regression
vector and x0 is now seen as a vector. The second step is to estimate this part,
eventually after a model reduction. In Hastie et al. (2009) a large number of
estimation procedures are described for the linear regression case, and also for
other cases. In Example 6 of Section 3, we concentrated on a method to reduce
the model before doing the estimation.
Model reduction, in regression models as well as in other models can be
motivated from many points of view. Cook (2007) related this to data reduction
and considered regression of a random variable y in with respect to a random
vector x. A reduction R in x from p dimensions to m dimensions, m < p was
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said to hold if one of the following equivalent statements holds:
(i) x|(y,R(x)) has the same distribution as x|R(x),
(ii) y|x has the same distribution as y|R(x),
(iii) y is independent of x given R(x).
Cook (2007) states that this is quite analoguous to the ordinary definition
of sufficiency. In fact it is equivalent to Definition 4 above for the UCV θ = y
when the data are given by z = x.
A special case is when the reduction is linear: R(x) = Px for some projec-
tion operator P of rank m. Then (iii) is equivalent to
(iv) y is independent of Qx given Px,
where Q = P⊥.
Consider now the case where x is multinormal. Then a stronger statement
is obtained if we add the extra condition
(v) Qx is independent of Px,
and this is equivalent to Cov(Qx,Px) = 0. It is proved in Cook et al. (2012)
that in the multinormal case (or in general when independence is weakened to
uncorrelatedness) the statement (iv)+(v) is equivalent to the statement that the
reduced model is an envelope model of dimension m (see Cook et al. (2010) for
a definition and a comprehensive discussion). Furthermore, it is proved in op.
cit. that this envelope model is equivalent to the population PLS model with
m relevant components, that is, the same model that was motivated in Section
3 from invariance.
Parameters in the reduced model are estimated in op. cit. by maximum
likelihood and other methods. Bayesian estimation is discussed in Helland et
al. (2012).
In the next part of the book I will address quantum mechanics from an epis-
temic point of view. A crucial concept is then that of an inaccessible e-variable,
that is, an epistemic variable which cannot be estimated with arbitrary accuracy
by any experiment. In the regression model where the dimension p by neces-
sity is larger than the number n of observations, the regression vector β must
be seen as an inaccessible parameter. However, under suitable circumstances,
the e-variable function βTx0 may still be estimable. In particular this is the
case when x0 is regarded as random, with the same distribution as the other
xi’s. One approach towards estimating this function may be model reduction
as discussed in this section.
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PART II
10 Inaccessible conceptual variables and quan-
tum theory
The statistical literature is full of discussions on how to do inference, but con-
tains very little on the choice of question to do inference on in some given
situation. These different questions may be conflicting, even complementary.
In the following sections I will start by formalizing a way in which the discus-
sion of such complementary questions may be addressed in the extreme case
where it is only possible to raise one out of many different possible questions at
a time. Each such question will be an epistemic question ’What is θ?’ for some
e-variable θ, and I will assume that the epistemic process ends by giving some
information about θ, in the simplest case a complete specification: θ = uk.
The concept of an epistemic process is taken to be very wide in this book.
In addition to statistical questions concerning a parameter θ, we can think of
questions like: How many sun hours will there be here tomorrow? At the outset,
to address this epistemic question will involve meteorological expertise and a lot
of data from similar situations, but tomorrow the question can be answered by
just counting the number of sun hours. Both these processes will be seen as
epistemic processes.
So far I have assumed that each relevant e-variable is accessible, that is,
it can be assessed with arbitrary accuracy by some experiment. In Helland
(2006, 2008, 2010) several situations with inaccessible conceptual variables were
described, and it was indicated that such situations in special cases could form
a link to important parts of quantum theory. I consider this way of thinking
to be essential as a step towards obtaining a unification of epistemic science,
and also as an attempt to give an alternative background for the - from a
statistical point of view and also from the layman’s point of view - very formal
language that one finds in textbooks and in scientific publications, both within
quantum physics and in the mathematical traditions developed from this. In
the following sections a less formal approach will be presented. Compared to
my earlier publications, the discussion here will hopefully give both a simpler
and a more complete treatment of my approach towards quantum mechanics.
In statistics, the parameter concept is connected to a hypothetical popula-
tion of items. My e-variables are intended also for situations where we have
a single item or a few items, and a human subject or a group of subjects use
these variables in making statements about the item(s). This is crucial for my
epistemic interpretation of quantum mechanics, an interpretation which I also
share with the Bayesian quantum foundation school; see below.
Quantum theory has a long history starting with the work of several eminent
physicists in the beginning of the previous century, via the formalization made
by von Neumann (1932) to the rather intense debate on quantum foundation
that we see today. Interpretations of the theory have been given by several
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authors, but it has also been argued that no interpretation is needed; see Fuchs
and Peres (2000). Several attempts have been made recently to derive quantum
theory from a few explicit or implicit physical assumptions; see Hardy (2001),
Chiribella et al. (2010), Masanes (2010), Fields (2011) and Fivel (2012). There
is also a group of quantum foundation researchers working towards a link with
Bayesian inference; see Caves et al. (2002), Schack (2006), Timpson (2008),
Fuchs (2010) and Fuchs and Schack (2011). The use of quantum information
theory in the exploration of the foundation has also recently proved to be very
useful, see Fuchs (2002). The present work has much in common with these
schools, but I find it fruitful to maintain a broader link to statistics, in particular
to allow a broader view on statistical inference than just the Bayesian view.
In this way I will argue for a foundation which is purely epistemological: A
general approach for going from experienced data to information about the
nature behind these data.
One very obvious case of an inaccessible conceptual variable is in connection
to counterfactual reasoning. Assume a single medical patient and let the doctors
have the choice between two mutually exclusive treatments. Let θi be the time
for this patient until recovery when treatment i is used (i = 1, 2), and let
φ = (θ1, θ2). Then θ1 or θ2 can be predicted before the treatment is applied,
and each of them can be determined precisely after some time period, but φ
is inaccessible, that is, there is no procedure by which φ can be assessed with
arbitrary accuracy at any time for a single patient by any medical doctor, by
any scientist or by any observer. This can be amended by instead of one patient
considering large homogeneous groups of patients, which is done in standard
statistical texts, but in practice there is a limitation on how homogeneous a
group of patients can be. And concepts may be of interest for one single patient,
too.
Here are two other examples of inaccessible conceptual variables:
• We want to measure some quantity θ1 with a very accurate apparatus
which is so fragile that it is destroyed after a single measurement. There
is another quantity θ2 which can only be found by dismantling the appa-
ratus, and then it can not be repaired. The vector φ = (θ1, θ2) is again
inaccessible.
• Assume that two questions are to be asked to a single individual at some
given moment, and that we know that the answer will depend on the
order in which the questions are posed. Let the e-variable (θ1, θ2) be the
answers when the questions are posed in one order, and let the answers
be (θ3, θ4) when the questions are posed in the opposite order. Then the
vector φ = (θ1, θ2, θ3, θ4) is inaccessible.
From a statistical point of view: Inaccessible parameters also occur in linear
models of non-full rank, often used in the case of unbalanced data, cp. Searle
(1971), and in the analysis of designed experiments where only some contrasts
can be estimated. Also, in regression models where the number of variables by
necessity is larger than the number of observations, the regression parameter is
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an inaccessible parameter. In my opinion a more complete theory of statistical
inference is definitely obtained if we allow for inaccessible conceptual variables.
It is a crucial fact that the inaccessible conceptual variables take abstract
values in some mathematical space and that operations such as group actions
may be made on this space. This is the case with the counterfactual example
above, where a group action such as a change of time scale can be made. How-
ever, I will not regard the inaccessible conceptual variables as physical variables,
and they do not take concrete values, so I am not developing a hidden variable
theory of the kind that has been much debated in the physical literature over
the years.
An example of a hidden variable theory is David Bohm’s dual wave-particle
theory, and John Bell (see Bell, 1987) proved that this theory is non-local.
In fact, Bell proved much more. His famous theorem states that any realistic
theory consistent with quantum mechanics must be non-local. This result has
been very important in discussions among physicists in recent years. Bell’s
theorem is proved using the socalled Einstein-Podolski-Rosen experiment and
Bell’s inequality, concepts which for completeness will be discussed later in this
book. One point for me here is that I do not want to develop a non-local theory,
that is, a theory where communication is made by signals travelling faster than
the light speed. Then I am instead forced to take a closer look upon the concept
of realism. This has also been done recently in a very convincing way by Nistico`
and Sestito (2011). In that paper they take as a point of departure the criterion
of reality as formulated be Einstein et al. (1935):
Criterion of reality. If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can
predict the value of a physical quantity, then there exists an element of physical
reality corresponding to this physical quantity.
Following arguments from Bohr’s discussion of Einstein et al. (1935) they
make the case for a strict interpretation of this criterion:
Strict interpretation. To ascribe reality to P , the measurement of an
observable whose outcome would allow for the prediction of P , must actually be
performed.
Nistico` and Sestito (2011) go on and formulate an extension of quantum
correlation which is consistent with the strict interpretation, and using this
they show that Bell’s argument and several related arguments in the literature
fail when realism is interpreted in this strict way. Thus the possibility turns out
to be open to interpret the non-locality theorems in the physical literature as
arguments supporting the strict criterion of reality, rather than as a violation
of locality.
Since the present book is theoretical and not experimental, I will have to
modify Nistico` and Sestito’s requirement of strict interpretation slightly: ’... a
description of how the measurement can be actually performed, must be given.’
It is important that my conceptual variables are thought of as defined by one
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person or a group of persons and to the experimental data that he/she/they are
able to obtain.
In other papers, Bell’s theorem is interpreted as saying that quantum physics
must necessarily violate either the principle of locality or counterfactual definite-
ness. Counterfactual definiteness is defined as the ability to speak with meaning
of definiteness of results of measurements that have not been performed (i.e.,
the ability to assure the existence of objects, and properties of objects, even
when they have not been measured.) In this book it is crucial that I do not
assume counterfactual definiteness. All my conceptual variables are assumed to
be defined by some person(s), and these conceptual variables will not necessarily
be such that results of measurements not performed will have meaning. Here
is a simple example: By first sight, one of the statements ’I have something
on my lap’ and ’I do not have anything on my lap’ must be true. But if I am
standing, neither of these statements are true. The logical status of statements
must depend on the context.
In my formulation, I will look upon the accessible e-variables as variables
connected with experiment which actually can be imagined to be performed by
some person. This person will have a certain context for his experiment. It is
possible that another person, who has no communication with the first one, has
a different context and uses different e-variables to formulate his observations,
therefore getting seemingly conflicting predictions. But as soon as communi-
cation is restored, there must be no conflict any more. To make this precise:
The two persons must then make non-conflicting predictions if they agree on a
common context, and they must agree on observed results as long as they both
have observed results.
11 The maximal symmetrical epistemic setting;
definitions
I proceed to discuss a setting from which I will show that essential parts of
the formalism of quantum mechanics can be derived. From my point of view
this is nothing but a special situation with an inaccessible conceptual variable,
where I focus upon accessible sub conceptual variables and where symmetry is
introduced by natural group actions. The purpose at this point is not to derive
all aspects of quantum mechanics, only as much that we see that the e-variable
concept is useful also in this connection, so that we can obtain an interpretation
where there is a link to the ordinary statistical theory of estimation/prediction.
Later the assumptions made here will be weakened.
Let in general φ be an inaccessible conceptual variable taking values in some
topological space Φ, and let λa = λa(φ) be accessible functions for a belonging
to some index set A. I will repeat that an e-variable is accessible if it in the
given context can be estimated with arbitrary accuracy by some experiment.
Technically I will without further mention assume that all functions defined on
Φ are Borel-measurable. To begin with, I will assume that the functions λa are
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maximal, and also that there is an isomorphism between them.
Assumption 1. a) Consider the partial ordering defined by α < β iff α =
f(β) for some function f . Under this partial ordering each λa(φ) is maximally
accessible.
b) For a 6= b there is an invertible transformation gab such that λb(φ) =
λa(gab(φ)).
Note that the partial ordering in a) is consistent with accessibility: If β is
accessible and α = f(β), then α is accessible. Also, φ is an upper bound under
this partial ordering. The existence of maximal accessible conceptual variables
follows then from Zorn’s lemma.
Below, I will often single out a particular index 0 ∈ A. Then a), given b),
can be formally weakened to the assumption that λ0(φ) is maximally accessible,
and b) can be weakened to the existence for all a of an invertible transformation
g0a such that λ
a(φ) = λ0(g0a(φ)). Take gab = g
−1
0a g0b.
In the example above with counterfactual medical treatments, we can take
λa = θ1, λb = θ2, φ = (λa, λb) and gab((λ
a, λb)) = (λb, λa). In general, when
the transformation of Assumption 1b exists, it is usually easy to see how it can
be chosen.
Even though φ is inaccessible, it is possible to operate on φ with functions,
in particular group actions. For instance, in the medical example above, one can
operate on φ with a common change of time unit. It is then important to make
sure that these actions induce unique operations on the accessible e-variables
λa. The property which ensures this, is given by:
Definition 8. Let a group H act upon a conceptual variable φ, and let
η = η(φ) be a sub conceptual variable. Then η is said to be permissible with
respect to H if η(φ1) = η(φ2) implies η(hφ1) = η(hφ2) for all h ∈ H.
When η is permissible with respect to H , one can define a group H˜ of actions
upon η by h˜η(φ) = η(hφ). For a group H˜ acting upon η one can always find at
least one corresponding group H acting upon φ.
For a given η, there is a unique maximal group with respect to which η is
permissible. This is the group of actions h for which η(φ1) = η(φ2) is equivalent
to η(hφ1) = η(hφ2) for all pairs (φ1, φ2).
Let us now go back to the situation of Assumption 1. We single out one
particular index 0 ∈ A.
Definition 9. a) Let G0 be the maximal group of transformations of Φ
under which λ0(φ) is permissible, and let Ga = g−10a G
0g0a.
b) Let G be the group generated by G0 and the transformations g0a.
It is easy to see that Ga is the maximal group under which λa is permissible
and that G is the group generated by Ga; a ∈ A and the transformations gab.
In this setting I want to introduce the further
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Assumption 2. a) The group G is a locally compact topological group, and
satisfies week assumptions such that an invariant measure on Φ exists. (see
Appendix 3).
b) λa(φ) varies over an orbit or a set of orbits of the smaller group Ga. This
is made precise in the following way: λa varies over an orbit or a set of orbits
of the corresponding group G˜a.
c) The group generated by products of elements of Ga, Gb, ...; a, b, ... ∈ A is
equal to G.
Assumption 2a) is a technical one, needed in the next section. Note that
G is defined in terms of transformations upon Φ, so that the topology must be
introduced in terms of these transformations. Technically this can be achieved
by assuming Φ to be a metric space with metric d, and letting gn → g if
supφd(gn(φ), g(φ)) → 0. Assumption 2b) can be motivated from Example 16
below. Concerning 2c), it follows from gagb... = g−10a g
0g0ag
−1
0b g
0′g0b, ..., where
ga ∈ Ga, gb ∈ Gb, ... and g0, g0′ , ... ∈ G0, that the group of products is contained
in G. That it is equal to G, is an assumption on the richness of the index set A
or the richness of G0.
The setting described here, where Assumption 1 and Assumption 2 are satis-
fied, includes many quantum mechanical situations including spins and systems
of spins. I will call it the maximal symmetrical epistemic setting. Later I will
also sketch a macroscopical situation where the assumptions of the maximal
symmetrical epistemic setting are satisfied. I hope to discuss this latter subject
further elsewhere, but the focus in the present book will be quantum-mechanical.
Example 16. Model the spin vector of a particle such as the electron by
a vector φ, an inaccessible conceptual variable. More generally, we can let φ
denote the total spin/angular momentum vector for any particle or system of
particles. Let the symmetry group G be the group of rotations of the vector φ,
that is, the group that fixes the norm ‖φ‖. Next, choose a direction a in space,
and focus upon the spin component in this direction:
ζa = ‖φ‖cos(φ, a).
The largest subgroup Ga with respect to which ζa is permissible, is given by
rotations around a together with a reflection in a plane perpendicular to a.
However, the action of the group G˜a on ζa is just a reflection together with the
identity.
Finally, introduce model reduction of the kind discussed in Section 3: The
orbits of G˜a as acting on ζa are given as two-point sets {±c} together with the
single point 0. A maximal model reduction is to one such orbit. Later I will give
arguments to the effect that we want to reduce to the a set of orbits indexed by
an integer or half-integer j, and that we will let this reduced set of orbits be
−j,−j + 1, ..., j − 1, j.
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Letting λa be the parameter ζa reduced to this set of orbits of Ga, and assuming
this to be the maximal accessible parameter, we can prove that the general
assumptions of this section are satisfied (except in the case j = 0, where we must
redefine G = G0 to be the trivial group). For instance, here is an indication
of an argument leading to the proof of Assumption 2c): Given a and b, a
transformation gab sending λa(φ) onto λb(φ) can be obtained by a reflection in
a plane P perpendicular to a plane containing the two vectors a and b, where
P contains the mid-line between a and b.
The case with one orbit and c = 1/2 correspond to electrons and other spin
1/2 particles. The direction defined by a = 0 is some arbitrary fixed direction.
In general, Assumption 2b) may be motivated in a similar manner: First, an
e-variable ζa is introduced for each a through a chosen focusing; then define Ga
as the maximal group under which ζa is permissible, and finally λa as a reduction
of ζa to a set of orbits of G˜a. The content of Assumption 2b) together with
Assumption 1 is that it is this λa which is maximally accessible. This may be
regarded as the quantum hypothesis.
12 The maximal symmetrical epistemic setting;
Hilbert space
The crucial step now towards the formalism of quantum mechanics is to define
a Hilbert space, that is, a complete inner product space which serves as a state
space in the formalism (see Appendix 3). In ordinary quantum mechanics all
observables are identified with operators on such a Hilbert space and every
state is identified with a unit vector in the Hilbert space or more generally with
a ray proportional to a unit vector. There is a large, fairly abstract general
theory on this, well known to physicists, but largely unknown to statisticians.
My goal here is to rederive this theory from the assumptions of the maximal
symmetrical epistemic setting. This may serve as introducing statisticians and
other professionals to the theory, and also serve as a link between epistemic
cultures. This section is somewhat technical, and can be skimmed at the first
reading, but it is essential for what I feel should be the way to understand
ordinary quantum theory.
12.1 A preliminary solution
By Assumption 2a) there exists an invariant measure ρ for the group’s action:
ρ(gA) = ρ(A)
for all g ∈ G and for all Borel-measurable subsets A of Φ. In general there
is a distinction between right-invariant and left-invariant measures (again see
Appendix 3), but I will limit myself here to compact groups and other situations
where the two measures coincide. This is not crucial, however. There are
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general arguments in Helland (2010) that ρ always should be chosen as the right-
invariant measure. If G is transitive on Φ, then ρ is unique up to a multiplicative
constant. For compact groups, ρ can be normalized, i.e., taken as a probability
measure. In the case of a compact group with r orbits, we take ρ = r−1
∑
ρi,
where ρi is the unique invariant normed measure on orbit i.
The measure ρ allows us to define L2(Φ, ρ) as the space of all complex
measurable functions f for which
∫
Φ |f(φ)|2ρ(dφ) <∞, equiped with the scalar
product (f1, f2) =
∫
Φ
f∗1 (φ)f2(φ)ρ(dφ), where f
∗ denotes complex conjugate, in
particular, ‖f‖2 = (f, f). We identify f1 and f2 when ‖f1− f2‖ = 0. This then
gives a Hilbert space. The following closed subspace is also a Hilbert space:
Definition 10. In the symmetrical epistemic setting the basic Hilbert
space is given by
H = L(Λ0) = {f ∈ L2(Φ, ρ) : f(φ) = r(λ0(φ)) for some r}.
Thus H is defined as the set of L2-functions that are functions of λ0(φ).
In an attempt to link this to the other λa’s, we first define the (left) regular
representation U of the group G: For given f ∈ L2(Φ, ρ) and given g ∈ G we
define a new function U(g)f by
U(g)f(φ) = f(g−1φ). (6)
Without proof I mention 5 properties of the set of operators U(g):
- U(g) is linear: U(g)(a1f1 + a2f2) = a1U(g)f1 + a2U(g)f2.
- U(g) is unitary: (U(g)f1, f2) = (f1, U(g)
−1f2).
- U(g) is bounded: supf :‖f‖=1‖U(g)f‖ = 1 <∞.
- U(·) is continuous: If gn → g0 in the group topology, then U(gn)→ U(g0)
(in the matrix norm in the finite-dimensional case, which is what we will focus
on below; in general in the topology of bounded linear operators).
- U(·) is a homomorphism: U(g1g2) = U(g1)U(g2) and U(e) = I for the unit
element.
The concept of homomorphism will be crucial in this section. In general,
a homomorphism is a mapping k → k′ between groups K and K ′ such that
k1k2 → k′1k′2 when k1 → k′1 and k2 → k′2, and such that e → e′ for the unit
elements. Then also k−1 → (k′)−1 when k → k′.
A representation of a group K is a continuous homomorphism from K into
a group of linear operators on some vector space. If the vector space is finite
dimensional, the linear operators can be taken as matrices (see Appendix 3).
There is a large and useful mathematical theory about operator (matrix) rep-
resentation of groups; some of it is sketched in Appendix 3. Equation (6) gives
one such representation of the basic group G on the vector space L2(Φ, ρ).
Proposition 2. Let L(Λa) = {f ∈ L2(Φ, ρ) : f(φ) = r(λa(φ)) for some r}
and let Ua = U(g0a). Then
L(Λa) = U−1a H through r(λ
a(φ)) = U−1a r(λ
0(φ)).
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Proof.
If f ∈ L(Λa), then f(φ) = r(λa(φ)) = r(λ0(g0aφ)) = U(g0a)−1r(λ0(φ)) =
U−1a f0(φ), where f0 ∈ H .
Since a = 0 is an arbitrary, but fixed index, this gives in principle a unitary
connection between the different choices of H , different representations of the
’Hilbert space apparatus’. As already stated, in conventional quantum theory,
observables are represented by operators on such a Hilbert space. One of our
points is that this formal theory quite generally can be understood in terms of
conceptual variables. In principle one could imagine that one could represent
everything in the single Hilbert space H through the unitary transformation of
Proposition 2.
This simple solution is not satisfactory, however. To see this, look at the
discrete case. Then by a reasonable epistemic definition, a state is given by the
statement of the form λa = uak, that is, a maximally accessible e-variable λ
a has
been chosen, an epistemic question: ’What is λa?’ has been asked, and after an
epistemic process a definite answer is found. In L(Λa) this can be represented
by the indicator function fka (φ) = I(λ
a(φ) = uak). When transformed into a
function in H by Proposition 2, this turns out to be
Uaf
a
k = U(g0a)I(λ
0(g0a(φ)) = uk) = U(g0a)U(g0a)
−1I(λ0(φ) = uk) = f0k .
Thus by this simple transformation the indicator functions in H are not able to
distinguish between the different questions asked.
12.2 Towards the final solution
Another reason why the simple solution is not satisfactory is that the regular
representation U will not typically be a representation of the whole group G on
the Hilbert space H . This can however be amended by the following theorem.
Its proof and the resulting discussion below are where the Assumption 2c) of the
maximal symmetrical epistemic setting is used. Recall that throughout, upper
indices (Ga, ga) are for the subgroups of G connected to the accessible variables
λa, similarly (G˜a, g˜a) for the group (elements) acting upon λa. Lower indices
(e.g., (Ua = U(g0a)) are related to the transformations between these variables.
Theorem 1. (i) A representation (possibly multivalued) V of the whole
group G on H can always be found.
(ii) For ga ∈ Ga we have V (ga) = UaU(ga)U †a.
The proof of Theorem 1 is given i Appendix 4.
What is meant by a multivalued representation? As an example, consider
the group SU(2) of unitary 2 × 2 matrices. Many books in group theory will
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state that there is a homomorphism from SU(2) to the group SO(3) of real 3-
dimensional rotations, where the kernel of the homomorphism is ±I. This latter
statement means that both +I and −I are mapped into the identity rotation
by the homomorphism. For an explicit way to formulate the homomorphism
SU(2)→ SO(3), see for instance Knapp (1986), Exercise 5(a) of Chapter 1.
In this case there is no unique inverse SO(3)→ SU(2), but nevertheless we
may say informally that there is a multivalued homomorphism from SO(3) to
SU(2). Examples of such a discussion can be found in Ma (2007). Here is a
way to make this precise:
Extend SU(2) to a new group with elements (g, k), where g ∈ SU(2) and k is
an element of the group K = {±1} with the natural multiplication. The multi-
plication in this extended group is defined by (g1, k1)·(g2, k2) = (g1g2, k1k2), and
the inverse by (g, k)−1 = (g−1, k−1). Then there is an invertible homomorphism
between this extended group and SO(3).
A similar construction can be made with the representation V of Theorem
1.
Theorem 2. (i) There is an extended group G′ such that V is a univariate
representation of G′ on H.
(ii) There is a unique mapping G′ → G, denoted by g′ → g, such that
V (g′) = V (g). This mapping is a homomorphism.
Theorem 3. (i) For g′ ∈ G′ there is a unique g0 ∈ G0 such that V (g′) =
U(g0). The mapping g′ → g0 is a homomorphism.
(ii) If g′ → g0 by the homomorphism of (i), and g′ 6= e′ in G′, then g0 6= e
in G0.
The proofs of Theorem 2 and Theorem 3 are given in Appendix 4.
Note that while G is a group of transformations on Φ, the extended group
G′ must be considered as an abstract group.
12.3 The discrete case
In much of this book I will limit myself to the case where the accessible e-
variables λ have a finite discrete range. This is often done in elementary quan-
tum theory texts, in fact also in recent quantum foundation papers, and in our
situation it has several advantages:
- It is easy to interprete the principle that λ can be estimated with any fixed
accuracy.
- In particular, confidence regions and credibility regions for an accessible
e-variable can be taken as single points if observations are accurate enough.
- The operators involved (see later) will be much simpler and are defined
everywhere.
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- The operators can be understood directly from an epistemic setting, see
below.
Consider now statements of the form: λa = uak. We start with the following
remark: It is possible to simplify the notation for the values taken by λa under
the maximal symmetrical epistemic setting.
Proposition 3. The values uak can always be arranged such that u
a
k = uk
is the same for each a (k = 1, 2, ...).
Proof.
By Assumption 1
{φ : λb(φ) = ubk} = {φ : λa(gab(φ)) = ubk} = gba({φ : λa(φ) = ubk}).
The sets in brackets on the lefthand side here are disjoint with union Φ. But then
the sets in brackets on the righthand side are disjoint with union gab(Φ) = Φ,
and this implies that {ubk} gives all possible values of λa.
So look at the statement λa(φ) = uk. This means two things: 1) One has
sought information about the value of the maximally accessible e-variable λa,
that is, asked the question: What is the value of λa? 2) One has obtained the
answer λa = uk. This information can be thought of as a perfect measurement,
and it can be represented by the indicator function fak (φ) = I(λ
a(φ) = uk),
which is a function in L(Λa). From Proposition 2, this function can by a unitary
transformation be represented in H , which now is a vector space with a discrete
basis, a finite-dimensional vector space: Uaf
a
k . However, we have just seen that
this tentative state definition UaI(λ
a(φ) = uk) = U(g0a)I(λ
0(g0aφ) = uk) led to
ambiguities. These ambiguities can be removed by replacing the two g0a’s here
in effect by different elements g′0ai of the extended group G
′. Let g′0a1 and g
′
0a2
be two different such elements where both g′0a1 → g0a and g′0a2 → g0a according
to Theorem 2 (ii). I will prove in a moment that this is in fact always possible
when g0a 6= e. Let g′a = (g′0a1)−1g′0a2, and define what physicists call a ket
vector by
|a; k〉 = V (g′a)UaI(λa(φ) = uk) = V (g′a)|0; k〉,
where |0; k〉 = I(λ0(φ) = uk).
Proposition 4. Suppose that G˜0 is transitive on the range of λ0. Then
for each a and k there is a g′(a, k) ∈ G′ such that |a; k〉 = V (g′(a, k))|0; 0〉.
For the proof, see again Appendix 4.
In the following I will not make use of Proposition 4, so I will not need the
assumption that G˜0 is transitive on the range of λ0. This is fortunate, for in
Example 16 this assumption is only satisfied for the spin 0 and the spin 1/2 case
(c = 0 or c = 1/2).
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Definition 9. |a; k〉 is the state vector in H corresponding to the statement
λa(φ) = uk.
Interpretation of the state vector |a; k〉: 1) The question: ’What is
the value of λa?’ has been posed. 2) We have obtained the answer λa = uk.
Both the question and the answer are contained in the state vector.
In order that this interpretation shall make sense, I need the following result,
which is proved in Appendix 4. I assume that G˜0 is non-trivial.
Theorem 4. a) Assume that two vectors in H satisfy |a; i〉 = |b; j〉, where
|a; i〉 corresponds to λa = ui for one perfect measurement and |b; j〉 corresponds
to λb = uj for another perfect measurement. Then there is a one-to-one function
F such that λb = F (λa) and uj = F (ui). On the other hand, if λ
b = F (λa) and
uj = F (ui) for such a function F , then |a; i〉 = |b; j〉.
b) Each |a; k〉 corresponds to only one {λa, uk} pair except possibly for a
simultaneous one-to-one transformation of this pair.
Corollary. The group G is properly contained in G′, so the representation
V of Theorem 1 is really multivalued.
Proof of the corollary.
If we had G′ = G, then |a; k〉 and |b; k〉 both reduce to UaI(λa(φ) = uk) =
UbI(λ
b(φ) = uk) = I(λ
0 = uk), so Theorem 4 and its proof could not be valid.
Theorem 4 and its corollary are also valid in the situation where we are
interested in just two accessible variables λa and λb, which might as well be
called λ0 and λa. We can then provisionally let the group G be generated by
g0a, ga0 = g
−1
0a and all elements g
0 and ga. The earlier statement that it is
always possible to find two different elements g′0a1 and g
′
0a2 in G
′ which are
mapped onto g0a follows.
Finally we have
Theorem 5. For each a ∈ A, the vectors {|a; k〉; k = 1, 2, ...} form an
orthonormal basis for H.
Proof.
Taking the invariant measure ρ on H as normalized to 1, the indicator func-
tions |0; k〉 = I(λ0(φ) = uk) form an orthonormal basis for H . Since the map-
ping |0; k〉 → |a; k〉 is unitary, the Theorem follows.
So if b 6= a and k is fixed, there are complex constants cki such that |b; k〉 =∑
i cki|a; i〉. This opens for the interference effects that one sees discussed in
quantum mechanical texts. In particular |a; k〉 =∑i dki|0; i〉 for some constants
dki. This is the first instance of something that we also will meet later in
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different situations: New states in H are found by taking linear combinations
of a basic set of state vectors.
In the case of a finite-dimensional space H , the ket vector |a; k〉 may be
looked upon as a coloumn vector. The corresponding dual vector, its complex
conjugate row vector is called a bra vector 〈a; k|. The scalar product 〈a; i| · |b; j〉
is written as a bracket 〈a; i|b; j〉. It follows from Theorem 5 that 〈a; i|a; j〉 = δij ,
and thus the ket vectors have the norm 1. For any operator A on H we also
define the complex scalar 〈a; i|A|b; j〉.
The information contained in the ket |a; k〉 is by definition the same as the
information contained in the one-dimensional projector |a; k〉〈a; k|, where we in
general define |α〉〈β| by (|α〉〈β|)|γ〉 = |α〉〈β|γ〉 for all kets |γ〉. In particular,
|a; k〉〈a; k|b; j〉 is the projection of the ket vector |b; j〉 along the vector |a; k〉.
Later |a; k〉 will be redefined in terms of a phase factor, that is, a constant
multiplier of norm 1, but then |a; k〉〈a; k| is independent of such a phase factor.
These projectors are the starting point for defining the operator connected to
the e-variable λa:
Aa =
∑
k
uk|a; k〉〈a; k|. (7)
Since λa was assumed to be maximal, all the values uk must be different.
Thus Aa is an operator with distinct eigenvalues. All the eigenvalues and eigen-
vectors can be recovered by specifying the operator Aa. Since the eigenvalues
are real-valued, Aa is per definition Hermitian: Aa† = Aa (see Appendix 3).
Interpretation of the operator Aa: This gives all possible states and
all possible values corresponding to the maximal accessible e-variable λa.
13 The general symmetrical epistemic setting
Go back to the definition of the maximal symmetrical epistemic setting. Let
again φ be the inaccessible conceptual variable and let λa for a ∈ A be the
maximal accessible conceptual variables satisfying Assumption 1. Let the cor-
responding induced groups Ga and G satisfy Assumption 2. Finally, let ta for
each a be an arbitrary function on the range of λa, and assume that we observe
θa = ta(λa); a ∈ A. We will call this the symmetrical epistemic setting; it is no
longer necessarily maximal with respect to the observations θa.
Consider first the quantum states |a; k〉. We are no longer interested in the
full information on λa, but keep the Hilbert space as in Section 12, and now
let fak (φ) = I(t
a(λa) = ta(uk)) = I(θ
a = uak), where u
a
k = t
a(uk). We let
again g′0a1 and g
′
0a2 be two distinct elements of G
′ such that g′0ai → g0a, define
g′a = (g
′
0a1)
−1g′0a2 and then
|a; k〉 = V (g′a)Uafak = V (g′a)|0; k〉,
where |0; k〉 = f0k .
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Interpretation of the state vector |a; k〉: 1) The question: ’What
is the value of θa?’ has been posed. 2) We have obtained the answer θa = uak.
Both the question and the answer are contained in the state vector.
From this we may define the operator connected to the e-variable θa:
Aa =
∑
k
uak|a; k〉〈a; k| =
∑
k
ta(uk)|a; k〉〈a; k|.
Then Aa is no longer necessarily an operator with distinct eigenvalues, but Aa
is still Hermitian: Aa† = Aa.
Interpretation of the operator Aa: This gives all possible states and
all possible values corresponding to the accessible e-variable θa.
The projectors |a; k〉〈a; k| and hence the ket vectors |a; k〉 are no longer
uniquely determined by Aa: They can be transformed arbitrarily by unitary
transformations in each space corresponding to one eigenvalue. In general I
will redefine |a; k〉 by allowing it to be subject to such transformations. These
transformed eigenvectors all still correspond to the same eigenvalue, that is, the
same observed value of θa and they give the same operators Aa. In particular,
in the maximal symmetric epistemic setting I will allow an arbitrary constant
phase factor in the definition of the |a; k〉’s.
As an example of the general construction, assume that λa is a vector: λa =
(θa1 , ..., θam). Then one can write a state vector corresponding to λa as
|a; k〉 = |a1; k1〉 ⊗ ...⊗ |am; km〉
in an obvious notation, where a = (a1, ..., am) and k = (k1, ..., km). The different
θ’s may be connected to different subsystems.
So far I have kept the same groups Ga and G when going from λa to θa =
ta(λa), that is from the maximal symmetrical epistemic setting to the general
symmetrical epistemic setting. This implies that the (large) Hilbert space will
be the same. A special case occurs if ta is a reduction to an orbit of Ga. This
is the kind of model reduction discussed in Section 3. Then the construction of
the previous sections can also be carried with a smaller group action acting just
upon an orbit, resulting then in a smaller Hilbert space. In the example of the
previous paragraph it may be relevant to consider one Hilbert space for each
subsystem. The large Hilbert space is however the correct space to use when
the whole system is considered.
Connected to a general physical system, one may have many e-variables θ
and corresponding operators A. In the ordinary quantum formalism, reviewed
in the next section, there is well-known theorem saying that, in my formulation,
θ1, ..., θn are compatible, that is, there exists an e-variable λ such that θi = ti(λ)
for some functions ti if and only if the corresponding operators commute:
[Ai, Aj ] ≡ AiAj −AjAi = 0 for all i, j.
(See Holevo, 2001.) Compatible e-variables may in principle be estimated si-
multaneously with arbitrary accuracy.
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14 The quantum-mechanical culture
In this section I will no longer assume the symmetrical epistemic setting, and
we thus will dispense with group-theoretical assumptions like Assumption 1 and
Assumption 2. I just take as a point of departure a finitedimensional complex
vector space H with kets |k〉 and corresponing bras 〈k|. The one-dimensional
predictors |k〉〈k| are defined as before, and all operators on H are of the form
A =
∑
k
vk|k〉〈k| with 〈i|j〉 = δij .
From this all the features of elementary quantum mechanics follow except
the probability statements, which I will come back to later. The operators can
be multiplied as also discussed in Appendix 3. The multiplication is associative,
but not commutative. As usual we define the commutator as
[A,B] = AB −BA.
The Hermitian adjoint operator A† is defined such that the ket A†|k〉 cor-
responds to the bra 〈k|A, in other words 〈i|A†j〉 = 〈iA|j〉 for all |i〉, |j〉. This
A† can also be defined by complex conjugating the eigenvalues in the formula
above. The observables are defined as the Hermitian operators: A† = A. In
general one has (AB)† = B†A†. The possible values of the observables are their
eigenvalues, and the states are given by the ket vectors.
We see that all the features of the previous section occur again, only in an
abstract setting.
In an attempt to make this a little more concrete, look again at Example 16.
Let Jx, Jy and Jz be the operators corresponding to spin in 3 orthogonal direc-
tions x, y and z. In quantum mechanical texts (see Messiah, 1969) it is shown
that there is a constant d such that these operators satisfy the commutation
relations:
[Jx, Jy] = idJz, [Jy, Jz] = idJx, [Jx, Jz] = idJy.
This can also be proved fairly easily directly in my setting for the electron spin
case j = 1/2, using the geometry of SU(2). In standard quantum mechanics
d = h¯/2, where h¯ is Planck’s constant. We will choose units such that d = 1/2.
In great generality, commutation relations may be derived from group properties
by exploiting the relation between Lie groups and Lie algebras; see for instance
Barut and Raczka (1985).
Several consequences of the above commutation relations are derived in stan-
dard texts, for instance Messiah (1969). First it is shown that Jz commutes
with J2 = J2x +J
2
y +J
2
z and that J
2 has eigenvalues of the form j(j+1), where
j is integer or half integer. It is well known (see also the previous section)
that commuting operators can be simultaneously diagonalized. In terms of the
corresponding e-variables (θx, θy, θz) this means that the vector (‖θ‖2, θz) is ac-
cessible, where ‖θ‖2 = θ2x + θ2y + θ2z . Given j, the eigenvalues of Jz are of the
form −j,−j+1, ..., j−1, j as anticipated in Example 16. Also, eigenvectors can
be explicitly discussed.
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We conclude from this that we have two possible situations:
1) J2 is known; more explicitly, the squared modulus ‖θ‖2 is known, and
takes one of the values j(j + 1). Then the situation is exactly as in Example
16, in particular the assumptions of the maximal symmetrical epistemic setting
are satisfied.
2) The squared modulus ‖θ‖2 is unknown. Then the operator J2⊗Jz (taking
infinitely many, but discrete values) can be diagonalized, can be understood in
terms of conceptual variables, but is not directly given in terms of a maximal
symmetrical epistemic setting.
In conclusion, the assumptions from Section 13 defining a symmetrical epis-
temic setting are sometimes satisfied, sometimes not for a given quantum me-
chanical situation, but the introduction of conceptual variables does seem to be
useful for understanding what is going on. Model reduction seems to be crucial
here.
Let now by a slight change of notation J = (Jx, Jy, Jz) be the inaccessible
total angular momentum of a system of particles where ‖J‖2 = J(J + 1) is
known. Assume that J is the sum of two spins j1 and j2 where ‖j1‖2 = j1(j1+1)
and ‖j2‖2 = j2(j2 + 1) are known. Let |mi〉 be the state where jiz = mi for
−ji ≤ mi ≤ ji. Then the state |M〉 where Jz =M can be decomposed into
|M〉 =
∑
m1m2
cMm1m2 |m1〉 ⊗ |m2〉.
The coefficients cMm1m2 , nonzero only for m1 +m2 = M , are called Clebsch-
Gordon coefficients and are discussed in standard quantum mechanical texts like
Messiah (1969). Generalizations, only more technically involved, exist when J
is the sum of more than two spins or angular momenta. This is the second
instance where new states are found by taking linear combinations of a basic
set of state vectors.
From elementary quantum mechanical texts one can get the impression that
all linear combinations of state vectors in a Hilbert space are possible state
vectors. This is however not true; I will discuss superselection rules later. Nev-
ertheless, taking linear combinations of state vectors leads to the introduction of
interesting and important quantum mechanical phenomena, in particular that
of entanglement, which will be treated in Section 20.
15 Continuous e-variables. Phase space
Consider the one-dimensional movement of a single non-relativistic particle in
some force field, the particle having position ξ and momentum π at some given
time. Both ξ and π are e-variables and can be estimated by suitable experiments.
But it has been well known from the early days of quantum mechanics that it
is impossible to estimate the vector φ = (ξ, π) with arbitrary accuracy. Thus
the point φ in the phase space is an inaccessible e-variable.
I will first concentrate in the position ξ. This is a continuous variable, so
a state cannot be defined as simply as in the discrete case. Consider a fixed
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confidence interval or credibility interval (ξ, ξ¯) for this position. Either ξ lies in
this interval or it does not lie in this interval. In the first case, the confidence
coefficient/credibility coefficient of the interval can be made arbitrarily close to
1 by doing a suitable large experiment. In the second case, the same coefficient
can be made arbitrarily close to 0. Thus it is crucial by experiment, that is, by
an epistemic process, to make a choice between the two indicator variables:
I1(ξ) = I(ξ ∈ (ξ, ξ¯)), I2(ξ) = I(ξ /∈ (ξ, ξ¯)).
Let Gξ be the translation group on the real line R. The invariant measure
corresponding to Gξ is the Lebesgue measure dξ, and I will define the Hilbert
space H = L2(R, dξ). The indicator I1(ξ) belongs to this space. The indicator
I2(ξ) does not belong to H , but this is not important since I2 = 1− I1.
By letting ξ and ξ¯ vary, the ξ-state of the system can be defined in terms
of the indicators I1. For fixed ξ and ξ¯ this is a discrete e-variable taking values
I1 = 0 and I1 = 1. It is crucial in quantum mechanics that linear combinations
of states defined by indicators and the limits of these also can be introduced as
states. They will emerge through the time development of states through the
Schro¨dinger equation; see Section 23. In fact this is the third instance where
new states are found by taking linear combinations of a basic set of state vectors.
The approach I will take here is a limiting operation obtained through divid-
ing the real line into many intervals such that the width of each interval tends
to zero. Through this limiting process we can approximate any function f in
H . In traditional quantum mechanics, any such f is describing a state of the
particle, and f is called a wave function. I will not go into any interpretation
of this here, but just mention that there are interpretations trying to connect
this to the theory of stochastic processes; this is the content of the stochastic
mechanics of Edward Nelson (1967). I will discuss this later in connection to
the Schro¨dinger equation, but here I only address the limiting process. I will
limit myself to continuous f .
Thus for each n let ξn1 < ξn2 < ... < ξnkn be a sequence of real numbers
such that
1. ξn1 → −∞ and ξnkn →∞ as n→∞.
2. δn = ξn,i+1− ξni is constant for i = 1, ..., kn− 1 and tends to 0 as n→∞.
Let Ini(ξ) = I(ξ ∈ (ξni, ξn,i+1]) for i = 1, 2, ..., kn − 1. For a given function
f ∈ H , define the step function approximation fn by fn(ξ) = f(ξni) for ξni ≤
ξ < ξn,i+1 when i = 1, ..., kn − 1; fn(ξ) = 0 for ξ < ξn1 and for ξ ≥ ξnkn . Thus
fn(ξ) =
∑
i f(ξni)Ini(ξ), a linear function of indicators. Finally, on the space of
such step functions define the operator An by
Anfn(ξ) =
∑
i
ξnif(ξni)Ini(ξ). (8)
The interpretation of (8) is as follows: Approximate ξ by ξni when ξ ∈
(ξni, ξn.i+1] (and neglect its value when ξ < ξn1 or ξ ≥ ξnkn ; this is assumed to
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have negligible probability/ confidence coefficient). This approximate variable
is discrete, so we can use the theory of Section 12 (in the simple case where we
have only one Hilbert space, so a = 0). The indicators Ini can be regarded as
an orthonormal set of ket vectors for this approximate variable for a suitable
normalization of the Lebesgue measure. Then (8) is equivalent to (7) of Section
12 with |0; i〉 = Ini(ξ) constituting an orthonormal basis for a Hilbert space
Hn of step functions, a subspace of H . Thus An is the quantum-mechanical
operator of the discrete variable.
It is of interest to see what happens when n tends to∞. The following basic
result is proved in Appendix 4.
Theorem 6. Assume that f is a continuous function in H such that the
function k defined by k(ξ) = ξf(ξ) satisfies ‖k‖ < ∞. Then ‖fn − f‖ → 0 and
‖Anfn − k‖ → 0 as n→∞.
In this specific sense the operator A corresponding to the e-variable ξ can be
said to be the operator of multiplying with ξ. By Theorem 6 it is motivated as
such an operator defined on all continuous f in H such that
∫ |ξf(ξ)|2dξ <∞.
The operator A is an unbounded operator, and as such it must always have
a limited domain of definition D(A). There is a very large and advanced math-
ematical theory on unbounded operators; see for instance Murphy (1990) or
Bing-Ren (1992).
So far I have considered the position ξ. A completely parallel discussion can
be made on the moment π in the Hilbert space Hpi = L2(S, dπ), where S is
the line where π varies. Thus the operator B corresponding to momentum π in
this space is multiplication by π with domain of definition D(B) = {f ∈ Hpi :∫ |πf(π)|2dπ <∞.
As in the discrete case it is important to have everything described in one
Hilbert space, so we need a unitary transformation from Hpi to H . For this
case we have a completely different and simpler solution than I offered in the
maximal symmetric epistemic setting, namely the use of Fourier transform. If
f̂ ∈ Hpi, we define the corresponding f ∈ H by
(Uf̂)(ξ) = f(ξ) =
1√
2 · 3.14
∫
exp(i
ξπ
h¯
)f̂(π)dπ,
where h¯ is Planck’s constant, which has the correct unit of measurement. One
point here is that this unitary transformation does not transform indicator vari-
ables into indicator variables, so there is no confusion between simple π-states
and simple ξ-states. The inverse transformation is given by
(U †f)(π) = f̂(π) =
1√
2 · 3.14
∫
exp(−i ξπ
h¯
)f(ξ)dξ.
By partial integration one can show that the operator C = UBU † corre-
sponding to B in H is given by −ih¯ d
dξ
with domain of definition D(C) given
by the set of differentiable f such that
∫ |f ′(ξ)|2dξ < ∞. It follows that when
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f ∈ D(A) ∩D(C) we have (AC − CA)f(ξ) = ih¯f(ξ), so A and C do not com-
mute. Hence by the brief discussion at the end of Section 13, ξ and π cannot
be estimated simultaneously with arbitrary accuracy, in agreement with ob-
served fact. From the commutation relation Heisenberg’s uncertainty relation
can be proved: From any estimators ξ̂ and π̂ we have std(ξ̂)std(π̂) > h¯/2. For a
derivation, see standard quantum-mechanical texts or Holevo (2001). But now
I am anticipating the inference theory which will be developed in the following
sections.
16 Link to statistical inference
In this section I again assume first the maximal symmetrical epistemic setting of
Section 11, but everything that I say can be generalized, see later. We can here
think of a spin component in a fixed direction to be assessed. To assume a state
|a; k〉 is to assume perfect knowledge of the e-variable λa: λa = uk. Such perfect
knowledge is rarely available. In practice we have data za about the system,
and use these data to obtain knowledge about λa. Let us start with Bayesian
inference. This assumes prior probabilities πak on the values uk, and after the
inference we have posterior probabilities πak(z
a). In either case we summarize
this information in the density operator:
σa =
∑
k
πak |a; k〉〈a; k|.
Interpretation of the density operator σa: 1) We have posed the
question ’What is the value of λa?’ 2) We have specified a prior or posterior
probability distribution πak over the possible answers. The probability for all
possible answers to the question, formulated in terms of state vectors, can be
recovered from the density operator.
A third possibility for the probability specifications is a confidence distribu-
tion; see Subsections 2.3 and 2.4 and references there. For discrete λa the con-
fidence distribution function Ha is connected to a discrete distribution, which
gives the probabilities πak . Extending the argument of Xie and Singh (2011) to
this situation, this should not be looked upon as a distribution of λa, but a
distribution for λa, to be used in the epistemic process.
Since the sum of the probabilities is 1, the trace (sum of eigenvalues) of any
density operator is 1. In the quantum mechanical literature, a density operator
is any positive operator with trace 1.
Note that specification of the maximally accessible e-variables λa is equiva-
lent to specifying t(λa) for any one-to-one function t. The operator t(Aa) has
then distinct eigenvalues since the operator Aa has distinct eigenvalues. Hence
it is enough in order to specify the question 1) to give the set of orthonormal
vectors |a; k〉.
Given the question a, the e-variable λa plays the role similar to a param-
eter in statistical inference, even though it may be connected to a single unit.
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Inference can be done by preparing many independent units in the same state.
Inference is then from data za, a part of the total data z that nature can pro-
vide us with. All inference theory that one finds in standard texts like Lehmann
and Casella (1998) applies. In particular, the concepts of unbiasedness, equiv-
ariance, avarage risk optimality, minimaxity and admissibility apply. None of
these concepts are much discussed in the physical literature, first because mea-
surements there are often considered as perfect, at least in elementary texts,
secondly because, when measurements are considered in the physical literature,
they are discussed in terms of the more abstract concept of an operator-valued
measure, which is relevant if the question a is not kept fixed; see later.
Whatever kind of inference we make on λa, we can take as a point of depar-
ture the statistical model and the generalized likelihood principle of Section 8.
Hence after an experiment is done, and given some context τ , all evidence on
λa is contained in the likelihood p(za|τ, λa), where za is the portion of the data
relevant for inference on λa, also assumed discrete. This is summarized in the
likelihood effect:
E(za, τ) =
∑
k
p(za|τ, λa = uk)|a; k〉〈a; k|.
Interpretation of the likelihood effect E(za, τ): 1) We have posed
some inference question on the maximally accessible parameter λa. 2) We have
specified the relevant likelihood for the data. The likelihood for all possible an-
swers of the question, formulated in terms of state vectors, can be recovered from
the likelihood effect.
Since the focused question assumes discrete data, each likelihood is in the
range 0 ≤ p ≤ 1. In the quantum mechanical literature, an effect is any operator
with eigenvalues in the range [0, 1].
Return now to the generalized likelihood principle of Section 8. The following
principle follows.
The focused generalized likelihood principle (FGLP)Consider two
potential experiments in the symmetrical epistemic setting with equivalent con-
texts τ , and assume that the inaccessible conceptual variable φ is the same in
both experiments. Suppose that the observations z∗1 and z
∗
2 have proportional
likelihood effects in the two experiments, with a constant of proportionality in-
dependent of the conceptual variable.
Assume in addition that one is sure that the decision problem does not depend
on any irrelevant UCV. Then the questions posed in the two experiments are
equivalent, that is , there is a maximal e-variable λa which can be considered to
be the same in the two experiments, and the two observations produce the same
evidence on λa in this context.
In many examples the two observations will have equal, not only propor-
tional, likelihood effects. Proportionality of the likelihood may be an option
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when the e-variable is not maximal. Here is an example: Assume p(za|τ, θa) =
p(−za|τ, θa) = p(za|τ,−θa) = p(−za|τ,−θa). Then zb = (za)2 contains the
same evidence on θa as za, we have only evidence on θb = (θa)2, we have
p(zb|τ, θa) = 2p(za|τ, θa) and |b; k2〉〈b; k2| = |a; k〉〈a; k| + |a;−k〉〈a;−k|, where
|b; k2〉 corresponds to the question: ’What is the value of θb?’ with answer
θb = (uak)
2, and |a;−k〉 corresponds to the question: ’What is the value of θa?’
with the answer θa = −uak. A similar situation occurs whenever za and θa are
multi-valued in a corresponding way. In the following discussion I will specialize
to the case of one experiment and equal likelihood. Then the FGLP says simply
that the experimental evidence is a function of the likelihood effect.
In the FGLP we have the freedom to redefine the e-variable in the case
of coinciding eigenvalues in the likelihood effect, that is, if p(za|τ, λa = uk) =
p(za|τ, λa = ul) for some k, l. An extreme case is the likelihood effect E(za, τ) =
I, where all the likelihoods are 1, that is, the probability of z is 1 under any
considered model. Then any maximal accessible e-variable λa will serve our
purpose.
17 Rationality and experimental evidence
This section may at first sight seem to be slightly more speculative than the
rest of the paper, but it will end with a very concrete result.
Throughout the section I will consider a fixed context τ and a fixed maximal
epistemic setting in this context. The inaccessible e-variable is φ, and I assume
that the maximal accessible e-variables λa take a discrete set of values. Let the
data behind the potential experiments be za, also assumed to take a discrete
set of values.
Let first a single experimentalist A be in this situation, and let all conceptual
variables be attached to A, although he also has the possibility to receiving
information from others through part of the context τ . He has the choice of doing
different experiments a, and he also has the choice of choosing different models
for his experiment through his likelihood p(za|τ, λa). The experiment and the
model, hence the likelihood, should be chosen before the data are obtained. All
these choices are summarized in the likelihood effect E, a function of the at
present unknown data za, and also of the unknown e-variable λa. For use after
the experiment, he should also choose a good estimator/predictor λ̂a, and he
may also have to choose some loss function, but the principles behind these
latter choices will be considered as part of the context τ . If he chooses to do a
Bayesian analysis, the estimator should be based on a prior π(λa|τ). We assume
that A is trying to be as rational as possible in all his choices, and that this
rationality is connected to his loss function or to other criteria.
What should be meant by experimental evidence, and how should it be mea-
sured? As a natural choice, let the experimental evidence that we are seeking,
be the marginal probability of the obtained data for a fixed experiment and for
a given likelihood function. From the experimentalist A’s point of view this is
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given by:
paA(z
a|τ) =
∑
k
pA(z
a|τ, λa = uk)πA(λa = uk|τ),
assuming the likelihood chosen by A and A’s prior πA for λ
a. Some Bayesians
claim that their own philosophy is the only one which is consistent with the
likelihood principle. For my own view on this, see below and also comments in
Section 8. In a non-Bayesian analysis, we can let paA(z
a|τ) be the probability
given the true value u0k of the parameter: p
a
A(z
a|τ) = pA(za|τ, λa = u0k). In
general, take paA(z
a|τ) as the probability of the part of the data za which A
assesses in connection to his inference on λa. By the FGLP - specialized to the
case of one experiment and equal likelihoods - this experimental evidence must
be a function of the likelihood effect: paA(z
a|τ) = qA(E(za)|τ).
We have to make precise in some way what is meant by the rationality of
the experimentalist A. He has to make many difficult choices on the basis of
uncertain knowledge. His actions can partly be based on intuition, partly on
experience from similar situations, partly on a common scientific culture and
partly on advices from other persons. These other persons will in turn have
their intuition, their experience and their scientific education. Often A will
have certain explicitly formulated principles on which to base his decisions, but
sometimes he has to dispense with the principles. In the latter case, he has to
rely on some ’inner voice’, a conviction which tells him what to do.
We will formalize all this by introducing a perfectly rational superior actor
D, to which all these principles, experiences and convictions can be related. We
also assume that D can observe everything that is going on, in particular A, and
that he on this background can have some influence on A’s decisions. The real
experimental evidence will then be defined as the probability of the data za from
D’s point of view, which we assume also to give the real objective probabilities.
By the FGLP this must again be a function of the likelihood effect E, where
the likelihood now may be seen as the objectively correct model.
pa(za|τ) = q(E(za)|τ) (9)
As said, we assume that D is perfectly rational. This can be formalized
mathematically by considering a hypothetical betting situation for D against a
bookie, nature N . A similar discussion was recently done using a more abstract
language by Hammond (2011). Note the difference to the ordinary Bayesian
assumption, where A himself is assumed to be perfectly rational. This difference
is crucial to me. I do not see any human scientist, including myself, as being
perfectly rational. We can try to be as rational as possible, but we have to rely
on some underlying rational principles that partly determine our actions.
So let the hypothetical odds of a given bet for D be (1−q)/q to 1, where q is
the probability as defined by (9). This odds specification is a way to make precise
that, given the context τ and given the question a, the bettor’s probability that
the experimental result takes some value is given by q: For a given utility
measured by x, the bettor D pays in an amount qx - the stake - to the bookie.
After the experiment the bookie pays out an amount x - the payoff - to the
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bettor if the result of the experiment takes the value za, otherwise nothing is
payed.
The rationality of D is formulated in terms of
The Dutch book principle. No choice of payoffs in a series of bets shall
lead to a sure loss for the bettor.
For a related use of the same principle, see Caves et al. (2002).
Assumption 3. Consider in some context τ a maximal symmetrical epis-
temic setting where the FGLP is satisfied, and the whole situation is observed
and acted upon by a superior actor D as described above. Assume that D’s
probabilities q given by (9) are taken as the experimental evidence, and that D
acts rationally in agreement with the Dutch book principle.
A situation where all the three assumptions 1, 2 and 3 hold will be called a
rational epistemic setting. It will be assumed to be implied by essential situa-
tions of quantum mechanics. Later the assumptions 1 and 2 will be weakened.
The question will also later be raised if it can be coupled to certain macroscopic
situations.
Theorem 7. Assume a rational epistemic setting. Let E1 and E2 be two
likelihood effects in this setting, and assume that E1 + E2 also is a likelihood
effect. Then the experimental evidences, taken as the probabilities of the corre-
sponding data, satisfy
q(E1 + E2|τ) = q(E1|τ) + q(E2|τ).
Proof.
The result of the theorem is obvious, without making Assumption 3, if E1
and E2 are likelihood effects connected to experiments on the same e-variable
λa. We will prove it in general. Consider then any finite number of potential ex-
periments including the two with likelihood effects E1 and E2. Let q1 = q(E1|τ)
be equal to (9), and let q2 = q(E2|τ) be equal to the same quantity with a re-
placed by b. Consider in addition the following randomized experiment: Throw
an unbiased coin. If head, choose the experiment with likelihood effect E1; if
tail, choose the experiment with likelihood effect E2. This is a valid experiment.
The likelihood effect when the coin shows head is 12E1, when it shows tail
1
2E2,
so that the likelihood effect of this experiment is E0 =
1
2 (E1 + E2). Define
q0 = q(E0). Let the bettor bet on the results of all these 3 experiments: Payoff
x1 for experiment 1, payoff x2 for experiment 2 and payoff x0 for experiment 0.
I will divide into 3 possible outcomes: Either the likelihood effect from the
data z is E1 or it is E2 or it is none of these. The randomization in the choice
of E0 is considered separately from the result of the bet. (Technically this can
be done by repeating the whole series of experiments many times with the same
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randomization. This is also consistent with the conditionality principle.) Thus
if E1 occurs, the payoff for experiment 0 is replaced by the expected payoff x0/2,
similarly if E2 occurs. The net expected amount the bettor receives is then
x1 +
1
2
x0 − q1x1 − q2x2 − q0x0 = (1− q1)x1 − q2x2 − (1− 2q0)1
2
x0 if E1,
x2 +
1
2
x0 − q1x1 − q2x2 − q0x0 = −q1x1 − (1− q2)x2 − (1− 2q0)1
2
x0 if E2,
−q1x1 − q2x2 − 2q0 · 1
2
x0 otherwise.
The payoffs (x1, x2, x0) can be chosen by nature N in such a way that it leads
to sure loss for the bettor D if not the determinant of this system is zero:
0 =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
1− q1 −q2 1− 2q0
−q1 1− q2 1− 2q0
−q1 −q2 −2q0
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = q1 + q2 − 2q0.
Thus we must have
q(
1
2
(E1 + E2)|τ) = 1
2
(q(E1|τ) + q(E2|τ)).
If E1 + E2 is an effect, the common factor
1
2 can be removed by changing the
likelihoods, and the result follows.
Corollary. Assume a rational epistemic setting. Let E1, E2, ... be like-
lihood effects in this setting, and assume that E1 + E2 + ... also is a likelihood
effect. Then
q(E1 + E2 + ...|τ) = q(E1|τ) + q(E2|τ) + ....
Proof.
The finite case follows immediately from Theorem 7. Then the infinite case
follows from monotone convergence.
The result of this section is quite general. In particular the loss function
and any other criterion for the success of the experiments are arbitrary. So far
I have assumed that the choice of experiment a is fixed, which implies that it
is the same for A and for D. However, the result also applies to the following
more general situation: Let A have some definite purpose of his experiment,
and to achieve that purpose, he has to choose the question a in a clever manner,
as rationally as he can. Assume that this rationality is formalized through the
actor D, who has the ideal likelihood effect E and the experimental evidence
p(z|τ) = q(E|τ). If two such questions shall be chosen, the result of Theorem 7
holds, with essentially the same proof.
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17.1 On the nature of the superior actor D
We all go through our lives making repeated choices in different contexts. These
choices are governed by our free will, but they may also be influenced by people
that we look up to, who perhaps have done similar choices before. In our
childhood, the persons that form our basis are most often our parents, but later
other ideals may take over. Human beings that get a confused relation to their
first ideals, may later have difficulties in making good choices, and in certain
cases they may end up with suffering from serious psychological defects, even
mental illnesses.
As scientists we also have ideals that we look up to. These may be personal,
or they may be substantiated through certain well-defined principles. Earlier
in this section I made the assumption that the experimentalist A, when posing
a focused question to nature, made his decisions inspired by an ideal D, and
that D was perfectly rational. This may be regarded as a simplification. In
reality, when making our choices, we are influenced by a multitude of conscious
or subconscious causes. All these causes are here collected together in the actor
D. I assume that D has a positive influence on A, positive with respect to the
question that A has chosen as the focus of his experiment.
Let us look at the process of making choices in some greater generality.
People in different cultures make their choices partly on the basis of cultural
values. These values may have a historical origin, and they may also be related
to religion. Christianity, Islam and Judaism are all founded upon the belief in
a personal God. This belief is intimately connected to different, unfortunately
partly conflicting, cultures. The believers act under the assumption that there
is a God behind everything, and that God is perfectly rational. They believe
that He influences all human beings, also those who serve as ideals for others.
In this sense, God may take the roˆle as the ultimate ideal D within the relevant
culture.
This situation is obviously not satisfactory from a scientific point of view.
A human being should be free to believe in a personal God, in fact such a
belief may have very positive effect on his life. But if a scientist should take
such a belief as a basis for his intuitive choices, God should act over and above
all human cultures, and in particular He should be independent of the way
He is worshipped in any specific congregation. Nevertheless I personally see
the respect for sacred values and the worshipping of God as something of the
deepest and most valuable in human life.
In general a culture may be looked upon as part of a man’s context when
making his choices. At the outset, all human beings should be respected, and
so also the context they have for making their choices. Hence it is a part of
my philosophy that no culture should in principle be seen as superior to other
cultures when it comes to inspiring people’s choices. However, this tolerance
has it limits; one of these is an ultimate respect for people’s life. Extremists
taking lives under the belief that their own culture is threatened by other cul-
tures, should not in any way be accepted. In addition there are of course other
universal ethical rules that should be respected.
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In essence certain cultural values and more generally certain value-contexts
for making choices may be seen from a global point of view to be more satis-
factory than other set of values, but this can only be determined by rational
arguments. Hence communication between cultures is very important in our
world as it is now. As a particular continuation of this statement, this book in
itself is written with the purpose of finding a common language with which one
can communicate across scientific epistemic cultures.
Some people may react against me in that I am discussing aspects of religion
and of culture here in relation to the motivation for a purely mathematical
result, in fact a relatively simple result. But this is a result which in the next
section will form the basis for deriving a formula by which one can calculate
probabilities in quantum mechanics. I will later, in Section 22, come back to
the insight that our free will can be mimicked by nature, and this is connected
with deep aspects of quantum mechanics itself.
18 The Born formula
18.1 The basic formula
Born’s formula is the basis for all probability calculations in quantum mechanics.
In textbooks it is usually stated as a separate axiom, but it has also been argued
for by using various sets of assumptions; see Helland (2008) for some references.
Here I will base the discussion upon the result of Section 17.
I begin with a recent result by Busch (2003), giving a new version of a
classical mathematical theorem by Gleason. Busch’s version has the advantage
that it is valid for a Hilbert space of dimension 2, which Gleason’s original
theorem is not, and it also has a simpler proof. For completeness I reproduce
the proof for the finite-dimensional case in Appendix 5.
Let in general H be any Hilbert space. Recall that an effect E is any op-
erator on the Hilbert space with eigenvalues in the range [0, 1]. A generalized
probability measure µ is a function on the effects with the properties
(1) 0 ≤ µ(E) ≤ 1 for all E,
(2) µ(I) = 1,
(3) µ(E1 + E2 + ...) = µ(E1) + µ(E2) + ... whenever E1 + E2 + ... ≤ I.
Theorem 8. (Busch, 2003). Any generalized probability measure µ is of
the form µ(E) = trace(σE) for some density operator σ.
It is now easy to see that q(E|τ) = p(z|τ) on the ideal likelihood effects
of Section 17 is a generalized probability measure if Assumption 3 holds: (1)
follows since q is a probability; (2) since E = I implies that the likelihood is 1
for all values of the e-variable, hence p(z) = 1; finally (3) is a concequence of
the corollary of Theorem 7. Hence there is a density operator σ = σ(τ) such
that p(z|τ) = trace(σ(τ)E) for all ideal likelihood effects E = E(z).
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Define now a perfect experiment as one where the measurement uncertainty
can be disregarded. The quantum mechanical literature operates very much
with perfect experiments which give well-defined states |k〉. From the point of
view of statistics, if, say the 99% confidence or credibility region of λb is the
single point uk, we can infer approximately that a perfect experiment has given
the result λb = uk.
In our maximal symmetric epistemic setting then: We have asked the ques-
tion: What is the value of the maximally accessible e-variable λb, and are in-
terested in finding the probability of the answer λb = uj though a perfect
experiment. This is the probability of the state |b; j〉. Assume now that this
probability is sought in a context τ = τa,k defined as follows: We have previous
knowledge of the answer λa = uk of another maximal question: What is the
value of λa? That is, we know the state |a; k〉. If λa is maximally accessible, this
is the maximal knowledge about the system that τ may contain, so the context
τ cannot contain more information about this system. It can contain irrelevant
information, however.
Theorem 9. (Born’s formula) Assume a rational epistemic setting. In
the above situation we have:
P (λb = uj |λa = uk) = |〈a; k|b; j〉|2.
Proof.
Fix j and k, let |v〉 be either |a; k〉 or |b; j〉, and consider likelihood ef-
fects of the form E = |v〉〈v|. This corresponds in both cases to a perfect
measurement of a maximally accessible parameter with a definite result. By
Theorem 8 there exists a density operator σa,k =
∑
i πi(τ
a,k)|i〉〈i| such that
q(E|τa,k) = 〈v|σa,k|v〉, where πi(τa,k) are non-negative constants adding to 1.
Consider first |v〉 = |a; k〉. For this case one must have∑i πi(τa,k)|〈i|a; k〉|2 = 1
and thus
∑
i πi(τ
a,k)(1 − |〈i|a; k〉|2) = 0. This implies for each i that either
πi(τ
a,k) = 0 or |〈i|a; k〉| = 1. Since the last condition implies |i〉 = |a; k〉 (mod-
ulus an irrelevant phase factor), and this is a condition which can only be true
for one i, it follows that πi(τ
a,k) = 0 for all other i than this one, and that
πi(τ
a,k) = 1 for this particular i. Summarizing this, we get σa,k = |ak〉〈a; k|,
and setting |v〉 = |b; j〉, Born’s formula follows, since q(E|τa,k) in this case is
equal to the probability of the perfect result λb = uj .
18.2 Consequences
Here are three easy consequences of Born’s formula:
(1) If the context of the system is given by the state |a; k〉, and Ab is the
operator corresponding to the e-variable λb, then the expected value of a perfect
measurement of λb is 〈a; k|Ab|a; k〉.
(2) If the context is given by a density operator σ, and A is the operator cor-
responding to the e-variable λ, then the expected value of a perfect measurement
of λ is trace(σA).
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(3) In the same situation the expected value of a perfect measurement of
f(λ) is trace(σf(A)).
Proof of (1):
E(λb|λa = uk) =
∑
i
uiP (λ
b = ui|λa = uk)
=
∑
i
ui〈a; k|b; i〉〈b; i|a; k〉 = 〈a; k|Ab|a; k〉.
These results give an extended interpretation of the operator A compared to
what I gave in Section 12: There is a simple formula for all expectations in terms
of the operator. On the other hand, the set of such expectations determine the
state of the system. Also on the other hand: If A is specialized to an indicator
function, we get back Born’s formula, so the consequences are equivalent to this
formula.
As an application of Born’s formula, we give the transition probabilities for
electron spin. Throughout this paper, we will, for a given direction a, define the
e-variable λa as +1 if the measured spin component by a perfect measurement
for the electron is +h¯/2 in this direction, λa = −1 if the component is −h¯/2.
Assume that a and b are two directions in which the spin component can be
measured.
Proposition 5. For electron spin we have
P (λb = ±1|λa = +1) = 1
2
(1± cos(a · b)).
This is proved in several textbooks, for instance Holovo (2001), from Born’s
formula. A proof using the Pauli spin matrices is also given in Helland (2010).
18.3 A macroscopic example
A very relevant question is now: Are all these results, including Born’s formula,
by necessity confined to the microworld? Recently, physicists have become in-
terested in larger systems where quantum mechanics is valid, see Vedral (2011).
As we have defined it, there is nothing microscopic about the symmetrical epis-
temic setting. It may or may not be that the rationality Assumption 3 also is
valid for some larger scale systems. The following example illustrates the point.
Example 17. In a medical experiment, let µa, µb, µc and µd be continuous
inaccessible parameters, the hypothetical effects of treatment a, b, c and d, re-
spectively. Assume that the focus of the experiment is to compare treatment
b with the mean effect of the other treatments, which is supposed to give the
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parameter 13 (µa+µc+µd). One wants to do a pairwise experiment, but it turns
out that the maximal parameter which can be estimated, is
λb = sign(µb − 1
3
(µa + µc + µd)).
(Imagine for example that one has four different ointments against rash. A
patient is treated with ointment b on one side of his back; a mixture of the
other ointments on the other side of his back. It is only possible to observe
which side improves best, but this observation is assumed to be very accurate.
One can in principle do the experiment on several patients, and select out the
patients where the difference is clear.) This experiment is done on a selected set
of experimental units, on whom it is known from earlier accurate experiments
that the corresponding parameter
λa = sign(µa − 1
3
(µb + µc + µd))
takes the value +1. In other words, one is interested in the probabilities
π = P (λb = +1|λa = +1).
Consider first a Bayesian approach. Natural priors for µa, ..., µd are indepen-
dent N(ν, σ2) with the same ν and σ. By location and scale invariance, there
is no loss in generality by assuming ν = 0 and σ = 1. Then the joint prior of
ζa = µa − 13 (µb + µc + µd) and ζb = µb − 13 (µa + µc + µd) is multinormal with
mean 0 and covariance matrix (
4
3 − 49− 49 43
)
.
A numerical calculation from this gives
π = P (ζb > 0|ζa > 0) ≈ 0.43.
This result can also be assumed to be valid when σ →∞, a case which in some
sense can be considered as independent objective priors for µa, ..., µd.
Now consider a rational epistemic setting for this experiment. Since again
scale is irrelevant, a natural group on µa, ..., µd is a 4-dimensional rotation group
around a point (ν, ..., ν) together with a translation of ν. Furthermore, ζa and
ζb are contrasts, that is, linear combinations with coefficients adding to 0. The
space of such contrasts is a 3-dimensional subspace of the original 4-dimensional
space, and by a single orthogonal transformation, the relevant subset of the 4-
dimensional rotations can be transformed into the group G of 3-dimensional
rotations on this latter space, and the translation in ν is irrelevant. One such
orthogonal transformation is given by
ψ0 =
1
2
(µa + µb + µc + µd),
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ψ1 =
1
2
(−µa − µb + µc + µd),
ψ2 =
1
2
(−µa + µb − µc + µd),
ψ3 =
1
2
(−µa + µb + µc − µd).
Let G be the group of rotations orthogonal to ψ0. We find
ζa = −2
3
(ψ1 + ψ2 + ψ3),
ζb = −2
3
(ψ1 − ψ2 − ψ3).
The rotation group element transforming ζa into ζb is homomorphic under
G to the rotation group element gab transforming a = − 1√3 (1, 1, 1) into b =
− 1√
3
(1,−1,−1). Let Ga be the maximal subgroup of G under which ζa is per-
missible. This is isomorphic with the group of rotations around a together with
a reflection in the plane perpendicular to a, but the action on ζa is just a reflec-
tion. The orbits of this group are given by two-point sets {±c}. In conclusion,
the whole situation is completely equivalent to the spin-example of Example 16
and satisfies the assumptions of the symmetrical epistemic setting. Making the
rationality Assumption 3 then implies from Proposition 5:
π = P (sign(ζb) = +1|sign(ζa) = +1) = 1
2
(1 + a · b) = 1
3
.
To be precise, Example 17 satisfies the assumptions of the symmetrical epis-
temic setting except Assumptions 2a) and 2c). To have these assumptions sat-
isfied, we must extend the situation:
Example 18. Let the situation be as in Example 17 with the addition that
we have available treatments with hypothetical effects µa for a ∈ A, where the
index set A can be taken to be the 3-dimensional unit sphere.
It is clear that the extension from Example 17 to Example 18 does not mean
anything for the result.
I guess that many statisticians will prefer the Bayesian calculations here for
the rational epistemic setting calculations, which some may consider to have
a more speculative foundation. But the prior chosen in this example must be
considered somewhat arbitrary, and its ’objective’ limit may lead to conceptual
difficulties. Since experiments of this kind can in principle be done in practice
- at least approximately, the question whether the Bayesian solution or the
rational epistemic setting solution holds in such cases, must ultimately be seen
as an empirical question. I hope to discuss further whether the rational epistemic
setting can apply to certain macroscopic situations in a future publication.
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18.4 Generalizations of Born’s formula
Consider first the general symmetric epistemic setting of Section 13, that is, our
question concerns a function θa = ta(λa) of the maximal accessible e-variable.
Going through the proof of Born’s formula, it is nowhere used that the acces-
sible epistemic e-variable is maximal. At the end of Section 16, an example was
shown where proportional likelihoods were used for non-maximal e-variables.
However, in the proof of Theorem 7 we had a situation where equality of the
likelihoods was assumed, so that the experimental evidence was a function of the
likelihood effect. Hence when |a; k〉 and |b; j〉 refer to any symmetrical accessible
e-variables θa and θb, we still have P (|b; j〉||a; k〉) = |〈a; k|b; j〉|2.
Born’s formula can be extended beyond the symmetrical epistemic setting.
First the context τ may contain irrelevant information. But also the target
state |K, b; k〉 may contain irrelevant information in addition to the answer to
the question ’What is the value of λb?’: |K, b; j〉 = |b; j〉 ⊗ |K〉. The addi-
tional information should not change the context even if it is unknown to the
experimentalist; here we may appeal to case 2) of the generalized principle for
conditioning (GPC) of Section 7. Also, in the spin example of Section 13 the
case with unknown total spin represents no problem: 〈i|j〉 = 0 when |i〉 and
|j〉 have different total spin, so no transition between these states can occur.
Finally, from the discussion around Example 18, it seems like the Assumptions
2a) and 2c) of Section 11 can be relaxed. My conjecture is that the discussions
of this paper can be generalized to all cases of interest in quantum mechanics,
but this represents in its generality an open question.
But let |ψk〉 and |θj〉 be any ket vectors, formed by linear combinations of
basic vectors or in other ways, only connected to e-variables ψ and θ. Then we
can again go through our arguments for the Born formula, and see that these
arguments carry over, so P (|θj〉||ψk〉) = |〈ψk|θj〉|2.
Finally, to indicate how Born’s formula generalizes to continuous systems,
look at the spacial wave function f of Section 15. By using a limiting argument
similar to that used in Theorem 6, and anticipating the discussion of Section
23, one can prove the following from the Born formula: Assume that the state
of the system is given by the wave function f(ξ). Then the probability density
of a perfect measurement of the position ξ is given by |f(ξ)|2.
18.5 Superselection rules
Two states |ψ〉 and |θ〉 obay a superselection rule if 〈ψ|A|θ〉 = 0 for all oper-
ators A representing physical observables. This can be the case for instance
if the Hilbert space decomposes as H = H1 ⊕ H2, |ψ〉 ∈ H1, |θ〉 ∈ H2 and
all observables act either on H1 or H2. In this case the linear combinations
|η〉 = α|ψ〉+ β|θ〉 have no physical meaning in the following sense:
〈η|A|η〉 = trace(σA)
for all A, where σ = |α|2|ψ〉〈ψ|+ |β|2|θ〉〈θ|, so the artificial superposition might
as well be replaced by a density matrix. A thorough discussion of superselection
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rules can be found in Giulini (2009).
19 Quantum statistical inference
It is an important task now to depart from the assumption of perfect measure-
ments, and address measurements with real data z. I first introduce the concept
of operator-valued measure.
Assume a likelihood p(zb|λb = ubj) for the e-variable λb. Define an operator-
valued measure M by M({zb}) = ∑j p(zb|λb = ubj)|b; j〉〈b; j|. These operators
satisfy M(S) = I for the whole sample space and are countably additive. Let
the current state be given by the question: ’What is the value of λa?’, and
then the probabilities πa(uak) for the different values λ
a = uak. Then, defining
σ =
∑
k π
a(uak)|a; k〉〈a; k| we get P (B) = trace(σM(B)) for all sets B in the
sample space. This is again proved by a straightforward argument from Born’s
formula.
In some applications the density matrix σ depends upon an unknown pa-
rameter θ. Then the probability measure P above also depends upon θ, and we
obtain a statistical model. This is the point of departure of Barndorff-Nielsen
et al. (2003), where many notions of ordinary statistical inference theory are
generalized.
Related to this is the phenomenon of collapse of the wave packet. Assume
first an initial state |a; k〉, and then an ideal measurement giving the value λb =
ubj. After the measurement the state then changes to |b; j〉. This discontinuous
change of the state has been considered a great problem in the very common
general ontological view on quantum mechanics, problems so great that some
physicists adhere to a many-worlds interpretation (see Everett 1973) to cope
with it. In our statistical interpretation the collapse represents no problem. A
similar ’collapse’ occurs in Bayesian statistics once an observation is made.
The situation is similar, but more complicated when a real measurement is
made. To cope with this, Barndorff-Nielsen et al. (2003) introduced the notion
of an instrument. A simple instrument is one where the state is transformed by
projecting onto orthogonal subspaces of the Hilbert space, together spanning the
whole space. This is also called the Lu¨ders-von Neumann projection postulate,
and is similar to the collapse in the ideal measurement above. It is indicated in
op. cit. that more general instruments can be formed by combining this with
Schro¨dinger evaluation (see Section 23) and forming compound systems.
There is a large literature on quantum statistical inference. The field started
with the monographs of Helstrom (1976) and Holevo (1982), the latter continued
in Holevo (2001). There is much more material in Barndorff-Nielsen et al.
(2003). Hayashi (2005) is a collection of papers on the asymptotic theory of
quantum statistical inference.
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20 Entanglement, EPR and the Bell theorem
The total spin components in different directions for a system of two spin 1/2
particles satisfy the assumptions of a maximal symmetric epistemic setting.
Assume that we have such a system where j = 0, that is, the state is such that
the total spin is zero. By ordinary quantum mechanical calculations, this state
can be explicitly written as
|0〉 = 1√
2
(|1,+〉 ⊗ |2,−〉 − |1,−〉 ⊗ |2,+〉), (10)
where |1,+〉 ⊗ |2,−〉 is a state where particle 1 has a spin component +1/2
and particle 2 has a spin component −1/2 along the z-axis, and vice versa for
|1,−〉 ⊗ |2,+〉. This is what is called an entangled state, that is, a state which
is not a direct product of the component state vectors. I will follow my own
programme, however, and stick to the e-variable description.
Assume further that the two particles separate, the spin component of parti-
cle 1 is measured in some direction by an observer Alice, and the spin component
of particle 2 is measured by an observer Bob. Before the experiment, the two ob-
servers agree both either to measure spin in some fixed direction a or in another
fixed direction b, orthogonal to a, both measurements assumed for simplicity to
be perfect. As a final assumption, let the positions of the two observers at the
time of measurement be spacelike, that is, the distance between them is so large
that no signal can reach from one to the other at this time, taking into account
that signals cannot go faster that the speed of light by the theory of relativity.
This is Bohm’s version of the situation behind the argument against the
completeness of quantum mechanics as posed by Einstein et al. (1935) and
countered by Bohr (1935 a, b). This discussion is still sometimes taken up
today, although most physicists now support Bohr.
I will be very brief on this discussion here. Let λ be 2 times the spin compo-
nent as measured by Alice, and let η be 2 times the spin component as measured
by Bob. Alice has a free choice between measuring in the the directions a and
in the direction b. In both cases, her probability is 1/2 for each of λ = ±1.
If she measures λa = +1, say, she will predict ηa = −1 for the corresponding
component measured by Bob. According to Einstein et al. (1935) there should
then be an element of reality corresponding to this prediction, but if we adapt
the strict interpretation of Section 10 here, there is no way in which Alice can
predict Bob’s actual real measurement at this point of time. Bob on his side
has also a free choice of measurement direction a or b, and in both cases he has
the probability 1/2 for each of η = ±1. The variables λ and η are conceptual,
the first one connected to Alice and the second one connected to Bob. As long
as the two are not able to communicate, there is no sense in which we can make
statements like η = −λ meaningful.
The situation changes. however, if Alice and Bob meet at some time after
the measurement. If Alice then says ’I chose to make a measurement in the
direction a and got the result u’ and Bob happens to say ’I also chose to make
a measurement in the direction a, and then I got the result v’, then these
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two statements must be consistent: v = −u. This seems to be a necessary
requirement for the consistency of the theory. There is a subtle distinction here.
The clue is that the choices of measurement direction both for Alice and for
Bob are free and independent. The directions are either equal or different. If
they should happen to be different, there is no consistency requirement after
the measurement, due to the assumed orthogonality of a and b.
Let us then look at the more complicated situation where a and b are not
necessarily orthogonal, where Alice tosses a coin and measures in the direction
a if head and b if tail, while Bob tosses an independent coin and measures in
some direction c if head and in another direction d if tail. Then there is an
algebraic inequality
λaηc + λbηc + λbηd − λaηd ≤ 2. (11)
Since all the conceptual variables take values ±1, this inequality follows from
(λa + λb)ηc + (λb − λa)ηd = ±2 ≤ 2.
Now replace the conceptual variables here with actual measurements. Tak-
ing then formal expectations from (11), assumes that the products here have
meaning as random variables; in the physical literature this is stated as an
assumption of realism and locality. This leads formally to
E(λ̂aη̂c) + E(λ̂bη̂c) + E(λ̂bη̂d)− E(λ̂aη̂d) ≤ 2 (12)
This is one of Bell’s inequalities, called the CHSH inequality.
On the other hand, using quantum-mechanical calculations, that is Born’s
formula, from the basic state (10), shows that a, b, c and d can be chosen such
that Bell’s inequality (12) is broken. This is also confirmed by numerous exper-
iments with electrons and photons.
From our point of view the transition from (11) to (12) is not valid. One
can not take the expectation term by term in equation (11). The λ’s and η’s
are conceptual variables belonging to different observers. Any valid statistical
expectation must take one of these observers as a point of departure. Look
at (11) from Alice’s point of view, for instance. She starts by tossing a coin.
The outcome of this toss leads to some parameter λ being measured in one
of the directions a or b. This measurement is an epistemic process, and any
prediction based upon this measurement is a new epistemic process. The concept
of ancillary statistic from Subsection 6.2 generalizes immediately from inference
on a parameter to prediction or inference on any e-variable. In particular, the
outcome of the coin toss here is ancillary. By the conditionality principle GPC
of Section 7 (the case 1) there) in any epistemic process for Alice, she should
condition upon this ancillary. So in any prediction she should condition upon
the choice a or b.
By doing predictions from this result, she can use Born’s formula. Suppose
that she measures λa and finds λa = +1, for instance. Then she can predict
the value of λc and hence ηc = −λc. Thus she can (given the outcome a of
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the coin toss) compute the expectation of the first term (11). similarly, she
can compute the expectation of the last term in (11). But there is no way in
which she simultaneously can predict λb and ηd. Hence the expectation of the
second term (and also, similarly the third term) in (11) is for her meaningless.
A similar conclusion is reached if the outcome of the coin toss gives b. And of
course a similar conclusion is valid if we take Bob’s point of view. Therefore the
transition from (11) to (12) is not valid, not by non-locality, but by a simple
use of the conditionality principle. This can also in some sense be called lack
of realism: In this situation is it not meaningful to take expectation from the
point of view of an impartial observer. By necessity one must see the situation
from the point of view of one of the observers Alice or Bob.
Entanglement is very important in modern applications of quantum mechan-
ics, not least in quantum information theory, including quantum computation.
It is also an important ingredient in the theory of decoherence (Schlosshauer,
2007), which explains why ordinary quantum effects are not usually visible on
a larger scale. Decoherence theory shows the importance of the entanglement
of each system with its environment. In particular, it leads in effect to the con-
clusion that all observers share common observations after decoherence between
the system and its environment, and this can then be identified with the ’ob-
jective’ aspects of the world; which is also what the superior actor D of Section
16 would find.
21 Mermin’s experiment
Mermin (1985) discusses the following hypothetical experiment to illustrate the
peculiar features of quantum mechanics:
Two detectors, one belonging to Alice and one belonging to Bob, are far from
each other, and no communication between the two detectors is permitted. Each
detector has a switch that can be set in one of three positions 1, 2 or 3, and each
detectors responds to an event by either flashing a green light (G) or flashing
a red light (R). Midway between the two detectors there is a source emitting
particles, causing simultaneous events at the two detectors.
Alice chooses her switch randomly and so does Bob with his switch. A third
observer reads off the positions of the switches and the responses R or G after
each event. For instance, 32RG means that Alice has position 3, Bob position
2, there is a red flash at Alice’s detector and a green flash at Bob’s detector. A
large number of events of this type is read off. After this, the observer notes
the following:
1) If one examines only those runs in which both the switches have the same
setting, then one finds that the lights always flash the same colors.
2) If one examines all runs, without any regard to how the switches are set,
then one finds that the pattern of flashing is completely random. In particular,
half the time the lights flash the same color, and half the time different colors.
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Is this really possible? asks Mermin, and answers that by classical thinking it
is not. Imagine that the detectors are triggered by particles that have a common
origin at the source. Suppose, for example, that what each particle encounters
as it enters one detector is a target divided into eight regions, labeled RRR,
RRG, RGR, RGG, GRR, GRG, GGR, and GGG. Suppose that each detector is
wired so that if a particle lands in the GRG bin, the detector flips into a mode
in which the light flashes G if the switch is set to 1, R if it is set to 2, and G if
it is set to 3; RGG leads to a mode with R for 1 and G for 2 and 3, and so on.
One can imagine variants of this, but all such variants leads to an instruction
set of this type. The feature 1) will then result for all possible switch settings of
the two detectors if and only if both Alice’s detector and Bob’s detector receives
the same instruction.
Can this then be made consistent with the observation 2)? The answer is
no. For the purpose of the present argument one can let the probability of
each of RRR, RRG,... be arbitrary. Given that the result is RRG, then the
detectors will flash the same color when the switches are set to 11, 22, 33, 12,
or 21; they will flash different colors for 13, 31, 23. or 32. Thus with this result,
the detectors will flash the same color 5/9 of the time. With exactly the same
reasoning, for all the results RRG, GRR, RGR, RGG, GRG, and GGR, the
detectors will flash the same color 5/9 of the time, since this argument only
depends upon the fact that one color appears twice and the other once. But in
the remaining cases RRR and GGG, the detectors always flash the same color.
Thus by classical thinking, the two detectors will by necessity flash the same
color at least 5/9 of the time. This is inconsistent with 2).
The argument just given, corresponds to Bell’s inequality for this experiment.
The point is now that according to quantum mechanics, Bell’s inequality is
violated: One can indeed make a quantum mechanical experiment in which
both 1) and 2) holds!
Let the source produce two particles of spin 1/2 in the singlet state, that
is, with the total spin equal to 0. Let Alice’s detector be as follows: If the
switch has position 1, she asks for the spin component in the z-direction; if the
switch has position 2 or 3, she asks for the spin component in two different
directions in a plane orthogonal to the line towards the source, each separated
120o from the z-axis. The detector flashes green if the answer is +1/2, red if the
answer is −1/2. Bob’s detector is similar, except that position 1 corresponds
to a question in the −z-direction, and the directions of his positions 2 and 3
are opposite to Alice’s directions corresponding to positions 2 and 3. With
this arrangement, it is obvious that 1) will hold always. A straightforward
calculation using Proposition 5 shows that 2) also holds.
Thus one must by necessity conclude that the classical argument does not
hold in the quantum-mechanical setting. What is wrong? According to my
view, one must take into account that there are different observers here, and
the classical argument must be replaced by an argument from the point of view
of one of the observers. First, let us take Alice’s point of view. As in the
previous section, a valid argument must be conditional on the position chosen
by her switch. Also, everything should be conditional on the context. Our task
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is to find some context where the quantum-mechanical result can be explained.
We describe the context in terms of a third actor Charles, which must be
assumed to act before any event is observed and before Alice and Bob make their
choices. The actions of Charles will be described in very concrete terms. He
is assumed to have a box containing 4 balls, three yellow and one blue. Before
each event he draws a ball randomly from the box. This is the background for
producing the results of Alice and Bob. The context is then such that Alice
and Bob always get the same result if their switch is the same. If Alice and
Bob have different switches, the context give them the same result if the ball
chosen by Charles is blue, opposite if the ball is yellow. The whole procedure is
repeated for every event.
So let us first look at the experiment from Alice’s point of view. To be
concrete, assume that she chooses switch 1 and gets as her result a green flash.
She does not know Bob’s switch position, but she knows the context. Thus
she knows that if then Bob chooses switch 1, his result will also be a green
flash. If he chooses switch 2 or 3, his probability of green will be 1/4 and
probability of red 3/4. If the switch is not recorded, his probability of green
will be 1/3 · 1+ 2/3 · 1/4 = 1/2. Thus the experiment will satisfy 2). She knows
from the context that it satisfies 1).
The situation is similar from Bob’s point of view.
This situation can also be looked upon by an impartial observer David pre-
dicting only one event, but knowing the context. He can make predictions under
two circumstances: a) knowing the two switch positions or b) not knowing the
switch positions. In the last case he will predict according to 2) that the prob-
ability of equal flash is equal to 1/2 by the same argument as used for Alice. In
the circumstance a) he will predict equal flash if the switch positions are equal,
otherwise a probability 1/4 of equal flash. If he makes predictions for several
events, but staying all the time in the same state, the results will be the same.
We need not worry how nature chooses the actor Charles. It is only necessary
that one such context produces the result of the quantum experiment. The main
thing is the use of the statistical conditionality principle: The result of the whole
experiment should be conditional, given the ancillary knowledge of the observer.
In my view, Mermin’s hypothetical experiment clarifies the role of the Bell
type inequalities, and the reason why such inequalities can be violated in quan-
tum mechanics.
22 The free will theorem
Throughout the times, several authors have proposed various types of hidden
variable theories which they claim to be consistent with quantum mechanics.
Again and again the scopes of these theories have been limited by so-called
no-go-theorems. One of the first and most well-known of these theorems was
that of Kochen and Specker (1967): If a theory should be compatible with
quantum mechanics, one can not find an arbitrary set of hidden variables that
are non-contextual and take definite values at any time.
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The newest no-go-theorem is The Free Will Theorem of Conway and Kochen
(2006, 2008). They take as a point of departure the EPR-type experiment
with spin 1 particles, but presumably this can be generalized. They state two
assumptions that are weaker than, but implied by quantum mechanics and one
assumption which is implied by relativity theory. Under these assumptions they
prove:
The Free Will Theorem. If the choice of directions in which to per-
form spin 1 experiments is not a function of the information accessible to the
experimenters, then the responses of the particles are equally not functions of
the information accessible to them.
Thus the particles in a sense have a free will: Their responses are not in any
way determined by past history. Past history is here a very wide concept. It can
include stochastic variables given in advance, so this kind of simple randomness
will not help.
The specific assumptions that Conway and Kochen give for their free will
theorem are:
1) SPIN.
Measurements of Alice and Bob are both given in some frame (x, y, z), and
the measurements are always 1, 0,1 in some order. This is in particular satisfied
by the squares of the spin 1 components along the coordinate axes according to
quantum mechanics, which are commuting operators.
2) TWIN.
If the measurements performed by Alice and Bob are along the same axis,
they give the same result. This is analogous to what we assumed in the Bell
experiment discussed above, only that the signs of Bob’s measurements are
reversed.
3) FIN.
There is a finite upper bound to the speed with which information can be
effectively transmitted. This assumption is weakened in Conway and Kochen
(2008).
Admittedly, especially the SPIN-assumption describes a rather special situa-
tion, but one can assume that the theorem can be generalized to other situations
with entanglement, in the language of the present book: To other situations
where Alice and Bob choose their measurement freely, but in different contexts.
The result of the Free Will Theorem is then that Nature also chooses its response
freely: It is not in any way a function of the past history of the universe.
23 The Schro¨dinger equation
During a time when no measurement is done on the system, the ket vector is
known in quantum mechanics to develop according to the Schro¨dinger equation:
ih¯
d
dt
|ψ〉t = H |ψ〉t, (13)
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where H is a selfadjoint operator called the Hamiltonian (the total energy op-
erator).
I will give two sets of arguments for the Schro¨dinger equation, one rough
and general, and then one specific related to position. The last argument also
includes a discussion of the wave function.
23.1 The general argument
Assume that the system at time 0 has a context given by the ket |ψ〉0 and at
time t by the ket |ψ〉t. Let us assume that we ask an epistemic question about
the variable θ, and that the ket corresponding to a specific value of this vari-
able is |θ〉0 at time 0 and |θ〉t at time t. We have the choice between making
an ideal measurement at time 0 or at time t. Since there is now disturbance
through measurement of the system between these two time points, the prob-
ability distribution of the answer must be the same whatever choice is made.
Hence according to Born’s formula
|0〈θ|ψ〉0|2 = |t〈θ|ψ〉t|2. (14)
Now we refer to a general theorem by Wigner (1959), proved in detail by
Bargmann (1964): If an equation like (14) holds, then there must be a unitary
or antiunitary transformation from |ψ〉0 to |ψ〉t. (Antiunitary U means U−1 =
−U †.) Since by continuity an antiunitary transformation can be excluded here,
so we have
|ψ〉t = Ut|ψ〉0
for some unitary operator Ut. Writing Ut = exp(
At
ih¯
) for some selfadjoint op-
erator At, and assuming that At is linear in t: At = Ht, this is equivalent to
(13).
23.2 Position as an inaccessible stochastic process
As in Section 15 consider the motion of a non-relativistic one-dimensional par-
ticle, but now make time explicit. Since momentum and hence velocity cannot
be determined simultaneously with arbitrary accuracy, it is also impossible to
determine positions ξ(s) and ξ(t) simultaneously for two different time points s
and t with arbitrary accuracy. Hence the vector (ξ(s), ξ(t)) is inaccessible. Fix a
time point t. Different observers may focus on different aspects from the past of
the time t in order to try to predict ξ(t) as well as possible. These aspects may
be formulated by propositional logic in different ways, but for reasons discussed
in Appendix 6 I will in this book concentrate on a probabilistic description.
Thus observer i may predict ξ(t) by conditioning on some σ-algebra Pi of infor-
mation from the past. This may be information from some specific time point
si with si < t, but it can also take other forms. We must think of these different
observers as hypothetical; only one of them can be realized. Nevertheless one
can imagine that all possible information, subject to the choice of observer later,
is collected in an inaccessible σ-algebra Pt, the past of ξ(t). The distribution
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of ξ(t), given the past Pt, for each t, can then be represented as a stochastic
process.
In the simplest case one can then imagine {ξ(s); s ≥ 0} as an inaccessible
Markov process: The future is independent of the past, given the present. Under
suitable regularity conditions, a continuous Markov process will be a diffusion
process, i.e., a solution of a stochastic differential equation of the type
dξ(t) = b(ξ(t), t)dt + σ(ξ(t), t)dw(t). (15)
Here b(·, ·) and σ(·, ·) are continuous functions, also assumed differentiable,
and {w(t); t ≥ 0} is a Wiener process. The Wiener process is a stochastic
process with continuous paths, independent increments w(t) − w(s), w(0) = 0
and E((w(t) − w(s))2) = t − s. Many properties of the Wiener process have
been studied, including the fact that its paths are nowhere differentiable. The
stochastic differential equation (15) must therefore be defined in a particular
way; for an introduction to Itoˆ calculus or Stochastic calculus; see for instance
Klebaner (1998). One well known result is Itoˆ’s formula: For a two times
continuously differentiable function f one has:
df(ξ(t), t) = ft(ξ(t), t)dt+ fx(ξ(t), t)dξ(t) +
1
2
fxx(ξ(t), t)σ
2(ξ(t), t)dt. (16)
There is also the Fokker-Planck equation for the probability density ρ(x, t)
of ξ(t):
ρt(x, t) = −(b(x, t)ρ(x, t))x + 1
2
(σ2(x, t)ρ(x, t))xx.
So far we have considered observers making predictions of the present value
ξ(t), given the past Pt. There is another type of epistemic processes which can
be described as follows: Imagine an actor A which considers some future event
for the particle, lying in a σ-algebra Fj. He asks himself in which position he
should place the particle at time t as well as possible in order to have this event
fulfilled. In other words, he can adjust ξ(t) for this purpose. Again one can
collect the σ-algebras for the different potential actors in one big inaccessible
σ-algebra Ft, the future after t. The conditioning of the present, given the
future, defines {ξ(t); t ≥ 0} as a new inaccessible stochastic process, with now t
running backwards in time. In the simplest case this is a Markov process, and
can be described by a stochastic differential equation
dξ(t) = b∗(ξ(t), t)dt+ σ∗(ξ(t), t)dw∗(t), (17)
where again w∗(t) is a Wiener process.
Since t is now running backwards in time, Itoˆ’s formula now reads:
df(ξ(t), t) = ft(ξ(t), t)dt+ fx(ξ(t), t)dξ(t) − 1
2
fxx(ξ(t), t)σ
2
∗(ξ(t), t)dt. (18)
The Fokker-Planck equation is now:
ρt(x, t) = −(b∗(x, t)ρ(x, t))x − 1
2
(σ2∗(x, t)ρ(x, t))xx.
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23.3 Nelson’s stochastic mechanics
Without having much previous knowledge about modern stochastic analysis and
without knowing anything about epistemic processes. Nelson (1967) formulated
his stochastic mechanics, which serves our purpose perfectly. Nelson considered
the multidimensional case, but for simplicity, I will here only discuss a one-
dimensional particle. Everything can be generalized.
Nelson discussed what corresponds to the stochastic differential equations
(15) and (17) with σ and σ∗ constant in space and time. Since heavy particles
fluctuate less than light particles, he assumed that these quantities vary inversely
with mass m, that is, σ2 = σ2∗ = h¯/m. The constant h¯ has dimension action,
and turns out to be equal to Planck’s constant divided by 2π. This assumes
that σ2 = σ2∗ , a fact that Nelson actually proved in addition to proving that
b∗ = b− σ2(lnρ)x.
Now define
u =
1
2
(b− b∗), v = 1
2
(b+ b∗).
Then
u =
1
2
σ2(lnρ)x,
and the two Fokker-Planck equations give the continuity equation
ρt = −(vρ)x.
By a simple manipulation from this, one finds that
ut = −1
2
σ2vxx − (vu)x. (19)
Related to (16) with (15) inserted and (18) with (17) inserted, Nelson defined
the forward and backward derivatives
Df(x(t), t) = ft(x(t), t) + b(x(t), t)fx(x(t), t) +
1
2
σ2fxx(x(t), t);
D∗f(x(t), t) = ft(x(t), t) + b∗(x(t), t)fx(x(t), t) − 1
2
σ2fxx(x(t), t),
and argued that the acceleration of the particle can be defined by
a(t) =
1
2
D∗Dx(t) +
1
2
DD∗x(t).
Then a simple manipulation shows that Dξ(t) = b(ξ(t), t), D∗ξ(t) = b∗(ξ(t), t)
and that
vt = a+ uux − vvx + 1
2
σ2uxx. (20)
By Newton’s law, the force F upon the particle is ma. Assuming that F is
derived as the negative gradient of a potential V , we get a = −m−1Vx. Inserting
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this and at the same time σ2 = h¯/m into (19) and (20), we have a coupled non-
linear set of differential equations for u(x, t) and v(x, t). This can be solved as
an initial value problem assuming u(x, 0) = u0(x) and v(x, 0) = v0(x) for some
given functions u0 and v0.
From the relationship between b and b∗ we already know that
Rx =
m
h¯
u,
where R(x, t) = 12 lnρ(x, t). Let S be defined up to an additive constant by
Sx =
m
h¯
v,
and define the complex function f(x, t) by
f = eR+iS .
Then |f(x, t)|2 = ρ(x, t). Nelson interpreted f as the wave function of the
particle.
A remarkable fact, noted by Nelson, is that the nonlinear set of equations
(19) and (20) for u and v transforms into a linear equation
ft = i
h¯
2m
fxx − i 1
h¯
V f + iα(t)f. (21)
To prove this, we compute the derivatives in (21) and divide by f , finding
Rt + iSt = i
h¯
2m
(Rxx + iSxx + [Rx + iSx]
2)− i 1
h¯
V + iα(t).
Taking x-derivatives here and separating real and imaginary parts, we see that
this is equivalent to the pair of equations
ut = − h¯
2m
vxx − (vu)x,
vt =
h¯
2m
uxx +
1
2
(u2)x − 1
2
(v2)x − 1
m
Vx.
This is the same as (19) and (20).
Finally, Nelson notes that since the integral of ρ is 1, hence independent
of t, if (21) holds at all then α(t) must be real. By choosing, for each t, the
arbitrary constant in S appropriately, we can arrange for α(t) to be 0. Thus
(21) is equivalent to
ih¯ft(x, t) =
1
2m
[(−ih¯ ∂
∂x
)2 + V (x)]f(x, t). (22)
This is the Schro¨dinger equation (13) with the Hamiltonian corresponding to
the sum of kinetic and potential energy. Note that as in Section 15 the operator
for the momentum of the particle is −ih¯ ∂
∂x
.
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As already noted, the argument here can be generalized to a multidimen-
sional particle, and also to a system of particles. An open problem at present is
to connect it to the derivation of the Hilbert space which was given in Section
11 and the following sections here. My conjecture is that this can only be done
if the whole set of arguments is generalized to the relativistic case. A possible
starting point for such a generalization may be the paper by Wigner (1939) on
the unitary representation of the inhomogeneous Lorentz group and the theory
that has been developed from this paper. If such a generalization could be done,
it might well supplement the theory of quantum electrodynamics with its renor-
malization. (An account of quantum electrodynamics together with its history
is given in Schweber (1994). The basis for Richard Feynman’s derivation of the
theory can be found in Brown (2005).)
24 Discussion
This paper falls naturally into two parts, Sections 1-9 on conventional inference,
and the last sections on quantum mechanics, although the two parts are closely
tied together. Let us first discuss some of the results of the first part.
As indicated in Section 9, statistical inference is often made in steps. At
each step, the results of the previous steps then form a part of the context. And
it may initiate more steps. A typical case is when a least squares estimation
is done in multiple regression, and this is followed by a residual analysis. Such
a sequence is not consistent with the ordinary likelihood principle, but it is
consistent with our extended basis.
It is often stated that a weakness with the definitions of sufficiency and
ancillarity is that they are strongly model dependent. This can remedied by
a stepwise analysis, where new models are tested in steps, following a residual
analysis from older models.
Taking more steps in the total inference, our basis is even consistent with al-
gorithmic procedures like Breiman’s trees (see Breiman, 2001, and references
there) and the ordinary partial least squares algorithm (Martens and Næs,
1989).
All this must be taken under one proviso, however: The overall goal of the
statistical analysis must be formulated first, and taken as part of the context
for all the steps.
I have not gone much into formal logic in this paper. In Section 5 I indicated
an equivalence between propositional logic and the ordinary basis for probability
models. When I now discuss inference in steps, the propositional logic must
be extended to temporal logic, for which there is a large literature; see an
introduction in Venema (2001). A further extension would be to proceed to
first order and higher order logic, but this is beyond the scope of the present
paper.
As a transition between the two parts of this paper, the following remark was
made: Statistical literature has much discussion about the way to do inference,
but very little on the choice of what to do inference about. These different
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questions may be conflicting, even complementary. The symmetrical epistemic
setting is a way to formalize a situation where only one out of many possible
questions may be addressed.
Here are some problems that must be considered open from the point of
view of the present approach, even though some of them are formally solved by
conventional quantum mechanics:
- First two technical open question: What conditions should a maximal
symmetrical epistemic setting satisfy in order that all unit vectors in H are
proportional to |a; k〉 for some a and k? Or in order that all orthonormal sets of
unit vectors in H are of the form {|a; k〉; k = 1, ..., d} except for phase factors?
A necessary condition is that no pairs of states are subject to a superselection
rule. On the other hand, the first statement holds for spin 1/2 particles, as
shown in Helland (2010). It is also easy to show that the second statement
holds for this case.
- Can one find examples where one is sure that the rational epistemic setting
is indicated in the macroscopic world? If possible, can such examples be used
in a constructive way in quantum information theory and practice?
- As discussed in Section 23 one can also treat continuous systems from the
point of view an epistemic process, but this treatment is not closely related to
the discussion of Section 11 and the following sections. A reconciliation may
induce technical problems, but these problems should be solvable given the
vast literature in related mathematics and theoretical physics over the years.
However, this development may also induce problems of fundamental art.
- What about a discussion of open systems?
- Can the group-theoretical approach used here in some way throw more
light upon elementary particle theory, where group theory is used extensively?
- Can a further development of the discussion here, extended to continuous
systems, lead to a reconciliation of quantum theory and relativity theory? It is
well known that quantum mechanics can be extended to take into account the
special theory of relativity, but that there are conceptual difficulties involved in
finding a synthesis between conventional quantum theory and the general theory
of relativity. Of course I do not have any solution to these difficulties at present.
Already here, however, it is tempting to suggest that gravitational fields and
related physical quantities are e-variables, and that they are inaccessible inside
black holes.
A completely different attempt to find a unified approach to statistics, quan-
tum theory and relativity theory is given by Frieden (1998, 2004).
To emphasize again part of the motivation behind the present book, I cite
Hardy and Spekkens (2010): ’Quantum theory is a peculiar creature. It was
born as a theory of atomic physics early in the twentieth century, but over time
its scope has broadened, to the point where it now underpins all of modern
physics with the exception of gravity. It has been verified to extreme high
accuracy and has never been contradicted experimentally. Yet despite of its
enormous success, there is still no consensus among physicists about what this
theory is saying about the nature of reality.’
What I have tried to do here, is to suggest a new foundation, and thereby
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a new interpretation, by bringing together basic ideas from statistics and from
physics. In the words of John A. Wheeler: ’Science owes more to the clash of
ideas than to the steady accumulation of facts.’
The underlying concept of both these sciences is that of an epistemic process:
The process of obtaining knowledge about nature from observations. We begin
with an epistemic question: ’What is the value of θ?’, where θ is some conceptual
variable. Then at the end of the process we have some knowledge of θ, in the
simplest case complete knowledge; θ = uk.
Quantum mechanics then emerges from the observation that in some cases
the values of two conceptual variables θa and θb can not be assessed simulta-
neously with arbitrary accuracy by any human being: The vector (θa, θb) is
inaccessible.
Despite of this fact probabilities of θb, given θa, can be found from Born’s
formula. The arguments for this formula, as given in the present book, rely on
a superior observer D. The probabilities obtained are then probabilities from
D’s point of view, which must be regarded as objective probabilities. In this
way the ontology of nature is restored, even though my arguments started with
a set of epistemic processes.
What I have offered through these arguments, is a new language, which in
my view must be taken as a common language for the foundation of statistics
and the foundation of physics. I am a strong believer in the thought that there
exists a conceptual basis which is common to all empirical scientific cultures. In
fact, I believe that there in some way should exist a common set of principles
behind all human cultures, and that the idea of such a basis ideally speaking
ought to be a part of the context for all human beings.
Given our own context, we are all subject to our free will. Thus we differ in
our opinions and in our actions, related to the fact our context differ: We have
different history, different background and different basic convictions.
Finally, let me cite St. Paul from 1. Corinthians 13.9: ’For we know in part
and we prophecy in part.’ In the narrow sense, this may be related to statistical
inference and prediction. But in fact, we are all at any time participating in
several epistemic processes, where we try to assess the values of conceptual
variables and where we also try to predict the future. And this is always done
in part, that is, in an incomplete way. Throughout the time that I have been
writing this book, I have also felt that I have been taking part in an epistemic
process. And I am quite convinced that there is still more to do in the attempts
to complete this process.
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APPENDIX 1
Independence and correlation
The concept of independence is important in this paper, or more particularly,
the concept of conditional independence. This can be taken as the basis for
the statistical concepts of sufficiency and ancillarity in the form that we use
them here. For a unified treatment of these and related concept based upon
conditional independence, see Dawid (1979). A further purpose of this Appendix
is to illustrate a main observation behind the paper: Inference from empirical
data and the ideas behind such inference are of interest across many scientific
cultures, and in discussing this, we should allow basic concepts and ideas to
be taken from several cultures, not only from the traditional statistical sphere.
The idea from this Appendix is taken from Everett (1973), a book which is the
basis for one of the most extreme interpretation of quantum mechanics: The
many-worlds interpretation.
In elementary statistical textbooks it is often stated that uncorrelatedness
does not imply independence. But what seems very difficult to find in the stan-
dard statistical literature, is the fact that there exists a simple measure of corre-
lation which is 0 if and only if the joint probability distribution is independent.
Although this goes back to Shannons basic paper from 1948; see Shannon and
Weaver (1949) and is well known among some statisticians (see Harris (1982),
where also the multivariate result is formulated, or Robinson (1991), who uses
essentially this concept in testing in econometrics), the result is simple enough
and important enough for a general discussion of independence to be introduced
explicitly. The present presentation is modified from Everett (1973). For sim-
plicity we develop the result only for discrete probability distributions, and then
present it in general.
Definition A. i) Let {Pi} be a discrete probability distribution. Then the
entropy of that distribution is defined as
H({Pi}) = −
∑
i
Piln(Pi)
with 0ln(0) = 0.
ii) For a joint probability distribution {Pij} with marginals {Pi·} and {P·j}
the correlation is defined as
C = C({Pij}) = H({Pi·}) +H({P·j})−H({Pij}).
Theorem A. C is always ≥ 0. It is equal to 0 if and only if Pij = Pi· · P·j
for all i and j.
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Proof. Let Qij = Pij/Pi·P·j if Pi·P·j > 0, otherwise Qij = 1. (Note that
Pi·P·j = 0 implies Pij = 0.) Then Pij = QijPi·P·j always, and
C =
∑
ij
Pij ln(
Pij
Pi·P·j
) =
∑
ij
Pi·P·jQij ln(Qij).
For x ≥ 0 it is always true that xln(x) > x− 1; except that one has equality for
x = 1. Hence
C >
∑
ij
Pi·P·j(Qij − 1) =
∑
ij
Pij −
∑
ij
Pi·P·j = 0
except when all the Qij = 1, that is, the case of independence.
Definition B. i) Consider any random variable u in the sense defined in
Section 2. Let P (·|τ) be its conditional probability distribution, given the e-
variable τ , and let p(u|τ) be its density with repect to a fixed positive measure
µ, to be understood. The conditional entropy of that variable is then
H(u|τ) = −
∫
u
p(u|τ)ln(p(u|τ))dµ.
ii) Let u and v be two random variables, and assume that the joint entropy
H(u, v|τ) is finite. Then the conditional correlation between u and v is defined
as
C(u, v|τ) = H(u|τ) +H(v|τ)−H(u, v|τ).
The entropy is always well-defined as a number in [0,∞]. If τ is a σ-algebra,
and a measure is defined on this σ-algebra, then H is only uniquely defined
almost surely with respect to this measure. This will be understood in the
following.
Theorem B. Assume that the joint entropy is finite. Then C(u, v|τ) ≥ 0,
and u and v are conditionally independent, given τ , if and only if C(u, v|τ) = 0.
Although the concept of entropy is not used explicitly in this paper, the result
above deserve to be mentioned, and also the simple observation that entropy
is related to the statistical concept of Kullback-Leibler distance. I also want
to recall here the well-known fact that dependence between random variables
in general implies no causation. For a simple treatment of this aspect; see
Wasserman (2004).
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APPENDIX 2
Proof that the generalized likelihood principle fol-
lows from the GWCP and the GWSP (Birnbaum’s
theorem); the discrete case
Let E1 and E2 be the two experiments in the generalized likelihood principle,
and let E∗ be the mixed experiment from the GWCP. On the sample space of
E∗ define the statistic
t(j, zj) =
{
(1, z∗1) if j = 1 and z1 = z
∗
1 or if j = 2 and z2 = z
∗
2
(j, zj) otherwise
.
I will use the factorization theorem to prove that t(j, zj) is a sufficient statistic
in the mixed experiment E∗. Define
h(j, zj |τ) =
{
c if (j, zj) = (2, z
∗
2)
1 otherwise
,
where c is the constant of proportionality between the two likelihoods. Define
for both values of j and for all zj :
g(t|θ, τ) = g((j, zj)|θ, τ) = f∗((j, zj)|θ, τ),
where f∗ is the point probability in E∗.
Now for all sample points except (2, z∗2) (but including (1, z
∗
1)), we have
t(j, zj) = (j, zj), so
g(t(j, zj)|θ, τ)h(j, zj |τ) = g((j, zj)|θ, τ) · 1 = f∗((j, zj)|θ, τ).
Such a factorization also holds for (2, z∗2). Namely, by using the definifions of
t, h, g, f∗ together with the GWCP, we have
g(t(2, z∗2)|θ, τ)h(2, z∗2 |τ) = g((1, z∗1)|θ, τ)c = f∗((1, z∗1)|θ, τ)c = c
1
2
f1(z
∗
1 |θ, τ)
= c
1
2
L1(θ|z∗1 , τ) =
1
2
L2(θ|z∗2 , τ) =
1
2
f2(z
∗
2 |θ, τ) = f∗((2, z∗2)|θ, τ).
Here L1 and L2 are the likelihoods of the two experiments E1 and E2, and I
have used the premise of the generalized likelihood principle.
Thus by the factorization theorem, t(j, zj) is a sufficient statistic for θ, and
by the WGSP we have that the evidence about θ in E∗ given by (1, z∗1) and
(2, z∗2) are the same. By the WGCP, (1, z
∗
1) gives the same evidence as z
∗
1 in E1
and (2, z∗2) gives the same evidence as z
∗
2 in E2. Hence these latter evidences
must also be the same, and the generalized likelihood principle follows.
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APPENDIX 3
Some group theory, operator theory and group
representation theory
A group G is defined in mathematics as a set of elements g with a composition
g1g2 satisfying the axioms: (i) There is a unit e such that eg = ge = g for all
g; (ii) For each g there is an inverse g−1 such that g−1g = gg−1 = e; (iii) The
composition is associative: (g1g2)g3 = g1(g2g3) for all g1, g2, g3.
The group is Abelian (commutative) if g1g2 = g2g1 for all g1, g2.
Important examples of groups are the additive group on the real numbers
and the multiplicative group on the positive real numbers.
Most of the groups used in this paper are group actions, that is, transforma-
tion groups on some set Φ, even though some must be seen as abstract groups.
A transformation g of Φ is any function on φ which is one-to-one and onto.
These functions can be composed by (g1g2)(φ) = g1(g2(φ)), and they have in-
verses g−1. The existence of a unit and the associative law are automatic. Thus
by definition they form a group. For any set Φ the group of all transformations
on Φ exists, and is called the automorphism group of Φ. Thus many groups G
of this paper may be considered as subgroups of some automorphism group.
An orbit of a transformation group G is a subset of Φ, the set of all φ
that are transformed from a single element φ0, that is {φ : φ = gφ0 for some
g ∈ G}. The restriction of G to an orbit or to a set of orbits will itself be a
group transformation, which again without possible confusion can be called G.
Restrictions to orbits of groups on the parameter space were used in connection
with model reduction in Section 3 and later. This constraint on model reduction
is important if the same transformation group shall be kept during the reduction.
Such reductions were important in connection to the symmetrical epistemic
setting used in introducing the quantum mechanical perspective.
A group where the only orbit is the full group, is said to be transitive. For
a transitive group, each element of Φ can be transformed to each other element
by some group action.
The stabilizer of an element φ0 ∈ Φ is the subgroup H of G such that
h(φ0) = φ0 for h ∈ H . If φ1 = gφ0, then H(φ1) = gH(φ0)g−1. For some groups
the stabilizer is trivial.
Let in general both the set Φ and the group G be given some topology,
both spaces assumed to be locally compact. Then one can under quite general
conditions (see Helland (2010) or any mathematical text on this) define in a
unique way (except for a multiplicative constant) two positive measures, a left
Haar measure µG satisfying µG(gD) = µG(D) and a right Haar measure νG
satisfying νG(Dg) = νG(D) for all g ∈ G and all Borel sets D ⊆ G.
Then turn to invariant measures on the set Φ itself. In mathematical texts, Φ
is often itself treated as a group, and then the concepts of Haar measures carry
over. But this is not satisfactory for all statistical applications. In Helland
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(2010, Subsection 3.3 and Appendix A.2.2) a summary of a way to fix this is
given. In that book, group actions were written to the right: φ → φg so that
φ(g1g2) = (φg1)g2. This is uncommon, but has a certain logical advantage: In
the product g1g2, we get that g1 comes first and then g2.
A left-invariant measure on Φ is then any measure µ satisfying µ(g(B)) =
µ(B) for any g ∈ G and for any Borel set B ⊆ Φ, while a right-invariant
measure is any measure ν satisfying ν(Bg) = ν(B) for all g,B. In Helland
(2010, Theorem A1) it was proved that a right invariant measure always exists
on a given orbit of G if the stabilizer of one element, hence of all elements, of
this orbit is compact. This is the case under weak technical assumptions (proper
group actions; see Wijsman, 1990) if G is locally compact. In Helland (2010,
Subection 3.3) a list of arguments were given why the right invariant measure
should be used as an objective prior in statistics if such a prior is required.
The invariant measure is unique up to a multiplicative scalar if the group ac-
tion is transitive, otherwise invariant measures can be introduced independently
on each orbit. For compact groups and in many other cases the left-invariant
measure and the right-invariant measure can be taken as identical. When Φ is
compact, the invariant measure can be taken as normalized: ν(Φ) = 1.
Two groups G and R are homomorphic if there exists a function T from G
to R such that T (g1g2) = T (g1)T (g2) for all g1, g2 and such that T (e) = e
′, the
unit in R. Then also T (g−1) = T (g)−1. They are isomorphic if T is one-to-one.
Then they may be considered as the same abstract group.
Next let us introduce some basic algebra. A vector space is a group under
addition where also multiplication by scalars is defined. In this paper we mainly
consider finite-dimensional complex vector spaces, meaning that the scalars are
complex numbers and that there exists a set of basis vectors ei; i = 1, ..., k that
are linearly independent:
∑
i ciei = 0 implies c1 = ... = ck = 0. A linear
operator A on a vector space is a function from the vector space into itself
satisfying
A(c1a1 + c2a2) = c1Aa1 + c2Aa2.
By relating it to the basis vectors, a linear operator can always be represented
by a square matrix:
Aej =
∑
i
eiD(A)ij .
Then if a =
∑
j ejaj and b = Aa =
∑
i eibi, we have bi =
∑
jD(A)ijaj . Thus if
a is the coloumn vector of components aj and similarly for b, we get b = D(A)a;
in complete anology to b = Aa.
If a is represented by the coloumn vector a, we define a† as represented
by the row vector (a∗1, ..., a
∗
k), where ∗ denotes complex conjugate. The scalar
product a†b is defined as
∑
i a
∗
i bi. This scalar product is linear in the second
vector and antilinear in the first, in agreement with the tradition in physics.
Mathematicians tend to use a scalar product which is linear in the first vector.
This is in effect just a cultural difference, but to outsiders it is annoying.
Two vectors a and b are orthogonal if a†b = 0. With this interpretation, the
basis vectors ei are automatically pairwise orthogonal and have norm ‖ei‖ ≡
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√
e
†
iei = 1. In general one can always find many sets of n orthogonal basis
vectors in an n-dimensional vector space.
A vector space with the structure above is called an inner product space.
This notion can be generalized to infinite-dimensional spaces, having an infinite
set of basis vectors. The norm ‖a‖ =
√
a†a induces a metric, hence a topology
on this space by d(a, b) = ‖a − b‖. The space is complete in this metric if
‖an−am‖ → 0 (n,m→∞) implies that there exists an a such that ‖an−a‖ →
0. A complete inner product space is called a Hilbert space. A closed subspace
of a Hilbert space is again a Hilbert space. A finite-dimensional inner product
space is always complete, hence a Hilbert space.
The identity operator I is defined by Ia = a, and the multiplication of
operators by (AB)(a) = A(Ba). Then (in the finite-dimensional case) D(I) is
diagonal with 1’s on the diagonal, and D(AB) = D(A)D(B), ordinary matrix
multiplication. An operator A is invertible if there exists an A−1 such that
A−1A = AA−1 = I. A finite-dimensional operator A is invertible if and only if
det(D(A)) 6= 0; then D(A−1) = D(A)−1.
The conjugate of an operator A, A†, is defined by a†(Ab) = (A†a)†b.
Slightly different, but equivalent notations for scalar products and conjugates,
using kets and bras, were used in the main text. An operator A is called Her-
mitian if A† = A. An operator V is called unitary if V −1 = V †.
An eigenvector v and an eigenvalue λ are solutions of Av = λv. An operator
A is Hermitian if and only if all its eigenvalues are real-valued. Eigenvectors
corresponding to different eigenvalues are then automatically orthogonal. In
the k-dimensional Hermitian case there are always sets of k pairwise orthogonal
eigenvectors.
A group representation of G is a continuous homomorphism from G to the
group of invertible linear operators V on some vector space H :
V (g1g2) = V (g1)V (g2).
It is also required that V (e) = I, the identity. This assures that the inverse
exists: V (g)−1 = V (g−1). The representation is unitary if the operators are
unitary (V (g)†V (g) = I). If the vector space is finite-dimensional, we have a
representation D(V ) on the square, invertible matrices. For any representation
V and any fixed invertible operator K on the vector space, we can define a
new representation by W (g) = KV (g)K−1. One can prove that two equivalent
unitary representations are unitarily equivalent, so K can be chosen as a unitary
operator.
A subspace H1 of H is called invariant with respect to the representation V
if u ∈ H1 implies V (g)u ∈ H1 for all g ∈ G. The null-space {0} and the whole
space H are trivially invariant; other invariant subspaces are called proper. A
group representation V of a group G in H is called irreducible if it has no
proper invariant subspace. A representation is said to be fully reducible if it
can be expressed as a direct sum of irreducible subrepresentations. A finite-
dimensional unitary representation of any group is fully reducible. In terms of a
matrix representation, this means that we can always find aW (g) = KV (g)K−1
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such that D(W ) is of minimal block diagonal form. Each one of these blocks
will represent an irreducible representation. They are all one-dimensional if
and only if G is Abelian. The blocks may be seen as operators on subspaces
of the original vector space, the irreducible subspaces. These are important in
studying the structure of the group.
A useful result is Schur’s Lemma (; see for instance Barut and Raczka, 1985):
Let V1 and V2 be two irreducible representations of a group G; V1 on the
space H1 and V2 on the space H2. Suppose that there is a transformation T
from H1 to H2 such that
V2(g)T (v) = T (V1(g)v)
for all g ∈ G and v ∈ H1.
Then either T is zero or it is an isomorphism. Furthermore, if H1 = H2,
then T = λI for some complex number λ.
Let ν be the right and left invariant measure of the space Φ induced by
the group G, assuming the two to be equal, and consider the Hilbert space
H = L2(Φ, ν). Then the right regular representation of G on H is defined
by UR(g)f(φ) = f(φg) and the left regular representation by UL(g)f(φ) =
f(g−1φ). These representations always exist, and they can be shown to be
unitary.
If V is an arbitrary representation of a compact group G in H , then there
exists in H a new scalar product defining a norm equivalent to the initial one,
relative to which V is a unitary representation of G.
For references to some of the vast literature on group representation theory,
see Helland (2010, Appendix A.2.4).
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APPENDIX 4
Proofs related to quantum states
Proof of Theorem 1 of Section 12.
(i) For each a and for ga ∈ Ga define V (ga) = U(g0a)U(ga)U(ga0). Then
V (ga) is an operator on H = L(Λ0), since it is equal to U(g0ag
aga0), and
g0ag
aga0 ∈ G0 by Definition 9a). For a product gagbgc with ga ∈ Ga, gb ∈ Gb
and gc ∈ Gc we define V (gagbgc) = V (ga)V (gb)V (gc), and similarly for all
elements of G that can be written as a finite product of elements from the
subgroups.
Let now g and h be any two elements in G such that g can be written as a
product of elements from Ga, Gb and Gc, and similarly h (the proof is similar for
other cases.) It follows that V (gh) = V (g)V (h) on these elements, since the last
factor of g and the first factor of h either must belong to the same subgroup or to
different subgroups; in both cases the product can be reduced by the definition
of the previous paragraph. In this way we see that V is a representation on the
set of finite products, and since these generate G by Assumption 2c), and since
U , hence by definition V , is continuous, it is a representation of G.
Since different representations of g as a product may give different solutions,
we have to include the possibility that V may be multivalued.
(ii) Directly from the proof of (i).
Proof of Theorem 2 of Section 12.
(i) Assume as in Theorem 1 that we have a multivalued representation V of
G. Define a larger group G′ as follows: If gagbgc = gdgegf , say, with gk ∈ Gk
for all k, we define g′1 = g
agbgc and g′2 = g
dgegf . A similar definition of new
group elements is done if we have equality of a limit of such products. Let G′ be
the collection of all such new elements that can be written as a formal product
of elements gk ∈ Gk or as limits of such symbols. The product is defined in the
natural way, and the inverse by for example (gagbgc)−1 = (gc)−1(gb)−1(ga)−1.
By Assumption 2c), the group G′ generated by this construction must be at
least as large as G. It is clear from the proof of Theorem 1 that V also is a
representation of the larger group G′ on H , now a one-valued representation.
(ii) Again, if gagbgc = gdgegf = g, say, with gk ∈ Gk for all k, we define
g′1 = g
agbgc and g′2 = g
dgegf . There is a natural map g′1 → g and g′2 → g, and
the situation is similar for other products and limits of products. It is easily
shown that this mapping is a homomorphism.
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Proof of Theorem 3 of Section 12.
(i) Consider the case where g′ = gagbgc with gk ∈ Gk. Then by the proof of
Theorem 1:
V (g′) = UaU(ga)U †aUbU(g
b)U †bUcU(g
c)U †c = U(g0ag
aga0g0bg
bgb0g0cg
cgc0)
= U(g0),
where g0 ∈ G0. The group element g0 is unique since the decomposition g′ =
gagbgc is unique for g′ ∈ G′. The proof is similar for other decompositions and
limits of these. By the construction, the mapping g′ → g0 is a homomorphism.
(ii) Assume that g0 = e and g′ 6= e′. Since U(g0)f˜(λ0(φ)) = f˜(λ0((g0)−1(φ))),
it follows from g0 = e that U(g0) = I on H . But then from (i), V (g′) = I, and
since V is a univariate representation, it follows that g′ = e′, contrary to the
assumption.
Proof of Proposition 4 of Section 12.
We have |a; k〉 = V (g′a)|0; k〉 = V (g′a)I(λ0(φ) = uk). Since G˜0 is transitive
on the range of λ0, there is a g˜0k ∈ G˜0 such that g˜0kuk = u0. Then |0; k〉 =
I(λa((g0k)−1φ) = u0) = U(g0k)I(λa(φ) = u0) = V (g0k)|0; 0〉 since V (g0k) =
U0U(g
0k)U †0 = U(g
0k). So the conclusion holds with g′(a, k) = g′ag
0k.
Proof of Theorem 4 of Section 12.
a) I prove the first statement; the second follows from the proof of the first
statement. Without loss of generality consider a system where each e-variable
λ takes only two values, say 0 and 1. Otherwise we can reduce to a degerate
system with just these two values: The statement |a; i〉 = |b; j〉 involves, in
addition to λa and λb, only the two values ui and uj . By considering a function
of the maximally accessible e-variable (cp. Section 13), we can take one specific
value equal to 1, and the others collected in 0. By doing this, we also arrange
that both ui and uj are 1, so we are comparing the state given by λ
a = 1 with
the state given by λb = 1.
By the definition, |a; 1〉 = |b; 1〉 can be written
V (g′a)UaI(λ
a(φ) = 1) = V (g′b)UbI(λ
b(φ) = 1)
for group elements g′a and g
′
b in G
′.
Use Theorem 3(i) and find g0a and g
0
b in G
0 such that V (g′a) = U(g
0
a) and
V (g′b) = U(g
0
b ). Therefore
U(g0a)U(g0a)I(λ
a(φ) = 1) = U(g0b )U(g0b)I(λ
b(φ) = 1);
I(λa(φ) = 1) = U(g0)I(λb(φ) = 1) = I(λb((g0)−1φ) = 1) = I((g˜0)−1λb(φ) = 1),
for g0 = (g0a)
−1(g0a)
−1g0bg0b ∈ G0.
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Both λa and λb take only the values 0 and 1. Since the set where λb(φ) = 1
can be transformed into the set where λa(φ) = 1, we must have λa = F (λb) for
some transformation F .
b) follows trivially from a).
***
It is not necessary to assume that V is an irreducible representation of the
groupG on the Hilbert spaceH . In general the Hilbert space can be decomposed
as H = H1 ⊕H2 ⊕ ..., where G has an irreducible representation on each of the
spaces Hi.
Not all vectors in H are necessarily possible state vectors. If A is an operator
corresponding to an absolutely conserved quantity like the charge or the total
spin of a particle, then linear combinations of eigenvectors of A with different
eigenvalues are not possible state vectors (superselection rules).
***
Proof of Theorem 6 of Section 15.
Let ǫ > 0 be given. Find first a > 0 so large that
∫ −a
−∞ |f(ξ)|2dξ,
∫∞
a
|f(ξ)|2dξ,∫ −a
−∞ |ξf(ξ)|2dξ,
∫∞
a
|ξf(ξ)|2dξ all are less than ǫ/4. Assume that n is so large
that ξn1 < −a and ξnkn > a. Since f is uniformly continuous on [−a, a] it
follows that
∫ a
−a |fn(ξ) − f(ξ)|2dξ → 0, so ‖fn − f‖ → 0. Since 1 −
∑
j Inj is
less than the indicator of (−∞,−a] plus the indicator of [a,∞), we have∫ |ξf(ξ)− ξf(ξ)∑j Inj(ξ)|2dξ < ǫ/2. Now
ξf(ξ)
∑
j
Inj(ξ)−Anfn(ξ) =
∑
j
(ξf(ξ)− ξnjfn(ξnj))Inj(ξ).
Hence using the uniform continuity of k(ξ) = ξf(ξ) on [−a, a], we get ∫ |ξf(ξ)−
Anfn(ξ)|2 → 0.
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APPENDIX 5
Proof of Busch’s Theorem for the finite-dimensional
case
The main point of the proof is to show that any generalized probability measure
on effects extends to a unique positive linear functional on the vector space of
all bounded linear Hermitian operators. This is done in steps.
1) It is trivial that µ(E) = nµ( 1
n
E) for all positive integers. It follows that
µ(pE) = pµ(E) for all rational numbers in [0, 1]. By approximating from below
and from above by rational numbers, this implies that µ(αE) = αµ(E) for all
real numbers α in [0, 1].
2) Let A be any positive bounded operator in H . Then there is a positive
number α such that 〈u|Au〉 ≤ α for all unit vectors u. Then E defined by
E = (1/α)A is an effect. Thus we can always write A = αE for an effect E.
Assume now that there are two effects E1 and E2 such that A = α1E1 = α2E2.
Assume without loss of generality that α2 > α1 > 0. Then µ(E2) =
α1
α2
µ(E1),
so α1µ(E1) = α2µ(E2). Therefore we can uniquely define µ(A) = α1µ(E1).
3) Let A and B be positive bounded operators. Take γ > 1 such that
1
γ
(A+B) is an effect. Then we can write µ(A+B) as γµ( 1
γ
(A+B)) = γµ( 1
γ
A)+
γµ( 1
γ
B) = µ(A) + µ(B).
4) Let C be an arbitrary bounded Hermitian operator. Assume that we have
two different decompositions C = A−B = A′ −B′ into a difference of positive
operators. Then A+B′ = A′+B implies µ(A) +µ(B′) = µ(A′) +µ(B). Hence
µ(A)−µ(B) = µ(A′)−µ(B′), so we can uniquely define µ(C) as µ(A)−µ(B). It
follows then easily from 3) that µ(C+D) = µ(C)+µ(D) for bounded Hermitian
operators.
5) This is extended directly to µ(C1+ ...+Cr) = µ(C1+ ...+Cr−1)+µ(Cr) =
µ(C1) + ...+ µ(Cr) for finite sums.
Let {|k〉; k = 1, ..., n} be a basis for H . Then for any Hermitian operator
C we can write C =
∑
i,j cij |i〉〈j|, where cij are complex numbers satisfying
cij∗ = cji. Define the operator σ by σij = µ(|i〉〈j|). Then σ is a positive
operator since 〈v|σv〉 = µ(|v〉〈v|) for any vector |v〉. Also
trace(σ) =
∑
i
σii =
∑
i
µ(|i〉〈i|) = µ(
∑
i
|i〉〈i|) = µ(I) = 1,
so σ is a density operator.
We have µ(C) =
∑
i,j σijcij = trace(σC), and this holds in particular when
C is an effect.
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APPENDIX 6
Propositional logic, probabilities and knowledge
Mathematical logic can be studies at many different levels. In this book I will
concentrate on propositional logic, and I will look at propositions as they are
formulated in ordinary, everyday language as primitive entities. For a more for-
mal approach to propositional logic including axioms and a separation between
syntax and semantics, see for instance Walicki (2012).
Propositions A and B can be connected: A ∨B means that A or B is true,
while A ∧ B means that both A and B are true, similarly for the connection
between more propositions. Also, ¬A means that A is not true. We let ⊥ denote
an impossible proposition, while ⊤ denotes a proposition which is aways true.
In ordinary texts in mathematical logic one usually works with a finite number
of propositions Ai. I will allow for an infinite, even uncountable number of
propositions, so that propositions of the form ’The rain tomorrow will amount
to less than or equal to x mm’ will be permitted for different x.
There is a close connection between propositional logic and set theory. The
translation is straightforward: ∨ translates into ∪, while ∧ translates into ∩;
¬A corresponds to Ac, while ⊥,⊤ correspond to ∅,Ω, assuming that all the sets
are subsets of Ω.
One can also define probabilities of propositions; in fact this is often done
in elementary probability texts. With the above translations, there is a close
connection to Kolmogorov’s axioms; see Subsection 2.1. For instance P (A1 ∨
A2 ∨ ...) = P (A1) + P (A2) + ... if the Ai’s satisfy Ai ∧ Aj = ⊥ for each pair.
Also P (¬A) = 1 − P (A). The rule P (A ∨ B) = P (A) + P (B) − P (A ∧ B) is
always true. It can be proved rigorously, but it can also be motivated by a Venn
diagram from the analogue with set theory.
Conditional probabilities can be defined by P (A|B) = P (A∧B)/P (B) when
P (B) > 0. In this book I need the more general notion of conditional proba-
bility given a σ-algebra of propositions B, and then it seems like we may need
to assume a little more structure. Assume thus that there exists a countable
collection of atomic propositions {Ci} such that all other propositions A can
be formed by combining the Ci’s by ∨’s, such that Ci ∧ Cj = ⊥ for pairs and
⊤ = ∨i Ci. This assumption simplifies the discussion. It is satisfied in the case
of a finite number of propositions closed under ∧ and ¬. In general we can think
of the Ci’s as formed by combining all propositions of interest through ∧’s. The
whole σ-algebra F is generated by the Ci’s.
Let now the sub-σ-algebra B be generated by {Bj}, partly a subset of {Ci}
and partly formed by taking ∨ of some Ci, such that Bj ∧Bk = ⊥ for pairs and
such that ⊤ = ∨j Bj . Then we can define
P (A|B) =
∑
j
P (A|Bj)1(Bj),
where 1(Bj) = 1 if Bj is true, 0 if it is not true. From this, P (A|B) is uniquely
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defined except on a set with probability 0. The analogue of the Radon-Nikodym
definition (1) is then ∫
B
P (A|B)dP = P (A ∧B)
for all B ∈ B. One of the open questions of this book is whether this formula
can be generalized in the context of propositional logic, and then can be taken
as a general definition of P (A|B).
In the probabilistic treatment I assumed in Section 5 that the observations
and the parameters could be defined on the same underlying probability space.
In the present setting I assume that all statements regarding conceptual vari-
ables can be given as compatible propositions. The concept of an epistemic pro-
cess is central in this book. Before any observations are made, all statements of
the form θ = u are unknown, where θ is the relevant epistemic variable. After
the observations are done, some proposition Ak : (θ = uk) is known to some
agent i in the simplest case. The statement that Ak is known to agent i may
be written KiAk, and the statement that agent j knows that i knows Ak may
be written KjKiAk. A survey of the formal propositional logic related to such
statements is given by Halpern (1995).
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